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1 
Jones v. Clinton: A Study in Politically Motivated 
Suits, Rule 11, and the First Amendment 
Carol Rice Andrews ∗ 
Yes, too much ink already has been spent discussing Paula 
Jones’s sexual harassment case against then-President Bill Clinton. 
However, precisely because the case is so well known, it is a good 
case to study the conflict between Rule 11 and the Petition Clause of 
the First Amendment. While political pundits, legal scholars, and the 
general public will never agree on the merits of the case, they cannot 
dispute that the case of Jones v. Clinton was (and remains) politically 
charged. Indeed, most observers would agree that at least some of 
the persons behind the suit—whether Paula Jones, her lawyers, or 
her financial backers—had political or other aims in bringing suit 
that were in addition to, or even in lieu of, obtaining relief for Ms. 
Jones’s alleged injuries. For this reason, Jones v. Clinton is a nearly 
perfect case for assessing the tension between Rule 11(b)(1) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which bars plaintiffs from bringing 
civil suit for “any improper purpose,”1 and the Petition Clause, 
 
 ∗  Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. I would like to 
thank Dean Ken Randall and the Law School Foundation for their support in all of my en-
deavors. In particular, I would like to thank the William H. Sadler fund for its generous finan-
cial assistance in my continuing study of court access under the Petition Clause. 
 1.  Under Rule 11, a litigant in federal court must certify that her civil pleading meets 
specified standards, and the court later may sanction the litigant or her lawyer if either has 
breached those standards. The certification provisions of paragraph (b) are the heart of Rule 
11: 
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, 
submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an at-
torney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowl-
edge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circum-
stances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by exist-
ing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if spe-
cifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable oppor-
tunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
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which guarantees persons the right to petition courts for redress of 
grievances.2 
In this article, I examine whether application of Rule 11(b)(1) to 
Paula Jones’s suit, to dismiss her claim or otherwise sanction Ms. 
Jones or her lawyers, would have violated her right of court access 
under the Petition Clause.3 The question is hypothetical, for the par-
ties in the actual case never pressed the issue of whether Ms. Jones’s 
filing of her suit violated Rule 11(b)(1), let alone whether such an 
application of the rule would offend the First Amendment. Yet, the 
question is not so speculative that it strains reality. The possibility of 
Rule 11(b)(1) sanctions was suggested by both the United States 
Supreme Court4 and Judge Susan Webber Wright, the District Court 
 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically 
so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 2.  The Petition Clause is the last protection of the First Amendment: “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to as-
semble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. 1 (em-
phasis added). The United States Supreme Court has held that “[t]he right of access to the 
courts is indeed but one aspect of the right to petition.” California Motor Transport Co. v. 
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). I further discuss California Motor Transport 
and the application of the Petition Clause to courts infra Part II.A. 
 3.  I focus my analysis on the Petition Clause, and not other clauses of the First 
Amendment, which would have protected some aspects of Ms. Jones’s activity during her liti-
gation. For example, Ms. Jones had a right of speech, but that right was not absolute during 
the litigation process. Due to the unique nature of courts and the trial process, the Court gives 
the government considerable latitude in controlling speech in court proceedings. See Seattle 
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32–33 n.18 (1984) (holding that “[a]lthough litigants 
do not ‘surrender their First Amendment rights at the courthouse door,’ those rights may be 
subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting” (citations omitted)). By contrast, the 
petition right addresses a unique step in the process, the point of initial access, and does not 
speak directly to the expression during the litigation. Ms. Jones also had a First Amendment 
right to associate with others, including financial backers, in connection with this suit. See gen-
erally Lester Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways Through the Legal Process: The Right of Univer-
sal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 595 (1973) (addressing the 
right to associate in litigation). In fact, the parties litigated this issue of association in connec-
tion with the President’s efforts to gain discovery of and from these persons. See infra notes 
258–59 (discussing the discovery debate). That debate, however, primarily addressed the rights 
of these other persons, outsiders to the litigation, and not the individual right of Ms. Jones to 
petition the court for redress. 
 4.  The Supreme Court addressed the issue in ruling that the President did not enjoy 
immunity from civil suits. After rejecting his plea for immunity, the Court commented on the 
argument that such a ruling would expose President Clinton and his successors to a barrage of 
frivolous suits brought to politically harass the President: 
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judge presiding over the Jones case.5 President Clinton echoed this 
theme when, in a nationally televised address, he attempted to justify 
his deposition testimony in the Jones case by arguing that the lawsuit 
had been “politically inspired.”6 The President’s plea to the Ameri-
can people was ironic, for if Ms. Jones in fact had improper motives 
in bringing suit, he could have at least attempted to rid himself of 
the case through use of Rule 11(b)(1). Under this strategy, President 
Clinton might have avoided all discovery in the case, and Ms. Jones, 
 
We are not persuaded that [this risk] is serious. Most frivolous and vexatious litiga-
tion is terminated at the pleading stage or on summary judgment, with little if any 
personal involvement by the defendant. Moreover, the availability of sanctions pro-
vides a significant deterrent to litigation directed at the President in his unofficial 
capacity for purposes of political gain or harassment. 
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708–09 (1997) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12, 56). In a footnote 
to this statement, the Court noted the various powers of a court to sanction litigants, including 
Rule 11(b)(1): “As Rule 11 indicates, sanctions may be appropriate where a claim is “presented 
for any improper purpose, such as to harass,” including any claim based on “allegations and 
other factual contentions [lacking] evidentiary support” or unlikely to prove well-grounded 
after reasonable investigation.” Id. at 709 n. 42 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1), (3)) (em-
phasis added). 
 5.  Judge Wright mentioned the potential use of Rule 11(b)(1) against Ms. Jones when 
she sanctioned President Clinton in April 1999, under Rule 37 (the discovery sanctions rule) 
for giving misleading deposition testimony in the case. She rejected the suggestion that the 
President’s behavior was justified because Ms. Jones’s case had been “politically inspired”: 
Certainly the President’s aggravation with what he considered a “politically inspired 
lawsuit” may well have been justified, although the Court makes no findings in that 
regard. Even assuming that to be so, however, his recourse for the filing of an im-
proper claim against him was to move for the imposition of sanctions against plain-
tiff . . . . The President could, for example, have moved for sanctions pursuant to 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 if, as he intimated in his address to the Nation, he was convinced 
that plaintiff’s lawsuit was presented for an improper purpose and included claims 
“based on ‘allegations’ and other factual contentions [lacking] evidentiary ‘support’ 
or unlikely to prove well-grounded after reasonable investigation.” . . . The Presi-
dent never challenged the legitimacy of plaintiff’s lawsuit by filing a motion pursuant 
to Rule 11, however, and it simply is not acceptable to employ deceptions and false-
hoods in an attempt to obstruct the judicial process, understandable as his aggrava-
tion with plaintiff’s lawsuit may have been. 
Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1130–31 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (citing Clinton v. Jones, 
520 U.S. 681, 708-09 (1997) and Rule 11(b)(1) and (b)(3)) (emphasis added). 
 6.  On August 17, 1998, the President in a televised address acknowledged that he had 
given misleading testimony in his deposition in the Jones case, in part because the case was a 
“politically inspired lawsuit.” See, e.g., id. at 1123 (quoting the President’s address). In addi-
tion, the President in his formal answer to the complaint, stated that Ms. Jones filed suit in 
order “to maximize plaintiff’s potential to derive economic benefit and simultaneously to harm 
the President.” The answer is on file with the author and is available online. See washington-
post.com: Jones v. Clinton Resources and Links (visited Feb. 3, 2001) <http://washington-
post.com/wp-srv/politics/special/pjones/docs/answer.htm.>. 
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not the President, would have been the subject of a sanctions in-
quiry. 
In assessing the potential use of Rule 11(b)(1) sanctions in the 
Jones case, I assume that at least some of Ms. Jones’s underlying 
claims7 had sufficient legal and factual bases to meet the “merit” 
standards of Rule 11(b)(2) and (b)(3).8 I acknowledge that this as-
sumption is subject to debate, but it is not far-fetched given the low 
threshold of merit required by Rule 11(b). To be sure, if Ms. Jones 
falsely stated facts in her complaint, she violated the factual merit 
standard of Rule 11(b)(3). But the true facts surrounding the inci-
dent in the hotel may never be known to us since it is essentially a 
“he said, she said” conflict. Assuming Ms. Jones’s version of the ho-
tel incident to be true, many would argue that her claims had some 
merit.9 The district court ultimately granted summary judgment 
 
 7.  Ms. Jones named both President Clinton and Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas 
state police officer, as defendants. In this article, I focus only on her several claims against the 
President. These claims are primarily Section 1983 claims that charged that the President sexu-
ally harassed her and thereby deprived Ms. Jones of her civil rights, both equal protection and 
due process. These claims were somewhat unusual, in that such allegations typically are pled 
under Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), but the limitation period for Title VII claims ex-
pired before Ms. Jones filed suit. Ms. Jones also asserted a Section 1985 conspiracy claim based 
on the same theories as her Section 1983 claims. Finally, she asserted state law claims for defa-
mation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Jones v. Clinton, 974 F. Supp. 712, 
715–18 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (summarizing claims). Ms. Jones later filed an amended complaint, 
which dropped her claims relating to reputation and which clarified her constitutional claims. 
See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 662 n.1 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (summarizing amended 
complaint). 
 8.  Paragraph (b)(2) of Rule 11 sets the legal standard for pleadings and motions: they 
must be “warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument” for change in the law. Para-
graph (b)(3) requires that factual assertions in a complaint have “evidentiary support” (or be 
identified as likely to have such support after reasonable opportunity for discovery). A fourth 
standard found in Rule 11(b)(4) addresses denials of factual assertions and thus has no applica-
tion to claims for relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2)–(4). See supra note 1 (reprinting Rule 11(b) 
in full). 
 9.  The merit of Ms. Jones’s suit has been the subject of on-going debate in the media. 
One particularly influential article, by Stuart Taylor, Jr., in the November 1996 issue of Ameri-
can Lawyer, argued that Ms. Jones’s evidence and case against President Clinton was “far 
stronger” than that charged by Anita Hill against Justice Clarence Thomas. Stuart Taylor, Jr., 
Her Case Against Clinton, AM. LAW. 57 (Nov. 1996). The article prompted further debate, 
including one online between Stuart Taylor and Professor Susan Estrich. See Principle, Politics, 
and Paula Jones, XIX AM. LAW. 49 (Feb. 1997) (reprinting excerpts of the online debate). In 
addition, some women’s groups and legal scholars opposed summary judgment in the case or 
at least cited Jones as an example in their arguments that courts inappropriately grant summary 
judgment in hostile work environment cases. See Amicus Brief of Women’s Equal Rights Legal 
Defense & Education Fund and of National Organization for Women, Dulles Area Chapter, 
Jones v. Clinton (8th Cir.) (No. 98-2161) (on file with author and available online); see also 
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against her because Ms. Jones did not have sufficient evidence of a 
legally cognizable injury,10 but the court earlier held that most of her 
claims had enough legal merit to withstand a motion to dismiss.11 
Failure to survive summary judgment alone does not render a com-
plaint so factually insufficient that it violates Rule 11(b)(3).12 In any 
event, I do not purport to argue the merits of her claims here. In-
stead, I assume sufficient merit to satisfy the other prongs of Rule 
11(b) so that the improper purpose clause of Rule 11(b)(1) is 
squarely at issue. 
The propriety of Rule 11(b)(1) improper purpose sanctions in 
the Jones case raises issues on two levels. The first is procedural and 
looks solely at the potential application of Rule 11, without consider-
ing any constitutional constraints. How, if at all, does Rule 11 apply 
to sanction a litigant who brings colorable claims for purposes other 
than, or in addition to, obtaining relief for injuries? This is by no 
means a settled question. On the one hand, it would seem illogical 
to bar plaintiffs from court if they have bad motives, because, as a 
practical matter, most plaintiffs bear some sort of ill feelings toward 
the defendant. Yet, the literal terms of the rule seem to preclude any 
and all ill motives. In Part I of this article, I examine these and other 
procedural issues and conclude that the President could have made a 
persuasive argument to sanction Ms. Jones and her lawyers under 
Rule 11(b)(1). Indeed, Rule 11 was a tool by which President Clin-
ton could have attempted to dismiss the suit, before the case pro-
 
Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 71 (1999) (noting Jones and arguing the federal courts misuse summary 
judgment in hostile environment cases); M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environ-
ments and Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 311 (1999) (refusing 
to comment on Jones v. Clinton because of its “uniquely political character” but arguing that 
district courts improperly grant summary judgment in cases such as Jones). 
 10.  See  Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 679 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (granting summary 
judgment on Jones’s remaining claims in amended complaint). 
 11.  See Jones v. Clinton, 974 F. Supp. 712, 732 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (dismissing Jones’s 
defamation and due process claims but holding that Jones’s remaining claims in original com-
plaint were viable causes of action). 
 12. The advisory committee for Rule 11 cautioned courts on this issue: 
That summary judgment is rendered against a party does not necessarily mean . . . 
that it held no evidentiary support for its position. On the other hand, if a party has 
evidence with respect to a contention that would suffice to defeat a motion for 
summary judgment based thereon, it would have sufficient “evidentiary support” for 
purposes of Rule 11. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1993). As to the meaning of and role of the 
“advisory committee” for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see infra note 43. 
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ceeded to the merits. If this were the case, the President could have 
avoided testifying about the Monica Lewinsky matter, which of 
course would have altered history. This is not to say that Judge 
Wright would have applied Rule 11 to dismiss Ms. Jones’s claims, 
only that Rule 11 left open this possibility. 
The procedural interpretation is not the end of the analysis. The 
second level of inquiry is constitutional. Assuming that the literal 
terms of Rule 11 would have allowed dismissal or other sanctions 
against Ms. Jones, would this application of Rule 11 have violated 
her right to petition courts under the First Amendment? In previous 
articles, I have examined in detail the history and scope of the right 
to petition courts.13 In Part II of this article, I recap that analysis and 
then focus specifically on whether Rule 11(b)(1) sanctions would 
have violated Ms. Jones’s right to petition courts. I conclude that the 
Petition Clause would have precluded any assessment of Rule 11 
sanctions14 against Ms. Jones that were based solely on her purpose 
in filing suit, whatever purpose that may have been. 
Finally, in Part III, I broaden my analysis and assess the future of 
Rule 11(b)(1) and of “political lawsuits.” I argue that the First 
Amendment allows motive to play only a minimal role in Rule 11. 
Rules of procedure cannot bar (or punish) access to court based 
solely on the motives of the plaintiff, as opposed to the merit of her 
 
 13.  In my first article, I generally assessed the bases for, scope of, and protections due 
the right to petition courts. Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition 
Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557 (1999) [hereinafter 
Access to Court]. In two additional articles, I analyzed whether the right to petition courts in-
validates or limits a variety of statutes and rules that purport to limit access to court based on 
the motive of the plaintiff. Carol Rice Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access: A First 
Amendment Challenge, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 665 (2000) (assessing a wide array of laws ranging 
from court rules to civil rights statutes) [hereinafter Motive Restrictions]; Carol Rice Andrews, 
The First Amendment Problem with the Motive Restrictions in the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
24 J. LEGAL PROF. 13 (2000) (focusing on the motive restrictions in the rules of professional 
rules of conduct for lawyers) [hereinafter Rules of Professional Conduct]. To varying degrees, all 
of this previous work addresses the issues in this article. This article refines and clarifies the 
analysis by focusing on one particular rule—Rule 11(b)(1)—and its interaction with the Peti-
tion Clause in a specific case—Jones v. Clinton. 
 14.  Other legal doctrines, such as the tort of abuse of process, also potentially would 
have allowed sanctions or damages against Ms. Jones based solely on her motive, but none so 
clearly isolate motive as does Rule 11(b)(1). Most other doctrines are ambiguous and arguably 
require a finding of lack of merit before they will permit an award of damages for filing a civil 
suit. Nevertheless, to the extent that they allow sanctions based solely on motive, they (for the 
most part) will violate the Petition Clause. See generally Motive Restrictions, supra note 13 (dis-
cussing other restrictions and analyzing their validity under the Petition Clause). 
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claim. As long as the underlying claims have some merit, courts must 
allow politically motivated lawsuits. These suits may test our collec-
tive patience, but preservation of First Amendment freedoms re-
quires patience. Just as we must tolerate a wide range of speech and 
people who speak out of spite, the First Amendment demands that 
we tolerate those who use our courts for similar aims. 
I. THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION: APPLYING RULE 11(b)(1) IN 
JONES V. CLINTON 
Even without considering the implications of the Petition 
Clause, the application of Rule 11(b)(1) in the Jones case raises a 
number of procedural uncertainties. The first concerns the actual 
motives of Ms. Jones and her lawyers and the level of proof necessary 
to find that they had some motive in bringing her claim other than 
obtaining relief. A second problem is determining whether these ul-
terior motives are “improper” within the meaning of Rule 11(b)(1). 
A third issue is whether such improper motive is alone a basis for 
sanctions under Rule 11, when the claim itself has some merit (as I 
assume for Ms. Jones’s claims here). In other words, if her claims 
met the legal basis standard of Rule 11(b)(2) and the factual support 
test of Rule 11(b)(3),15 could the court nevertheless sanction Ms. 
Jones for having an improper purpose? Finally, even assuming all of 
these hurdles are overcome, questions remain as to the appropriate 
sanction procedure. Could the court, for example, rely on Rule 
11(b)(1) to dismiss Ms. Jones’s complaint without ever reaching the 
merits of her claim? I explore each of these issues in the four parts 
below and conclude that the literal terms of Rule 11(b)(1) would 
have supported sanctions in the Jones case. The President could have 
filed a Rule 11 motion and argued in good faith that the court 
should dismiss Ms. Jones’s complaint in its entirety, based solely on 
her alleged improper motives. 
A. Determining the Motives of Ms. Jones and Her Legal Team 
We may never know the true motives of Ms. Jones and her law-
yers. The actual state of a person’s mind is exclusively within the 
knowledge of that person. But this does not mean that the President 
 
 15.  See supra notes 7–12 (discussing the Rule 11(b) merits standards as applied to Ms. 
Jones’s claims). 
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could not challenge Ms. Jones’s aims or that Judge Wright could not 
make findings as to Ms. Jones’s purposes. Courts and litigants regu-
larly assess motives. State of mind is a key element in most crimes, in 
many civil causes of action, and even under some other rules of civil 
procedure.16 
The question here is whether President Clinton had sufficient 
evidence on which to charge that Ms. Jones or her lawyers had at 
least some improper purposes, including political aims, that were in 
addition to, or in lieu of, her stated aim of redressing injury. The 
level of evidence needed to make this charge would itself be gov-
erned by Rule 11.17 Paragraph (b)(3) of Rule 11 required the Presi-
dent to have “evidentiary support” for any factual assertions regard-
ing Ms. Jones’s purposes or at least a reasonable belief that his 
assertions would be borne out through discovery.18 As I discuss with 
regard to Ms. Jones’s factual allegations,19 this is a low threshold. 
The President apparently had enough factual support to challenge 
Ms. Jones’s motive by the time he filed his answer in July 1997, for 
in his formal answer he charged that she had ill motives.20 The Presi-
dent certainly had a sufficient basis on which to believe that discov-
ery would further uncover evidence of her other motives.21 Indeed, 
information currently in the public record is more than the President 
 
 16.  Application of a few rules of civil procedure turn on the litigant’s state of mind. E.g., 
FED. R. CIV. P. 13(f) (providing for amendment to add a counterclaim where it was omitted 
due to “oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect”); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f) (providing for 
sanctions where a party or attorney fails to participate in “good faith” in the pre-trial confer-
ence); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(g) (same as to discovery plan); FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (setting forth 
grounds to set aside judgments, including “excusable neglect” and “fraud”). 
 17.  Rule 11, by its express terms, applies to “[e]very pleading, written motion, and 
other paper,” so its certification standards would apply to a Rule 11 motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 
11(a); see also FED. R. CIV. P. advisory committee’s note (1993) (noting that the filing of a 
Rule 11 “motion for sanctions is itself subject to the requirement of the rule and can lead to 
sanctions”). 
 18.  See supra note 1 (reprinting the Rule 11(b) factual merit standard). 
 19.  See supra notes 7–12. 
 20.  See supra note 6 (reprinting part of the President’s answer). 
 21.  Discovery is available to gather facts to support a Rule 11 motion, but federal rule-
makers urge courts to grant such discovery only in rare cases. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory 
committee’s note (1983) (noting that discovery should be conducted only by leave of court, 
and then only in extraordinary circumstances). In addition, Judge Wright could have held an 
evidentiary hearing to inquire further into these issues. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory com-
mittee’s note (1993) (noting that “[w]hether the matter should be decided solely on the basis 
of written submissions or should be scheduled for oral argument (or, indeed, for an evidentiary 
hearing), will depend on the circumstances”). 
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needed, under Rule 11, to charge that Ms. Jones and her lawyers 
had some “other” motives in bringing suit.22 
First, the President could have argued that Ms. Jones’s actual 
purpose in filing suit was to gain publicity and profit through book 
or movie deals. Ms. Jones’s sister and brother-in-law insist that this 
was her aim.23 Ms. Jones has denied this, but her avowed purpose in 
bringing suit calls her denial into question. Ms. Jones claims she filed 
suit to clear her good name following an adverse report in an ob-
scure magazine article in the American Spectator.24 Yet, the magazine 
article did not identify her by name and merely mentioned one inci-
dent between then-Governor Clinton and a “Paula.”25 It was Ms. 
Jones who, at a news conference that she initiated, publicly identified 
herself as the Paula in the article and brought the issue to the na-
tion’s attention.26 
This is not to say that a victim of inappropriate behavior by a fa-
mous person can never seek redress, lest she be labeled a publicity 
seeker, but it does call into question Ms. Jones’s purported aim of 
preserving her good name. Similarly situated parties have sought re-
 
 22.  Countless articles and books recount the events surrounding the Jones case and the 
related Lewinsky scandal and impeachment proceedings. In this article, I rely principally on 
contemporaneous news articles, actual papers filed in the Jones case and, as a general reference, 
the book by Jeffrey Toobin, which chronicles the Jones case and purports to quote key docu-
ments in the case. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, A VAST CONSPIRACY (1999). Many of the news arti-
cles and civil filings from the case are available (as of the publication date of this article) online 
at a variety of sites, including the Court TV website (www.courttv.com/legaldocs/ 
government/jones) and that of the Washington Post (http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/ 
politics/special/pjones). 
 23.  See Howard Schneider, Paula Jones and a House Divided, WASH. POST, June 9, 
1994, at C1. 
 24.  Ms. Jones’s first appearance before the national press was at a press conference in 
February 1994, a few months before she filed her complaint. At that conference, she an-
nounced the possibility of her lawsuit and stated her purposes behind the suit. See Michael 
Hedges, Woman Accuses Clinton of Sexual Advances in ‘91, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1994, at 
A1 (reporting that “Mrs. Jones said she was motivated to come forward now to clear her name 
and to attempt to resolve the emotional distress and publicity caused by the incident” with 
President Clinton in the Little Rock hotel room); Robert Shogan, Ex-Arkansas State Worker 
Says Clinton Harassed Her, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 12, 1994, at A21 (reporting that her 
lawyer said that Ms. Jones came forward due to a story in the January issue of American Spec-
tator and that she was “[t]rying to clear her name”). See generally TOOBIN, supra note 22, at 
ch. 1 (describing the events leading to Ms. Jones’s filing suit). 
 25.  See David Brock, Living With the Clintons, AM. SPECTATOR, Jan. 1994, at 18, 26. 
See TOOBIN, supra note 22, at 1–3, 11–14 (discussing article). 
 26.  Hedges, supra note 24, at A1 (noting that Ms. Jones at the February 1994 news 
conference identified herself as the woman identified as “Paula” in the American Spectator 
story); see also supra note 24 (discussing press conferences). 
1AND-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  9:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
10 
dress and affirmatively avoided such publicity. Other plaintiffs mak-
ing sensitive sexual allegations have concealed their identity through 
sealed records and even the use of fictitious names, such as “Jane 
Doe.”27 Women deponents in the Jones case itself were allowed such 
protection.28 Ms. Jones could have gone one step further if she did 
not want the notoriety inherent in suing the President of the United 
States. She could have named the President as a John Doe party and 
asked to proceed under seal.29 To be sure, such procedures would 
not have allowed Ms. Jones to publicly clear her name, but she at 
least could have gotten financial redress for the injury caused by the 
American Spectator reference to a “Paula” and for the President’s al-
leged work place harassment, without making “Paula Jones” a 
household word. 
The evidence also shows that Ms. Jones repeatedly considered 
the financial value of her suit, apart from any recovery she might ob-
tain in the case. Her contract with her first lawyer, Daniel Traylor, 
specifically contemplated future book and movie deals.30 In 1997, 
while the case was still pending, Ms. Jones’s public relations advisor 
tried to negotiate a book deal for Ms. Jones.31 Other of her lawyers 
reminded Ms. Jones of the financial value of her version of the details 
of her hotel encounter with the President.32 They warned that release 
 
 27.  The most famous example is the use of the “Jane Roe” pseudonym to protect the 
privacy of the pregnant woman who challenged abortion laws in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
120 n.4 (1973). The actual plaintiff in Roe v. Wade, Norma McCorvey, chose to reveal her 
name to gain publicity in 1984, as part of her campaign in support of abortion rights, and 
later, in 1995, as part of her “conversion” and arguments against abortion. See Steven 
Waldman & Ginny Carroll, Roe v. Roe, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1995, at 22. See generally Carol 
M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure to Recognize John Doe Parties, 57 
U. PITT. L. REV. 883, 908–13 (1996) (discussing use of fictitious name pleading to promote 
confidentiality). 
 28.  See Jones v. Clinton, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1054 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (releasing documents 
from under seal except that which relates to “Jane Doe” deponents). 
 29.  See Rice, supra note 27; see also Adam A. Milani, Doe v. Roe: An Argument for De-
fendant Anonymity when a Pseudonymous Plaintiff Alleges a Stigmatizing Intentional Tort, 41 
WAYNE L. REV. 1659 (1995) (advocating use of pseudonyms to protect defendants in notori-
ous cases). 
 30.  See TOOBIN, supra note 22, at 24–26 (reprinting excerpts of a contract between 
Jones and Traylor, including Ms. Jones’s agreement that Traylor could negotiate “all televi-
sion, radio or movie contracts” and that Traylor would receive one-third of Ms. Jones’s earn-
ings from such contracts). 
 31.  See TOOBIN, supra note 22, at 123–25. 
 32.  In two August 1997 letters to Ms. Jones, attorneys Gilbert Davis and Joseph Cam-
marata, who then represented Ms. Jones, urged her to accept the President’s offer of settle-
ment and noted that such settlement would best preserve the financial value of a book or 
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of her affidavit, which described distinguishing characteristics of the 
President’s genitalia, would lose most of its commercial value if re-
leased during discovery in the case.33 Ms. Jones reaped some of this 
outside value while the case was still pending. Non-charitable fund-
raising efforts helped her raise money that she spent on items only 
loosely related to litigation, such as clothing and hairstylists (as op-
posed to her attorney’s fees and other legal expenses).34 
Finally, and most importantly for this article, Ms. Jones, or at 
least her backers, apparently had political reasons for bringing or 
continuing suit against the President. From the very beginning, Ms. 
Jones sought out the advice of lawyers and other advisors who were 
associated with conservative, republican, or anti-Clinton causes. Be-
fore Ms. Jones filed suit, Daniel Traylor, her first lawyer, conferred 
with Cliff Jackson, who had a reputation in Arkansas for his contin-
ued and ardent opposition to Bill Clinton.35 Particularly telling is Ms. 
 
movie deal. These letters are on file with the author and are publicly available online at the 
Court TV website, supra note 22. As stated in the second letter, Davis and Cammarata with-
drew from representing Ms. Jones as a result of their disagreement over settlement. See Jones v. 
Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 2d 657, 662 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (noting substitution of counsel). 
 33.  Among other things, attorneys Davis and Cammarata in their first August 1997 let-
ter to Ms. Jones argued: 
You are in the best posture now to increase your financial gain from outside sources. 
If you decide not to settle, you will have to eventually turn over the Affidavit, and 
you will have to describe the distinguishing characteristics in discovery. It will be 
leaked by someone, as these things seem always to be, even if there is a protective 
order. There will be no value left to your revealing this information to any other en-
tity. Likewise, any interest in your writing a book, and appearances, after a settle-
ment for the full amount sued, but before the discovery has been pursued, will be 
very high. So much information is not in the public domain now but will be after 
discovery, and certainly after trial. 
Letter from Gilbert Davis & Joseph Cammarata, to Paula Jones (Aug. 19, 1997) (on file with 
author and available on the Court TV website, supra note 22). 
 34.  This fundraising created controversy even among groups supporting Jones’s cause, 
due to both the amounts kept by the fundraising firm, Bruce W. Eberle & Associates, and the 
amounts distributed to Ms. Jones personally. See Peter Baker & Amy Goldstein, Firm Raising 
Money For Jones But Funds Don’t Go To Lawyers, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1998, at A1. The 
President reported that his discovery showed that the money was used to pay for Ms. Jones’s 
“clothing, hair cuts, a personal computer, care and boarding for a pet, the towing of her car, 
and first and foremost, her public relations operation.” Jones v. Clinton, President Clinton’s 
Opposition to Motions of Paula Jones and Paula Jones Legal Defense Fund For Protective Or-
der, Oct. 30, 1997 (on file with author). 
 35.  See generally TOOBIN, supra note 22, at ch. 1 (describing Ms. Jones’s relationship 
with Traylor and Jackson and Jackson’s activities in opposition to the President). See also Clin-
ton Accused of Unwanted ‘91 Sexual Advance, CHI. TRIB. Feb. 12, 1994, at 16 (reporting that 
Cliff Jackson had “devoted the last two years to turning up embarrassing information from the 
president’s past”) [hereinafter Clinton Accused]; Shogan, supra note 24 (reporting that Cliff 
1AND-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  9:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
12 
Jones’s appearance with Mr. Jackson to announce her suit at a press 
conference organized by Mr. Jackson.36 They chose to hold the news 
conference at the annual meeting of the Conservative Political Ac-
tion Conference, which has been described as a gathering of “the 
hard core of the right wing of the Republican Party” and at which 
Cliff Jackson was scheduled to be a guest speaker concerning Presi-
dent Clinton.37 
As the case progressed, Ms. Jones attracted many more advisors 
and financial supporters from conservative political causes. Her pub-
lic relations advisor was Susan Carpenter-McMillan, who had long 
been associated with causes on the political right, such as anti-
abortion crusades.38 The “Rutherford Institute,” which actively pur-
sues conservative causes, agreed to pay Ms. Jones’s legal expenses 
(excluding attorney’s fees) and secured a law firm to represent her on 
a contingency fee basis.39 
I do not mean to say that Ms. Jones personally shared all of the 
views of her lawyers or advisors or that any of the motives were im-
proper. Nor is this listing of evidence an argument that her motives 
and associations may properly be used against her in assessing sanc-
tions. I address those issues in the remainder of this article. I list the 
evidence here as a starting point for envisioning the potential 
application of Rule 11(b)(1). The evidence sufficiently suggested 
that Ms. Jones and her lawyers had some aims behind the suit, 
 
Jackson was raising money for a “whistle-blower” fund for people who would corroborate sto-
ries against President Clinton). 
 36.  See Clinton Accused, supra note 35 (reporting that Cliff Jackson organized the news 
conference at the annual meeting of the Conservative Political Action Committee); Hedges, 
supra note 24 (reporting that “a large number of political activists [were] attending sessions of 
the Conservative Political Action Conference” at which Ms. Jones held her news conference); 
TOOBIN, supra note 22, at 26–28 (describing the press conference). 
 37.  TOOBIN, supra note 22, at 26; see also Shogan, supra note 24 (reporting that Cliff 
Jackson was “scheduled to participate in a panel discussion of Clinton and the media”). 
 38.  See generally TOOBIN, supra note 22 at 122–36 (describing Ms. Jones’s relationship 
with Carpenter-McMillian). See also Stephen J. Hedges et al., A Case of Hijacking: How Con-
servatives Made the Paula Jones Lawsuit Their Own, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 13, 1998 
(describing Ms. Jones’s relationship with Carpenter-McMillian and noting that Carpenter-
McMillian was a “conservative Los Angeles political activist” who had “campaigned against 
abortion” and “for the chemical castration of child molesters”). 
 39.  See Hedges et al., supra note 38 (reporting that the Rutherford Institute is “a group 
of Christian lawyers scattered throughout the country who do legal work to support school 
prayer, back anti-abortion activists, and promote other conservative causes”); TOOBIN, supra 
note 22, at 134–36 (describing the role of the Rutherford Institute); see also Jones v. Clinton, 
57 F. Supp. 2d 719 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (awarding the Rutherford Institute its costs associated 
with the President’s misleading deposition testimony). 
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Jones and her lawyers had some aims behind the suit, beyond receiv-
ing relief for her alleged injury. 
B. Defining “Improper” Purposes Within the Meaning of Rule 
11(b)(1) 
Having established that the President could make a plausible ar-
gument that Ms. Jones and her lawyers had motives in addition to 
vindication of her rights, the next question is whether these motives 
are improper under Rule 11(b)(1). The meaning of this seemingly 
simple clause is far from clear, as is demonstrated by an attempt to 
apply it to the Jones suit. I start with the text of the clause, which 
outlaws the filing of a complaint40 for “any improper purpose, such 
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the 
cost of litigation.”41 Ms. Jones seemingly did not have the last two 
listed bad intentions—to cause delay or to impose unnecessary finan-
cial burdens. That leaves harassment. This example might describe 
some of the supposed political purposes behind the suit—harassment 
of the President—but it does not fully capture the motives of gaining 
publicity for collateral financial reward and of generally advancing 
conservative political causes. 
We thus must step back and more broadly assess the meaning of 
Rule 11(b)(1). This assessment raises a number of issues. An initial 
question is whether the listing of improper purposes in Rule 
11(b)(1) is exclusive. If not, that leaves us with the task of determin-
ing what motives, in addition to the listed examples, are “improper.” 
This requires more than an evaluation of whether a single motive is 
good or bad. Jones, and likely most cases, are cases of mixed motive, 
where the plaintiff has both good and bad purposes. The assessment 
therefore must address the impact of the multiple motives and ask 
whether proper motives override improper ones. A final question 
raised by the Jones case is whether Rule 11(b)(1) addresses the mo-
tives of the plaintiff, her lawyers, or both. 
First, the fact that the motives do not precisely fit one of the 
enumerated examples of improper purpose does not save Ms. Jones’s 
 
 40.  Rule 11(b) also bars the presenting of other litigation papers for improper purpose 
and includes within this prohibition “the signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating.” See 
supra note 1. I further discuss the “later advocating” application of Rule 11, see infra Part 
II.C.3. 
 41.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(l); see supra note 1. 
1AND-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  9:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
14 
complaint. The list in Rule 11(b)(1) is not exclusive. The rule explic-
itly lists the three motives as examples through a “such as” clause, 
and the history of the rule shows that the rulemakers intended to bar 
all possible forms of abusive intentions. The original 1938 version of 
Rule 11, in the first compilation of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, barred only a single improper purpose, that of delay.42 In 
1983, federal rulemakers43 sought to strengthen the rule in order to 
provide a more effective deterrent against litigation abuse.44 They 




 42.  The 1938 version of Rule 11 provided in part: 
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the 
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good 
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not 
signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken 
as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been 
served. For a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate 
disciplinary action. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 308 U.S. 645, 676 (1938). 
 43.  In this article, I refer frequently to “rulemakers.” That body of persons has changed 
over time, as has the procedure for revising the rules. Congress has power under Article I to 
promulgate rules governing the procedure in federal courts. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 
460, 472 (1965) (stating that “the constitutional provision for a federal court system (aug-
mented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules 
governing the practice and pleading in those courts”). Congress has delegated most of its rule-
making authority to the Supreme Court, through the Rules Enabling Act. See 28 U.S.C.  
§ 2072 (1994). Congress also has set forth an elaborate system of committees and public hear-
ing by which the rules of procedure must be adopted or revised. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072-2077. 
In particular, the “advisory committee” makes recommendations as to rule revisions and re-
ports, through its official notes, on the history and meaning of those revisions. See id.  
§ 2077. I cite these advisory committee notes throughout this article in discussing the intent of 
the “rulemakers” and the meaning of the rule revisions. 
 44.  The advisory committee notes to the 1983 amendments state the aims of Rule 11 
and its revision: 
Since its original promulgation, Rule 11 has provided for the striking of pleadings 
and the imposition of disciplinary sanctions to check abuses in the signing of plead-
ings . . . . 
Experience shows that in practice Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring 
abuses. . . . 
. . . Greater attention by the district courts to pleading and motion abuses and the 
imposition of sanctions when appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tac-
tics and help to streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or de-
fenses. 
FED. R. CIV P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1983) (repealed 1993). 
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clause (to its current form),45 in order to clarify that the rule forbade 
abusive intentions “other than delay.”46 
What are these other “improper” intentions? The only additional 
guidance in the official comments is the advisory committee’s cita-
tion to the Second Circuit decision in Browning Debenture Holders’ 
Committee v. DASA Corp.47 In DASA, holders of convertible deben-
ture bonds sued the issuing corporation, the bank trustee, and its ac-
countant for fraud arising from an allegedly false proxy statement.48 
 
 45.  The 1983 version of Rule 11 provided: 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall 
be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address 
shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, 
motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically 
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affida-
vit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be over-
come by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborat-
ing circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the 
best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is 
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed 
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, 
it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the at-
tention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose 
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanc-
tion, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of 
the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or 
other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983). The most significant change to the rule in 1983 was the addition 
of the “reasonable inquiry” standard for the factual and legal merit of the pleading. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1983). (“The new language stresses the need for some 
prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the 
rule. The standard is one of reasonableness under the circumstances. This standard is more 
stringent than the original good-faith formula and thus it is expected that a greater range of 
circumstances will trigger its violation.”). I further discuss the 1983 revision infra at notes 48–
65 and accompanying text. 
 46.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1983). The 1983 advisory commit-
tee’s only comment as to improper purpose was the following: “The expanded nature of the 
lawyer’s certification in the fifth sentence of amended Rule 11 recognizes that the litigation 
process may be abused for purposes other than delay.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory commit-
tee’s note (1983) (citing Browning Debenture Holders’ Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 
1078 (2d Cir. 1977)). I discuss the DASA case infra at notes 48–56 and 110–115 and ac-
companying text. 
 47.  560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 48.  See id. at 1087–88. 
1AND-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  9:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
16 
After entering judgment for the defendants, the trial court used its 
inherent power (not Rule 11) to sanction the plaintiffs for their bad 
faith in bringing suit and in filing subsequent motions.49 The trial 
court held that the plaintiffs had the collateral purpose of coercing 
the defendant to lower the conversion price of the bonds.50 The Sec-
ond Circuit reversed the award of sanctions as to the filing of the 
complaint, primarily on the ground that the complaint stated at least 
a colorable claim.51 This was consistent with the Second Circuit 
standard for issuing sanctions under the court’s inherent power: such 
sanctions require that the court find both that the paper is frivolous 
and that it was made for an improper purpose.52 However, the Sec-
ond Circuit then suggested, in dictum, that the plaintiffs’ purpose of 
obtaining a collateral advantage was not improper, at least as to this 
colorable complaint.53 
Despite this suggestion, I believe that we can fairly infer that the 
advisory committee considered this collateral aim improper under 
Rule 11. The committee cited DASA immediately after noting that 
litigation can be abused for purposes “other than delay,”54 and the 
only abusive purpose found in DASA was the attempt to gain an 
outside advantage. Moreover, the Second Circuit upheld sanctions 
for plaintiffs’ subsequent filing of frivolous motions.55 Because the 
Second Circuit requires a finding of improper purpose before it will 
sanction under its inherent powers, the court must have concluded  
 
 
 49.  The trial court entered judgment for defendants, after trial on one count and sum-
mary judgment on all other counts, and awarded attorneys’ fees to defendants. Id. 
 50.  See id. at 1088 (noting that “what appellants really sought was a further reduction in 
the conversion price”). 
 51. See id. 
 52.  See id. (stating the two-part test for awarding sanctions under its inherent power: 
“the claim is entirely without color and has been asserted wantonly, for purposes of harassment 
or delay, or for other improper reasons” (emphasis added)). 
 53.  See id. (“The fact that the present suit was instituted to force a further reduction in 
the conversion price does not necessarily mean that it was brought in bad faith.”) This state-
ment is somewhat ambiguous, for some courts use “bad faith” as a short-hand reference to a 
pleading that is both frivolous and filed for improper purposes. See Cohen v. Virginia Elec. & 
Power Co., 788 F.2d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that an attorney who filed a motion to 
amend “did not act in bad faith in filing the pleading, because there was a legal basis for the 
claims he asserted” but affirming district court’s finding that the attorney acted for an im-
proper purpose). See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text (discussing Cohen). 
 54.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1983); see also supra note 46. 
 55. See DASA, 560 F.2d at 1088–89. 
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that the plaintiffs had an improper aim and that was likely the plain-
tiffs’ collateral bargaining aim, as found by the trial court.56 
Thus, the rulemakers gave the three motives in the rule itself and 
perhaps this collateral motive as examples of improper purpose. They 
did not give any more guidance as to what otherwise constitutes an 
improper motive. The case law following the 1983 adoption of the 
improper purpose clause offers little additional insight. The first 
problem is the scarcity of case law on the issue. Few cases address 
improper purpose, and those that do usually involve litigation papers 
that are patently frivolous. In these cases, the courts tend to focus on 
the frivolous pleading and then simply assume from the baselessness 
of the pleading that the litigant had an improper motive, usually a 
motive of harassment. Litigants rarely press the issue of the other’s 
motive in litigation. This is perhaps due to the fact that a defendant 
can more easily determine whether a complaint is frivolous than 
whether the plaintiff has an improper state of mind. The typical 
plaintiff does not volunteer or otherwise discuss her actual motives. 
Nevertheless, in a very few cases, the courts have assessed the 
litigant’s purpose, either through circumstantial evidence or through 
a litigant’s rare admission of her purpose. For the most part, these 
cases show that the assessment of motive is done on a case-by-case 
basis with very little consistency.57 A particular motive might seem 
improper to a court in one case but not in another. Courts, for ex-
ample, have found improper the plaintiff’s hatred for the defendant, 
when coupled with an intent to “harass and badger” the defendant58 
or to cause him to lose his job.59 Courts also have condemned collat-
eral purposes such as the desire to gain publicity60 and the intention 
 
 56.  The Second Circuit hinted that these motions might have been filed for delay or 
harassment purposes, but the only specific purpose found by the trial court was the desire to 
lower the conversion price. See id. 
 57.  See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE  § 
13(A)(l) (3d ed. 1994) (surveying purposes found to be improper). 
 58.  Nielson v. Hart, No. 93-1237-CV-W-1, 1995 WL 901297, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 
5, 1995) (holding that the plaintiff-employees’ ERISA claims against TWA “was a frivolous 
case pursued in bad faith and for an improper purpose” and noting that “[t]he only common 
thread among the four [p]laintiffs seems to be their antagonism toward TWA” and that plain-
tiffs pursued this claim “for no purpose other than to harass and badger TWA”). 
 59.  See Ballentine v. Taco Bell Corp., 135 F.R.D. 117 (E.D.N.C. 1991). I discuss 
Ballentine in more detail infra at notes 80–85 and 123–24. 
 60.  See Bryant v. Brooklyn Barbeque Corp., 130 F.R.D. 665, 670 (W.D. Mo. 1990), 
aff’d, 932 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that plaintiff is subject to sanctions for filing for 
an improper purpose because “the complaint was filed solely to attract publicity to plaintiff’s 
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to gather evidence for or intimidate witnesses in other cases.61 Yet, 
the Second Circuit held in one case that the plaintiffs’ intention to 
seek publicity and put pressure on the defendants to drop other 
claims was not an improper purpose under Rule 11(b)(1).62 
Courts have also taken mixed views regarding the political aims 
of the plaintiff. Some courts condemn use of the courts to pursue 
political gain while others seem to bend over backwards to accom-
modate such motives. For example, in two taxpayer cases, both of 
which the courts deemed to state only frivolous claims, one court 
sanctioned the plaintiff’s use of the courts to pursue an anti-tax “ti-
rade”63 while the other refused to condemn the plaintiff’s use of the 
courts as a forum for his “political and religious views” about the tax 
laws.64 The Ninth Circuit has held that even a “transparent political 
interest” is not necessarily improper under Rule 11 and that courts 
 
claims and to harass defendants”). I discuss Bryant in more detail infra at notes 126–30. 
 61.  See Davisson v. Engelke, No. CO-97-265, 1997 WL 585818, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Sept. 23, 1997) (interpreting Minnesota Rule 11 improper purpose clause and holding that 
filing a civil suit “to engage in discovery to circumvent the limited discovery allowed in crimi-
nal matters or to intimidate state witnesses are improper purposes under Rule 11”). But see 
Storage Technology Partners II v. Storage Technology Corp., 117 F.R.D. 675 (D. Colo. 
1987) (holding that plaintiff’s aim to take advantage of more liberal federal discovery was not 
improper under Federal Rule 11). 
 62.  See Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 1995). Sussman was a defen-
dant in a suit in an Israeli court concerning a failed bank operated by Sussman in Israel. Suss-
man then threatened his own suit in New York and warned of negative publicity and damage 
to Israeli investment in the United States. When the Israeli plaintiffs refused to drop their suit, 
Sussman (and another) sued in New York. The trial court dismissed, based on forum non con-
veniens, and later sanctioned Sussman’s attorneys under Rule 11(b)(1) for filing suit for the 
improper purpose of pressuring the Israeli government, through adverse publicity, to drop the 
Israeli suit. See Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 154 F.R.D. 68, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The Second 
Circuit reversed. As to the characterization of the motive, the Second Circuit said that the aim 
of negative publicity was not improper given that the claim itself was not frivolous: 
It is hardly unusual for a would-be plaintiff to seek to resolve disputes without re-
sorting to legal action; prelitigation letters airing grievances and threatening litiga-
tion if they are not resolved are commonplace, sometimes with salutary results, and 
do not suffice to show an improper purpose if nonfrivolous litigation is eventually 
commenced. 
Sussman, 56 F.3d at 459; see also infra note 94 (discussing other Rule 11 issues in Sussman). 
 63.  Allnutt v. Friedman, Bank, No. 92-5-7401-JS, 1995 WL 222067, at *6 (D. Md. 
Apr. 10, 1995) (holding that taxpayer’s bankruptcy challenge was frivolous and that his pur-
poses were improper, including that of “continuing his tirade against the government’s author-
ity to impose an income tax on him”). 
 64.  Auen v. Sweeney, 109 F.R.D. 678, 680 (N.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that taxpayer 
complaint against IRS agents was frivolous but refusing to assess an additional penalty for his 
purpose in “using the court as a forum for his political and religious views about what the law 
should be”). 
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generally must tolerate such purposes.65 However, in a suit against 
President Reagan arising out of the bombing of Libya, the District of 
Columbia Circuit held that federal courts were not proper forums for 
“protests” and that a political motive would not save a plaintiff from 
sanctions where his claim is frivolous.66 
One circuit, the Fourth Circuit, stands out in its attempt to de-
fine improper purpose. The Fourth Circuit’s first effort, in Cohen v. 
Virginia Electric & Power Co.,67 was not particularly instructive. In 
Cohen, the trial court assessed Rule 11 improper purpose sanctions 
against a plaintiff and his counsel because they filed a motion to 
amend their complaint with the intention of determining whether 
the defendant would oppose the new claims (and with the intention 
of withdrawing the new claims if defendant opposed them).68 The 
trial court found this purpose to be improper even though the aim of 
testing the resolve of an opposing party seemingly is a common liti-
 
 65.  In Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986), the plaintiffs filed 
suit under the Voting Rights Act and claimed that recall election materials violated the rights 
of Spanish-speaking people to read the materials. The trial court held that the claim was frivo-
lous and sanctioned the plaintiffs, in part for bringing the suit for the improper purpose of 
gaining political advantage for the plaintiffs’ favored candidate. The Ninth Circuit reversed on 
several grounds, including the finding that this political aim was improper. See infra note 98 
(discussing the Zaldivar court’s other ground for reversing sanctions). The Ninth Circuit did 
not approve of this motive. See Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 834 (“In this case, the law was deployed 
as a weapon in a controversy for which it was ill-suited: a purely political dispute”). However, 
the court held that such purpose was not improper within the meaning of Rule 11: 
We may assume that plaintiffs were at least as concerned with defeating the recall at-
tempt against Councilman Snyder as with the right of Spanish-speaking voters to 
read election materials in Spanish, and filed their claim intending to achieve a politi-
cal purpose. But the political inspiration for the federal law suit does not necessarily 
mean that the action is “improper” within the meaning of Rule 11. Much of the re-
districting litigation under the Equal Protection Clause has been inspired by those 
with a transparent political interest. Whatever the true purpose of the litigant, the 
vindication of voting rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be 
deemed impermissible harassment. 
Id. 
 66.  See  Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Here, the plaintiffs argued 
their political purpose saved them from sanctions. The trial court agreed and ruled that al-
though the claims were frivolous, it would not enter sanctions because the suit was brought as 
a political protest. See Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 322 (D.D.C. 1988). The court of 
appeals reversed: “We do not conceive it a proper function of a federal court to serve as a fo-
rum for ‘protests,’ to the detriment of parties with serious disputes waiting to be heard.” Sal-
tany, 886 F.2d at 440. 
 67.  788 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 68.  See id. at 249. 
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gation goal and even though the proposed new claims had merit.69 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, simply by stating that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding improper purpose and without giv-
ing any explanation as to what distinguished this motive from proper 
litigation aims.70 
Four years later, in 1990, the Fourth Circuit in In re Kunstler,71 
set a more formal standard for assessing improper purpose and also 
tackled the problem of the mixed motive case. The case was a civil 
rights suit in which the trial court sanctioned William Kunstler and 
other attorneys because, as the court found, they filed suit in order 
to gain publicity, embarrass government officials, and obtain evi-
dence for use in a criminal case.72 In affirming the sanctions, the 
Fourth Circuit stated that the test under Rule 11 should be whether 
the plaintiff sincerely intended to vindicate rights: 
The factors mentioned in [Rule 11(b)(1)] are not exclusive. If a 
complaint is not filed to vindicate rights in court, its purpose must 
be improper. However, if a complaint is filed to vindicate rights in 
court, and also for some other purpose, a court should not sanction 
counsel for an intention that the court does not approve, so long as 
the added purpose is not undertaken in bad faith and is not so ex-
cessive as to eliminate a proper purpose. Thus, the purpose to vin-
dicate rights in court must be central and sincere.73 
The court also instructed that, in assessing whether the plaintiff had 
this sincere central purpose of vindicating his rights, the trial court  
 
 
 69.  See id. (noting that “there was a legal basis for the claims” asserted in the amended 
complaint). 
 70.  See id. (finding no abuse of discretion that party and attorney acted for an improper 
purpose in violation of Rule 11 where they filed “a motion that they had no intention of 
pursuing if it were opposed”). 
 71.  914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 72.  See id. at 519. The complaint grew out of events following an incident in which two 
of the plaintiffs staged an armed takeover of a North Carolina newspaper to protest corruption 
in local law enforcement. See id. at 510–11. The suit charged local government officials of civil 
rights violations in the subsequent criminal prosecution of the two plaintiffs and general perse-
cution of their associates, who also joined as plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed their civil suit on the 
one-year anniversary of the takeover, during the pendency of the criminal proceedings, and 
held a press conference to announce the suit. After the two plaintiffs pled guilty in the criminal 
cases, all of the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), and the defendants moved for sanctions under Rule 11. See id. at 
512. 
 73.  Id. at 518. 
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must judge the plaintiff’s intent objectively, from the point of view 
of the plaintiff and not from the defendant’s perspective.74 
The Fourth Circuit found that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding that Mr. Kunstler and the other lawyers did not 
have the central purpose of vindicating the plaintiffs’ rights.75 That 
lack of proper purpose alone constituted a violation of Rule 
11(b)(1).76 However, the Fourth Circuit warned that some of the 
purposes listed by the district court would not by themselves support 
sanctions: 
At least some of these motives would not warrant sanctions under 
the improper purpose portion of Rule 11, if [plaintiffs’] central 
purpose in bringing suit had been to vindicate rights of the plain-
tiffs. Holding a press conference to announce a lawsuit, while per-
haps in poor taste, is not grounds for a Rule 11 sanction, nor is a 
subjective hope by a plaintiff that a lawsuit will embarrass or upset a 
defendant, so long as there is evidence that a plaintiff’s central pur-
pose in filing a complaint was to vindicate rights through the judi-
cial process.77 
This language seems somewhat at odds with the Fourth Circuit’s 
condemnation of the seemingly common litigation goal in Cohen, 
but the court cited Cohen with approval78 and also stated that it was 
not error for the trial court in Kunstler to consider these other pur-
poses, once it found an absence of a central purpose to vindicate 
rights.79 
 
 74.  See id. at 518–19. The court explained: 
An opponent in a lawsuit, particularly a defendant, will nearly always subjectively feel 
that the lawsuit was brought for less than proper purposes; plaintiffs and defendants 
are not often on congenial terms at the time a suit is brought. However, a court 
must ignore evidence of the injured party’s subjective beliefs and look for more ob-
jective evidence of the signer’s purpose. 
Id. at 519. 
 75.  See id. at 519–20. 
 76.  The court, however, found that sanctions also were warranted under the other 
clauses of Rule 11(b) and therefore did not decide whether this purpose would be sufficient to 
warrant sanctions had the claim been meritorious. See id. at 518 (noting that because the com-
plaint was “not well grounded in law or in fact” the court “need not decide whether a com-
plaint which is well grounded in law and in fact can be sanctioned solely on the basis that it was 
filed for an improper purpose”). I further discuss this issue under Rule 11 infra Part I.C and 
the Fourth Circuit’s position in particular infra note 122. 
 77.  In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 520 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 78.  See id. at 518. 
 79.  Id. (noting that because plaintiffs had no proper purpose for filing suit, the district 
1AND-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  9:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
22 
Ballentine v. Taco Bell Corp.80 is one of the few cases in the 
Fourth Circuit to apply the Kunstler test. There, the manager of a 
Taco Bell restaurant, Stanley Ballentine, sued Taco Bell Corporation 
and his supervisor, Denny Koenig, for sexual discrimination in staff-
ing procedures.81 The trial court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants and held an evidentiary hearing on Rule 11 sanctions. 
The court found that Ballentine named Koenig as a defendant in part 
to harass Koenig and to cause Koenig to lose his job.82 The court 
held that this intent warranted sanctions under Rule 11 even though 
Ballentine’s claim was arguably colorable and even though Ballentine 
also had the legitimate motive of wanting to remedy the alleged dis-
crimination.83 The trial court initially awarded sanctions without 
considering the impact of Kunstler.84 After learning of the new Kun-
stler test, the trial court reconsidered the motives of Ballentine and 
affirmed the sanctions because Ballentine’s improper aims out-
weighed the proper ones.85 Thus, the Fourth Circuit test does not 
preclude sanctions merely because the plaintiff may have a proper 
motive in filing suit but instead asks whether that proper motive was 
the central aim behind the claim. 
The Fourth Circuit approach has appeal as a restrained interpre-
tation of Rule 11(b)(1) and as a solution to the mixed motive case,86 
 
court’s “consideration of other possible motives for the suit . . . was proper”). 
 80.  135 F.R.D. 117 (E.D.N.C. 1991). 
 81.  He alleged that the restaurant gave preferential work schedules to female managers 
and that the restaurant fired him in retaliation for his filing of a complaint with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission. See id. at 119–20. 
 82.  See id. at 120–21. 
 83.  See id. at 122 (finding that “Ballentine had a dual motive in filing the lawsuit: the 
legitimate purpose of seeking relief for the loss of his job and the improper purpose of harass-
ing Koenig”). 
 84.  The trial court’s initial sanction order followed Kunstler by only one month. See id. 
at 124–25. 
 85.  In its supplemental opinion, the trial court found: 
Although Ballentine, at the time of the filing of the complaint, felt that he had a le-
gitimate claim, he also filed the suit in bad faith to harass and intimidate Koenig and 
in an attempt to make Koenig lose his job with Taco Bell. Ballentine’s central pur-
pose in adding Koenig to the lawsuit was to harass him. Ballentine’s purpose in 
naming Koenig to the lawsuit was so excessive as to eliminate any proper purpose. 
Ballentine’s purpose of vindicating rights in court was not central and sincere. 
Id. at 125. 
 86.  See JOSEPH, supra note 57, § 13(B)(2) (endorsing Kunstler test for cases of mixed 
purposes: “if a complaint is filed to vindicate rights in court, and also for some other purpose, a 
court should not sanction counsel”). 
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but it may not be correct. The text and history of Rule 11 suggest 
that the rule prohibits any bad motive of the plaintiff, regardless of 
her other motives. Rule 11 bars pleadings filed for “any improper 
purpose.” Unlike a few other rules of its kind, Federal Rule 11 does 
not qualify what role that purpose should take.87 Indeed, federal 
rulemakers, in amending Rule 11 in 1983, considered but rejected 
adding the word “primarily” to the improper purpose clause. A pro-
posed draft required that a litigant certify that the pleading “is not 
interposed primarily for any improper purpose,” but the advisory 
committee changed the final language and deleted “primarily.”88 The 
committee reported that it made the change “to eliminate any ambi-
guity arising out of the use of the word ‘primarily,’”89 and it likely 
acted in response to earlier criticism that the term “primarily” would 
improperly immunize motions filed partly to harass or delay.90 
In 1993, rulemakers made modest changes to the improper pur-
pose clause: it now states that the litigation paper “is not being pre-
sented” (rather than the 1983 language of “not interposed”) for any 
improper purpose.91 They, however, did not change the description 
or example of improper purpose. Nor did they add any clarification 
in the comments about Kunstler and the impact of a proper purpose. 
Thus, Rule 11 leaves open the possibility that the presence of any 
improper motive renders a plaintiff in violation of the rule. 
Finally, this leaves the question of whose abusive intentions are 
relevant. Some of the alleged ill motives in Jones, especially the po-
litical aims, are more easily attributed to the lawyers than to Ms. 
Jones herself. The introductory clause to Rule 11(b) expressly applies 
the certification standard to the person who signs the pleading—
usually the lawyer—but the improper purpose clause of Rule 
11(b)(1) does not say whose purpose the signing lawyer must certify. 
 
 87.  See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7(b)(1) (West 1998) (requiring certification that 
the paper is not filed “primarily” for an “improper purpose”). 
 88.  See Letter from Walter R. Mansfield, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 
to Judge Edward T. Gignoux, Chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (Mar. 9, 1982), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 190, 191 (1983). 
 89.  Id. 
 90. Federal rulemakers released the draft of the rule for public comment in June 1981. 
See id. In response, critics charged, among other things, that the “primarily” clause was too 
limiting and would not have barred papers filed for mixed motives. See Comments Re: Rule 7 
(and 11) (1981), microformed on CIS No. 7920-05 (Congressional Information Service). 
 91.  Compare supra note 1 (reprinting current version of Rule 11), with supra note 45 
(reprinting 1983 version of Rule 11). 
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The rule says only that the signing person, whether “an attorney or 
unrepresented party,” must certify that the pleading “is not being 
presented for any improper purpose.”92 One may ask who “presents” 
a complaint—the plaintiff or the attorney who files the complaint for 
her? The likely answer is both. A complaint is “presented” for an im-
proper purpose regardless of whether the purpose is of the signing 
attorney or of his client. 
This seems to be the view taken by the courts. The few courts 
that have analyzed purpose under Rule 11 have looked at the pur-
pose of both the attorney and plaintiff. Indeed, courts rarely make 
any distinction between the motives of a client and her lawyer. For 
example, in Kunstler, the Fourth Circuit affirmed sanctions against 
the plaintiff’s counsel, in part based on improper purpose, without 
addressing whether the plaintiffs, their counsel, or both, had this in-
tention.93 A court might choose to not assess sanctions against a 
plaintiff, if the only violation were her lawyer’s bad purposes,94 but 
sanctions are a separate question that I address in Part I.D below. 
The point here is that Judge Wright could have read Rule 11 as bar-
ring any improper motive, whether a motive of Ms. Jones or of her 
lawyers, and the case law suggests that at least some of their motives 
were improper under Rule 11(b)(1). 
Perhaps the best indication that the motives in Jones might be 
“improper” within the meaning of Rule 11 came from Judge Wright 
and the Supreme Court in this very case. Both intimated that politi-
cal motivation would be an improper purpose under Rule 11(b)(1).95 
They reserved question on whether the suit was in fact so motivated, 
 
 92.  See supra note 1 (reprinting Rule 11(b)). 
 93.  See supra notes 71–79 (discussing Kunstler). The trial court in assessing the sanc-
tions based the finding of improper purpose in large part on the actions of counsel (e.g., writ-
ing a letter to a judge in a related criminal case to announce the filing of the suit) but the pur-
pose that the trial court found improper (e.g., attempt to obtain leverage in the criminal case) 
likely belonged to plaintiffs and attorneys alike. See Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt, 132 
F.R.D. 650 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (lower court opinion in Kunstler). 
 94.  In Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 154 F.R.D. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), the trial court sanc-
tioned the plaintiffs’ lawyer but refused to sanction the plaintiffs even though the plaintiffs may 
have shared their purpose: plaintiffs “could share counsel’s strategic objective without perceiv-
ing that the strategy was improper, as counsel were bound to do with the benefit of profes-
sional standards.” Id. at 71. The Second Circuit reversed the award of sanctions on other 
grounds. See Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 1995); see also supra note 62 
(discussing the Second Circuit’s decision in Sussman). 
 95.  See supra notes 4–5 (reprinting the Supreme Court’s and Judge Wright’s statements 
concerning Rule 11 sanctions). 
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but they strongly suggested that if it were, the suit would be im-
proper within the meaning of Rule 11. Judge Wright’s statement was 
particularly telling. She did not speak of Ms. Jones’s personal motives 
but instead of the general inspiration behind the suit. Judge Wright 
advised the President that if the suit were in fact “politically inspired” 
as the President claimed, then his proper recourse was to file a Rule 
11 motion to challenge the complaint.96 Thus, the possibility was 
very real that Judge Wright could have found the motives to be im-
proper under Rule 11(b)(1). 
C. Assessing Improper Purpose Behind Meritorious Claims 
The more difficult procedural question is not whether the aims 
in Jones were improper under Rule 11(b)(l), but instead whether this 
bad purpose was by itself a violation of Rule 11. If the answer is yes, 
Rule 11(b)(1) would have been particularly advantageous to Presi-
dent Clinton because it would have focused the court’s inquiry solely 
on Ms. Jones’s motives and not the merits of her claims. The rule 
appears to say that motive alone can trigger sanctions. In fact, Rule 
11 seemingly is straight-forward on this issue. The improper purpose 
clause of Rule 11 paragraph (b)(1) and the merit standards of para-
graphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) are joined with the conjunction “and.”97 
The plaintiff must certify each of these standards, so violation of any 
one should be sufficient to subject the plaintiff to sanctions. 
Some courts have refused to follow the literal letter of Rule 
11(b)(1). They hold that the filing of a colorable complaint (as op-
posed to other litigation papers) is not sanctionable under Rule 11, 
no matter what the plaintiff’s purpose. The Ninth Circuit has led the 
circuits in this restrictive interpretation of Rule 11.98 In a 1991 en 
 
 96. See supra note 5. 
 97.  See supra note 1 (reprinting Rule 11(b)). 
 98.  The Ninth Circuit first expressed this view in Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 
F.2d 823, 831–34 (9th Cir. 1986). See supra note 65 (discussing the Zaldivar court’s charac-
terization of the plaintiff’s political motive). There, the court acknowledged that the text of 
Rule 11 was to the contrary, but it nonetheless refused to apply the improper purpose clause to 
a non-frivolous complaint: 
A more difficult question of interpretation exists as to whether a pleading or other 
paper which is well grounded in fact and in law as required by the Rule may ever be 
the subject of a sanction because it is signed and filed for an improper purpose. In 
short, may an attorney be sanctioned for doing what the law allows, if the attorney’s 
motive for doing so is improper? . . . The “well grounded in fact and warranted by 
existing law” clause is coupled with “improper purpose” clause by the conjunction 
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banc decision in Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp.,99 the Ninth 
Circuit held that a complaint is not subject to sanctions under Rule 
11 if it states non-frivolous claims.100 The Second,101 Fifth,102 and 
Tenth Circuits103 also follow this interpretation of Rule 11 and do 
not allow sanctions for a plaintiff’s improper purpose if her complaint 
is otherwise meritorious. 
For the most part, these courts base their restrictive reading of 
Rule 11 on the policy ground of promoting free access to court. In-
deed, most of these courts distinguish initial access, the filing of the 
complaint, from later litigation steps, such as the filing of a motion. 
They refuse to sanction meritorious complaints but leave open the 
possibility of sanctions against litigants who file motions for im-
proper purposes. As explained by the Ninth Circuit in Townsend: 
The reason for the rule regarding complaints is that the complaint 
is, of course, the document which embodies the plaintiff’s cause of 
action and it is the vehicle through which he enforces his substan-
tive legal rights. Enforcement of those rights benefits not only indi-
vidual plaintiffs but may benefit the public, since the bringing of 
meritorious lawsuits by private individuals is one way that public 
policies are advanced. . . . [I]t would be counterproductive to use 
Rule 11 to penalize the assertion of non-frivolous substantive  
 
 
“and.” By signing the pleading or other paper, the attorney certifies to both, thus 
suggesting that the two clauses are to be viewed independently. 
For purposes of deciding this case, it is unnecessary to answer this difficult question 
in other situations [e.g., excessive but well-grounded motions]. We deal here with 
the signing of a complaint that initiates the action. We hold that a defendant cannot 
be harassed under Rule 11 because a plaintiff files a complaint against that defendant 
which complies with the “well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law” 
clause of the Rule. 
Id. at 832. 
 99.  929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
 100. See id. at 1362. 
 101.  See Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 458–59 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting split in 
circuits and adopting Townsend); see also Barbara Comninos Kruzansky, Sanctions for Nonfrivo-
lous Complaints? Sussman v. Bank of Israel and Implications for the Improper Purpose Prong of 
Rule 11, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1359 (1998) (discussing Sussman and the Second Circuit position in 
relation to other circuits). 
 102.  See  National Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. National Fed’n of Fed. Employees, 844 
F.2d 216, 223–24 (5th Cir. 1988) (adopting Ninth Circuit distinction between complaints 
and subsequent papers in applying the improper purpose clause of Rule 11). 
 103.  See Burkhart v. Kinsley Bank, 852 F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that if a 
plaintiff filed a meritorious complaint “then any suggestion of harassment would necessarily 
fail”). 
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claims, even when the motives for asserting those claims are not en-
tirely pure.104 
This formulation may be good policy, and it closely resembles 
the Petition Clause argument that I make below in Part II. Indeed, I 
argue that the Petition Clause requires such a limitation on Rule 11 
for filing of the complaint. Nevertheless, this restrictive reading of 
Rule 11 contradicts the literal text of the improper purpose clause.105 
The restrictive interpretation finds mixed support in the history 
of the clause. The original version of Rule 11 imposed a delay prohi-
bition, which seemingly was an independent requirement. Under the 
1938 rule, a litigant’s signature certified she had read the pleading, 
there was good ground to support it, and it was not interposed for 
delay.106 Despite this language, apparently no court struck a pleading 
under the 1938 rule based solely on an alleged motive of delay.107 
The absence of such an application, however, is not particularly sig-
nificant because the 1938 rule was largely ignored in its entirety.108  
Courts likely did not consider whether delay was an independent ba-
sis for sanctions.109 
 
 104.  Id. at 1362. But see JOSEPH, supra note 57, § 14(A)(2) (arguing that the Ninth 
Court view “developed almost inadvertently and clearly as an offshoot of the minority view 
that nonfrivolous papers [of any kind] are never subject to improper purpose analysis” and that 
a “balanced reading of the text of the Rule does not support either of those doctrines”). 
 105.  See JOSEPH, supra note 57, § 14(A)(2) (noting that there “is no textual reason why 
a harassing complaint should be exempt from sanction when the next paper presented in the 
case clearly is not”). 
 106.  See supra note 42 (reprinting the 1938 version of Rule 11). The delay clause was a 
remnant from the predecessor Federal Equity Rule 24, which also imposed a delay prohibition. 
RULES OF PRACTICE FOR THE COURTS OF EQUITY OF THE UNITED STATES 24, 226 U.S. 629 
(1912) (stating that the signature of counsel was “a certificate by each solicitor that he has read 
the pleading so signed by him; that upon the instructions laid before him regarding the cases 
there is good ground for the same; that no scandalous matter is inserted in the pleading; and 
that it is not interposed for delay” (emphasis added)). 
 107.  See generally D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some 
“Striking” Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 30–40 
(1976) (surveying the reported cases under the 1938 rule). Likewise, the delay element in the 
predecessor Equity Rule 24 was never used to strike an otherwise meritorious pleading. See 
Risinger, supra at 28 (“There is not one reported case prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules [of 
Civil Procedure] where a finding of falsity was not required before a plea could be deemed a 
sham.”). 
 108.  See Risinger, supra note 107 (criticizing the rule and surveying the 23 reported cases 
of adversarial Rule 11 motions prior to 1977); see also 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR 
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1331 at 11–12 (2d ed. 1990) (reporting 
that the 1938 version of Rule 11 was “rarely used”). 
 109.  Professor Risinger, however, argued in 1977 that the delay clause should not be 
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When rulemakers in 1983 broadened the delay clause, they did 
not explicitly address whether motive was an independent basis for 
sanctions. The committee’s only explanatory comment on purpose 
addressed the broadening of the type of motive, not whether im-
proper motive alone was sanctionable.110 The committee’s citation to 
DASA arguably touches upon but does not clarify the issue. As dis-
cussed above,111 the Second Circuit in DASA reversed the sanctions 
as to the complaint because it stated a colorable claim even though 
plaintiffs had an improper collateral aim.112 The court affirmed sanc-
tions as to subsequent motions because the motions were both frivo-
lous and improperly motivated.113 The court thus imposed a test for 
sanctions similar to the restrictive reading of Rule 11. The problem 
in interpreting the committee’s citation to the case is that DASA did 
not involve Rule 11 but instead sanctions under the court’s inherent 
power.114 The restrictive two-part test is the prevailing approach for 
inherent power sanctions.115 What did the advisory committee mean 
when it cited DASA? Did it intend to endorse—or reject—the re-
strictive common law test for application of Rule 11? Or, did the 
committee intend to not comment on the issue at all but instead  
 
 
read as an independent requirement: 
The insertion [in the 1938 rule] of the certification that the pleading has not been 
interposed for delay seems logically redundant, since a pleading interposed only for 
delay could not have “good ground” no matter how that term is ultimately defined, 
and a pleading with independent “good ground” is not likely to be rendered im-
proper because tactical considerations of delay entered into the ultimate decision of 
whether or not to file an otherwise honest, meritorious, and proper pleading. 
Risinger, supra note 107, at 8. I further discuss Professor Risinger’s criticism of the 1938 rule 
infra notes 142–46, 160–62. 
 110.  See supra note 46 (reprinting advisory committee’s note). 
 111.  See supra notes 47–56 (discussing DASA). 
 112.  See  Browning Debenture Holders’ Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088–
89 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 113.  See id. 
 114.  See id. 
 115.  See supra note 52 (discussing DASA standard for imposing sanctions). Most, but 
not all, courts apply this strict two-part test before they will rely upon their inherent power to 
award attorney’s fees as a sanction, in part because such an award is in derogation of the so-
called American rule, under which each party bears his own attorney’s fees, win or lose. See 
infra notes 273–74 and accompanying text (discussing American rule). Nevertheless, at least 
some courts have suggested that they might award such sanctions based on bad purpose alone. 
See generally JOSEPH, supra note 57, ch. 4 (“Inherent Power: Bad Faith Litigation Abuse”); see 
also Motive Restrictions, supra note 13, at Part II.B.3 (discussing sanctions under inherent 
power based on a litigant’s improper purpose alone). 
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mean merely to give another example of bad motive? The committee 
did not explain its position.116 
The advisory committee was again silent on the issue when it 
modified Rule 11 in 1993 (to its current form), but this time the 
committee made some form changes to the rule that tended to rein-
force the view that proper purpose is an independent requirement. 
Rulemakers numbered each of the certification standards as separate 
subparagraphs117 and gave the improper purpose clause added 
prominence by listing it as the first (rather than last) certification 
standard.118 Yet, the rulemakers did not tinker with one crucial ele-
ment: the new Rule 11 continues to join the improper purpose 
clause to the merits standards with the word “and.” To be sure, the 
drafters could have clarified the issue in the advisory committee 
notes, but it is difficult to imagine any other changes to the rule itself 
that would have more firmly underscored the idea that proper pur-
pose is an independent requirement. 
Moreover, although the Townsend case was a prominent en banc 
decision in 1991, it was (and is) not the lone view on this issue. The 
Seventh Circuit declared in 1987 that improper purpose was an in-
dependent basis for Rule 11 sanctions. In Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. 
Canteen Corp.,119 the Seventh Circuit, in remanding to the district 
court for more factual findings, directed the trial court not to focus  
exclusively on whether the pleading had legal and factual merit, but 
also to consider the plaintiff’s purpose in filing suit: 
 
 
 116.  One other comment might be read as touching on the issue. The advisory commit-
tee, in explaining the 1983 deletion of the reference to “scandalous” material, stated: 
The former reference to the inclusion of scandalous or indecent matter, which is it-
self strong indication that an improper purpose underlies the pleading, motion, or 
other paper, also has been deleted as unnecessary. Such matter may be stricken un-
der Rule 12(f) [motion to strike, among other things, scandalous matter] as well as 
dealt with under the more general language of amended Rule 11. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1983) (emphasis added). Although ambiguous, 
this comment could be read as indicating the committee view that improper purpose alone is a 
sanctionable event and that under the 1983 rule, scandalous matter is merely evidence of such 
improper purpose, as opposed to an independent basis for sanctions as it arguably was under 
the 1938 rule. 
 117.  The 1983 rule listed the standards as clauses of a single sentence. See supra note 45. 
 118.  As to the text of the clauses themselves, rulemakers made somewhat significant 
changes to the merit certification standards but left the improper purpose language virtually 
unchanged. Compare supra note 1 with supra note 45. 
 119.  823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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Much of [plaintiff’s] brief in this court is devoted to a demonstra-
tion that it had an objectively sufficient basis for its claim of racial 
discrimination. Perhaps it can persuade the district court that it did, 
but this is not enough. Because Rule 11 has a subjective compo-
nent as well, the district court must find out why [plaintiff] pursued 
this litigation.120 
This portion of Szabo is dictum, but this and other statements by the 
court informed federal rulemakers that at least the Seventh Circuit 
read Rule 11 literally.121 Other circuit and district courts likewise 
have suggested in dicta that they would read Rule 11 literally and 
apply proper purpose as an independent standard for complaints.122 
 
 120.  Id. at 1083 (emphasis added). 
 121. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989) (en 
banc) (stating in dictum that Rule 11 “has both a subjective and an objective component” and 
that a paper filed for an improper purpose “is sanctionable whether or not it is supported by 
the facts and the law, and no matter how careful the pre-filing investigation”); Kapco Mfg., 
Inc. v. C & O Enters., Inc., 886 F.2d 1485, 1491 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting in dictum that “the 
language of [the 1983 version of] Rule 11 is mandatory; if a district court concludes that a 
party or attorney filed a pleading or other document for an improper purpose, then the court 
must impose a sanction”); see also Kruzansky, supra note 101, at 1382 (noting that the Seventh 
Circuit “has ruled—and ruled repeatedly—that a court may freely impose sanctions” against 
“the filer of a nonfrivolous complaint brought for an improper purpose”). 
 122.  For example, Justice Breyer, when sitting on the First Circuit, stated that proper 
purpose was a requirement independent of and in addition to merit under Rule 11: 
Although the wording of the amended Rule may possibly be ambiguous in this re-
spect, the historical context and advisory committee notes unquestionably override 
any syntactical uncertainties. Not surprisingly then, the amended Rule has rather 
consistently been read by federal appellate courts to reach groundless but “sincere” 
pleadings, as well as those which, while not devoid of all merit, were filed for some 
malign purpose . . . . 
Lancelloti v. Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 18–19 (1st Cir. 1990). The Fourth Circuit specifically reserved 
this question in Kunstler, but it cited with approval the Cohen case, where the Fourth Circuit 
had sanctioned an improperly motivated motion to amend a complaint even though the new 
claims had sufficient legal bases. See also supra notes 67–86 (discussing Cohen and Kunstler). 
The Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have in broad dicta described the certification ele-
ments of Rule 11 as independent standards and thus suggest that they would sanction plaintiffs 
for improper motive alone. See CTC Imports & Exports v. Nigerian Petroleum Corp., 951 
F.2d 573, 578 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting in dictum that “[e]ach duty is independent; the viola-
tion of one triggers Rule 11 sanctions”); INVST Fin. Group, Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 
815 F.2d 391, 402 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting that motion “violates all three sanctionable cir-
cumstances of Rule 11,” including “improper purpose of delaying the default judgment”); 
United States v. Milam, 855 F.2d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting in dictum that “at least 
three distinct, but at times overlapping, types of conduct . . . might warrant the imposition of 
Rule 11 sanctions,” including improper purpose). The District of Columbia Circuit apparently 
has not addressed the issue, but its district court has suggested that it would impose sanctions 
for bad motive alone. See Kerner v. Cult Awareness Network, 843 F. Supp. 748, 750 (D.D.C. 
1994) (refusing sanctions based on lack of legal merit and noting that “[d]efendant’s stronger 
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It is difficult to find any cases—before or after the 1993 amend-
ment—where the court relied solely on motive to sanction a plaintiff. 
Most cases in which the improper purpose clause is implicated also 
involve pleadings or motions that are factually or legally frivolous. 
Nevertheless, at least one court, that in Ballentine v. Taco Bell 
Corp.,123 relied solely upon the improper purpose clause to sanction a 
plaintiff. The court sanctioned Ballentine for having an harassing 
motive in naming his supervisor in his employment discrimination 
case even though his lawyer conducted a reasonable inquiry and even 
though Ballentine’s claim was not frivolous.124 
This split in authority suggests, at a minimum, that President 
Clinton could have argued in good faith that Ms. Jones violated 
Rule 11, even if her claims had some merit. Precedent in the Eighth 
Circuit, where the Jones case was pending, supports such an argu-
ment. The Eighth Circuit has not spoken directly on the issue, but it 
has affirmed trial courts that have stated sanctions are appropriate for 
improper purpose alone.125 The best example is Bryant v. Brooklyn 
Barbeque Corp.126 The court dismissed a civil RICO complaint for 
plaintiff’s failure to timely serve the complaint,127 and also found that 
 
charge is that plaintiff’s suit . . . is motivated by an ‘improper purpose’”). I discuss the Eighth 
Circuit cases infra at notes 126–30. See also Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Fed-
eral Rule 11—Some “Chilling” Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 
74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1320, 1331 (1986) (noting that the improper purpose clause is a “sepa-
rate element”). 
 123.  135 F.R.D. 117 (E.D.N.C. 1991); see also supra notes 59 and 80–85 (discussing 
Ballentine). 
 124.  The court stated: 
I found that Ballentine had made a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law. De-
spite this, I have found that Ballentine had a dual motive in filing the lawsuit: the le-
gitimate purpose of seeking relief for the loss of his job and the improper purpose of 
harassing Koenig. Under these circumstances, I conclude that even though the 
pleading may have been well grounded in law or fact, the fact that it was filed for an 
improper purpose violates Rule 11. 
Id. at 122. 
 125.  See Nielson v. Hart, No. 93-1237-CV-W-1, 1995 WL 901297, at *2 (W.D. Mo. 
Oct. 5, 1995) (finding that the claims were frivolous and brought for an improper purpose and 
that improper purpose alone supported sanctions under Rule 11(b)(1)); Perkins v. Gen. Mo-
tors Corp., 129 F.R.D. 655, 658 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (finding that plaintiffs pursued a number 
of frivolous litigation tactics and stating, in dictum, that “[s]anctions may be warranted under 
the ‘improper purpose’ clause even if a competent attorney could form a reasonable belief as to 
the viability of the original complaint”), aff’d 965 F.2d 597 (1992). 
 126.  130 F.R.D. 665 (W.D. Mo. 1990), aff’d 932 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 127.  See id. at 666–69 (finding no good cause for failure to serve the defendants within 
120 days as required by Rule 4). 
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plaintiff’s filing of the complaint violated Rule 11 in two ways. First, 
the plaintiff’s attorney admitted that he did not conduct a factual in-
quiry prior to filing the complaint.128 Second, the court found that 
the plaintiff’s purpose was to gain publicity and harass the defen-
dants, which was by itself sanctionable under Rule 11: 
Even if, however, the court found that plaintiff had established that 
a reasonable basis existed for the filing of the original complaint, 
the court would find that sanctions must be assessed based on the 
Rule 11 language prohibiting the filing of a pleading for an im-
proper purpose. . . . [P]laintiff admits that the pleading was filed to 
coincide with the sentencing of one of the defendants and that 
plaintiff made absolutely no effort to serve the complaint after it 
was filed. From these two admissions the court can reasonably con-
clude that the complaint was filed solely to attract publicity to 
plaintiff’s claims and to harass defendants, and not because plain-
tiff’s attorney had conducted an inquiry revealing that the claims 
had a reasonable basis in law or in fact.129 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sanction award even though the 
district court never reached the actual merit of plaintiff’s RICO 
claims.130 At a minimum, this holding means the Eighth Circuit 
views one of the two grounds (lack of inquiry or bad purpose) as a 
sufficient basis for sanctions. In other words, merit is not the sole 
test for sanctions under Rule 11. Bryant is an important departure 
from the restrictive view followed by other circuits, where merit is 
the sole test for complaints. In In re Keegan Management Co.,131 for 
example, the Ninth Circuit held that a meritorious complaint is not 
subject to Rule 11 sanctions even though the plaintiff failed to con-
duct a reasonable inquiry.132 Keegan is an extension of the Town-
 
 128.  The attorney admitted that he conducted his factual inquiry after filing the com-
plaint, with the intention of amending the complaint to conform to the results of his investiga-
tion. See id. at 670. 
 129.  Id. at 670. 
 130.  See Bryant, 932 F.2d at 699 (noting only that the “violation in this case occurred 
when the original complaint was filed for an improper purpose and without the ‘reasonable 
inquiry’ required by Rule 11”). 
 131.  78 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 132.  See id. at 434–35. The Ninth Circuit confuses the analysis by calling its view the 
“conjunctive” approach: it will not sanction a plaintiff unless his claims are “both baseless and 
made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.” Id. at 434 (quoting Townsend) (emphasis 
added). The literal reading of Rule 11 arguably is the more appropriate use of the “conjunc-
tive” label, given that Rule 11 states the standard in the affirmative and requires the plaintiff to 
conduct a reasonable inquiry and certify both proper purpose and merit. 
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send133 doctrine in which the Ninth Circuit held that purpose was 
not itself sanctionable. In other words, under the restrictive view, 
merit is controlling, at least for complaints, and the plaintiff is not 
subject to sanctions for either failure to investigate or bad motive. 
The Eighth Circuit affirmance in Bryant tells us that it rejects this re-
strictive view at least where plaintiff violated both the inquiry and 
purpose requirements. There is no reason to think that it would not 
so hold where plaintiff violated only one requirement, including the 
purpose standard.134 
In Jones, the statements of the Supreme Court and Judge Wright 
are ambiguous on this issue. The Supreme Court stated that “sanc-
tions may be appropriate where a claim is ‘presented for any im-
proper purpose,’ including any claim [that lacked evidentiary sup-
port].”135 Use of the term “including” suggests that a factually 
deficient claim is just one example of a claim that might be brought 
for an improper purpose, leaving open the question of the other 
types of claims that fit this category. Other examples of improper 
claims could include not only a claim that lacked legal foundation 
but also a claim that had both factual and legal merit but was politi-
cally inspired. Judge Wright quoted the Supreme Court, but, rather 
than using the “including” language of the Supreme Court, Judge 
Wright substituted the word “and.”136 This substitution suggests the 
restrictive interpretation of Rule 11, but it does not necessarily fore-
close the literal reading. By mentioning claims that were brought for 
an improper purpose and lacking evidentiary support, Judge Wright 
 
 133.  See supra notes 99–104 (discussing Townsend with regard to the improper purpose 
clause). The Keegan court relied upon Townsend in narrowly interpreting the reasonable in-
quiry standard. See In re Keegan Management Co., 78 F.3d at 434-35. 
 134.  Two other circuits, which like the Eighth Circuit have not taken the restrictive view 
of the improper purpose clause, have stated that they will issue sanctions for a plaintiff’s viola-
tion of the reasonable inquiry requirement, even though his complaint may have merit. The 
best illustration is Garr v. U.S. Healthcare Inc., 22 F.3d 1274 (3d Cir. 1994), in which the 
Third Circuit held that a plaintiff who does not conduct an adequate pre-filing investigation 
“will not be saved from a Rule 11 sanction by the stoke of luck that the document happened 
to be justified.” Id. at 1279. I further discuss Garr infra at notes 168–73. The Third Circuit 
elsewhere suggested that this reading extends to all of the certification elements of Rule 11, 
including purpose. See CTC Imports & Exports v. Nigerian Petroleum Corp., 951 F.2d 573, 
578 (3d Cir. 1991). Likewise, the First Circuit cited Garr with approval in Lichtenstein v. Con-
solidated Servs. Group, 173 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1999) and elsewhere stated in dicta that 
proper purpose is an independent requirement. See Lancelloti v. Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 18–19 (1st 
Cir. 1990). 
 135. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708–09, n.42 (1997). 
 136. Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1130–31 (E.D. Ark. 1999). 
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arguably is giving only one example of a sanctionable complaint. She 
did not intend to state the lone standard for sanctions unless she also 
meant to omit the Rule 11(b)(2) legal merit standard. 
In sum, President Clinton reasonably could have argued to 
Judge Wright that the court should sanction Ms. Jones and her law-
yers based on their purpose alone, regardless of the merit of Ms. 
Jones’s claims. Both Eighth Circuit precedent and the law of the case 
left the issue open for argument, and more importantly, the text of 
Rule 11 seemingly mandates this view. Ms. Jones and her lawyers 
had to certify that they had a proper purpose and that her claims had 
legal and factual merit. If they did not have a proper purpose, they 
violated at least the literal terms of Rule 11. 
D. Imposing Sanctions for Improper Purpose 
The final question is the nature of the sanction if in fact Judge 
Wright had found Ms. Jones or her lawyers in violation of Rule 11. 
A particularly interesting procedural question is whether the Presi-
dent could have relied upon Rule 11(b)(1) to dismiss the entire law-
suit early in the case and avoid any discussion of, or discovery into, 
the merits of Ms. Jones’s claims. This question is closely related to 
that of the preceding part. It would seem that if improper purpose is 
alone a sufficient basis on which to sanction a plaintiff, the President 
should have been able to raise the issue in an early defensive measure 
and obtain whatever sanctions the court deemed appropriate, includ-
ing dismissal. The issue of sanctions, however, is more complex, par-
ticularly after the 1993 amendments to Rule 11. These amendments 
instruct the court to impose minimal sanctions upon “separate mo-
tion.”137 They also urge careful consideration of whether the lawyer 
or the client is at fault, which in turn raises an issue as to whether the 
court should sanction Ms. Jones for her lawyers’ bad motives. These 
issues have burdened the interpretation of Rule 11 since its promul-
gation in 1938, and although the 1993 amendments send a message 
of caution in issuing Rule 11 sanctions, the literal terms of the rule 
have always permitted and continue to allow dismissal as a sanction 
even for a lawyer’s violation of the rule. 
The original 1938 version of Rule 11 required that the attorney 
representing a party sign the complaint138 and provided that when-
 
 137.  See infra note 183 (reprinting the sanctions provisions of the current 1993 rule). 
 138.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 308 U.S. 645, 676 (1938). See supra note 42 (reprinting 
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ever the “pleading is signed with the intent to defeat the purpose of 
the rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may pro-
ceed as though the pleading had not been served.”139 The rule sepa-
rately provided for sanctions against the attorney: the court could 
take “disciplinary action” against an attorney for a “willful viola-
tion.”140 Thus, the original rule allowed the ultimate sanction against 
a party—striking of his pleading—if his attorney signed the pleading 
in violation of the rule. 
Implementation of the sanction provisions of the 1938 rule pre-
sented problems. One arose from the phrase that the pleading “may 
be stricken as sham and false.” Was such a finding a prerequisite to 
striking the pleading? In other words, did the rule require the court 
to make a determination on the merits before imposing the “strik-
ing” sanction of Rule 11? On the one hand, the “sham and false” 
clause seemed to require that the pleading be at least false in fact be-
fore the court could strike it (putting aside the more difficult ques-
tion of what constitutes a “sham” pleading). Yet, the rule’s trigger 
for sanctions—“signed with an intent to defeat the purpose of the 
rule”—did not mention falsity but instead referred back to the other 
provisions of the rule, the good ground and delay clauses.141 A plead-
ing could violate either of those clauses even if it stated true facts. A 
pleading seemingly could be interposed for delay and be factually 
true. It also is possible that a pleading could be true in fact even 
though signing counsel at the time of filing does not believe she has 
“good ground to support it.” Thus, a pleading stricken on one of 
these two grounds would not necessarily be “false.” 
This ambiguity drew criticism in an influential 1977 article by 
Professor Michael Risinger.142 Professor Risinger studied the rule, 
criticized its poor drafting, and argued that courts should never use 
Rule 11 to strike a pleading without independently assessing the 
merits of the claims, usually through the summary judgment proce-
dure or at trial. This criticism was primarily academic, for as Profes-
sor Risinger noted, parties rarely invoked the 1938 rule in any fash-
ion. Professor Risinger found only one case (as of 1977) in which a 
 
1938 version of Rule 11). 
 139.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 308 U.S. 645, 676 (1938). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  See Risinger, supra note 107. 
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court struck a pleading based solely on Rule 11.143 In that case, 
Freeman v. Kirby,144 the court dismissed a complaint because the 
plaintiff’s counsel did not have sufficient ground to support the alle-
gations when he filed the complaint.145 The court never addressed 
the actual merits of the claim. This was precisely the concern raised 
by Professor Risinger: Rule 11 seemed to permit a court to dismiss a 
pleading under the good ground clause, without first determining 
whether the pleading had factual merit. He argued that the court 
should employ the summary judgment procedures of Rule 56, not 
the striking provision of Rule 11, to dispose of claims. 
Interestingly, Professor Risinger was not concerned that a court 
would dismiss any pleading based on the delay clause. He believed 
that a pleading that had “good ground to support it” could never be 
“interposed only for delay.”146 Professor Risinger, however, took lib-
erties with the language of the 1938 rule. The rule’s actual language 
did not include the word “only” and joined the good ground and 
delay clauses with the conjunctive. Its prohibition thus reached a 
plaintiff who filed a meritorious suit to achieve delay. To be sure, this 
situation was (and is) uncommon because plaintiffs rarely file a com-
plaint to achieve delay. Delay is a more serious concern in motion or 
discovery practice. Yet, there are some conceivable circumstances in 
which a plaintiff would file suit to achieve delay. She could seek delay 
in some matter collateral to the litigation. However, she could frame 
and file her suit in such a way as to multiply the proceedings and 
maximize the time necessary to resolve the dispute or the fees due  
plaintiff’s counsel.147 The literal language of the original Rule 11 
would have permitted a court to strike such a complaint. 
 
 143.  See id. Professor Risinger reported a total of only 23 cases in which a party even at-
tempted to have the other party’s pleading stricken under Rule 11. Of these, only two resulted 
in the court striking the pleading based solely on Rule 11 and one of those was reversed on 
appeal. Id. The one case of striking was the Freeman case, which Professor Risinger discussed 
at length. Id. at 38–42. 
 144.  27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
 145.  The court dismissed the complaint in response to defendant’s “motion to strike the 
complaint as sham within the meaning of Rule 11.” Id. at 396. The court found that the plain-
tiff’s pre-filing inquiry was inadequate because his attorney filed the complaint based solely on 
drafts of similar complaints before receiving crucial supporting facts. See id. at 398–99. 
 146.  Risinger, supra note 107, at 8. 
 147.  This concern prompted Congress to enact the federal vexatious litigation statute. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759 n.6 (1980) (re-
capping the history of Section 1927 and noting that United States Attorneys “who were paid 
on a piecework basis, apparently had filed unnecessary lawsuits to inflate their compensation”). 
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In 1983, rulemakers revised Rule 11. One of the chief concerns 
prompting the 1983 rule change was the reluctance of judges under 
the original rule to impose sanctions.148 Accordingly, rulemakers 
made sanctions mandatory upon a finding of a violation of the 
rule.149 They also opened up the available sanctions by authorizing 
the court to impose “an appropriate sanction” for a “violation of the 
rule,”150 as opposed to limiting the court to the sanctions of striking 
a pleading or discipline of attorneys, as the 1938 rule had done. Al-
though rulemakers made these changes to clarify the sanction proce-
dure, some questions still remained as to whether dismissal was a 
proper sanction. 
First, the 1983 rule mentioned the striking of a pleading only 
with regard to the failure to sign the pleading.151 Was this lone refer-
ence a limitation on that sanction? The history of this revision sug-
gests that it was not a limitation. The reference was an effort to sof-
ten the rule; an earlier draft of the 1983 rule instructed the court to 
refuse to accept a pleading that was not signed.152 The final version 
told the court to accept the non-signed pleading and strike it only 
after giving the litigant an opportunity to correct his mistake and 
sign the pleading.153 Moreover, the aim of the 1983 revisions was to 
encourage judges to issue sanctions and thereby limit litigation 
abuse. This would be accomplished by broadening the court’s op-
tions (hence, the “appropriate sanction” language), not by denying it 
the sanction of dismissal. 
A second ambiguity arose from the deletion in 1983 of the 
“sham and false” language. This would seem to be a logical im-
provement, given the problems that the clause presented under the 
old rule. The problem came from the advisory committee’s explana-
tion of the change. The advisory committee cited Professor Ris-
inger’s article and noted that “decisions [under the ‘sham and false’ 
clause] have tended to confuse the issue of attorney honesty with the 
merits of the action.”154 The meaning of this comment is difficult to 
 
 148.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1983) (noting that the “new lan-
guage [of the 1983 rule] is intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions”). 
 149.  See supra note 45 (reprinting the 1983 rule). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  See id. 
 152.  See Mansfield letter, supra note 88, at 191. 
 153.  See id. 
 154.  Id. at 199. 
1AND-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  9:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
38 
discern. Did the committee mean to reject the Freeman v. Kirby ap-
proach and endorse Professor Risinger’s view that the court should 
never employ Rule 11 to dismiss an action?155 This is a possible read-
ing given that the committee also cited Murchison v. Kirby.156 Mur-
chison was a companion case to Freeman v. Kirby, the case that Pro-
fessor Risinger had criticized.157 Professor Risinger approved of the 
court’s action in Murchison158 because the court (a different judge 
than that in Freeman) refused to strike the complaint under Rule 11 
on the ground that dismissal would unduly deprive plaintiff of his 
right to trial.159 
Although possible, it does not seem likely that the 1983 advisory 
committee meant in this comment to suggest that dismissal is never a 
proper sanction under Rule 11. First, Professor Risinger cited only 
one instance where the court had struck a pleading for violation of 
Rule 11, that in Freeman.160 A single case hardly would constitute 
the “decisions” that had confused the rule and which the committee 
seemingly condemned.161 Moreover, the Freeman court did not 
“confuse” the merits with the Rule 11 standards, which observers 
frequently termed “attorney honesty” under the 1938 rule.162 In 
Freeman, the court did not purport to decide the merits, but instead 
based its ruling on the lack of investigation of plaintiff’s counsel.163 
 
 155.  See supra notes 142–47. 
 156.  After citing Professor Risinger’s article, the advisory committee continued: “Mo-
tions under this provision [the sham and false clause] generally present issues better dealt with 
under Rules 8, 12, or 56.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1983) (citing Mur-
chison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)). 
 157.  The different plaintiffs in Freeman and in Murchison, through separate but cooperat-
ing counsel, brought virtually identical claims against the same defendant. See generally Ris-
inger, supra note 107, at 38–42 (discussing Freeman and Murchison). 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  See Murchison, 27 F.R.D. at 19. 
 160.  See supra note 143. 
 161.  See supra note 154. 
 162.  See Risinger, supra note 107. 
 163.  The Freeman court distinguished Murchison without explanation. See Freeman, 27 
F.R.D. at 397 n.1. Yet, the court relied upon an affidavit from the Murchion attorney in find-
ing that the Freeman attorney had not conducted a reasonable investigation. See id. at 398. 
Thus, although the 1938 rule did not impose an affirmative duty of investigation, the Freeman 
court imposed one and its ruling mirrors those under later versions of the rule, in which some 
courts hold that failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry is sanctionable even though plaintiff 
was lucky in its “shot in the dark” and stated a claim that turned out to be supported by the 
facts. See supra notes 128–34 and infra notes 171–77 and accompanying text (discussing the 
reasonable inquiry cases under the 1983 and 1993 rules). 
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Freeman thus underscores the difference between a merits decision 
and one based solely on Rule 11.164 
Unquestionably, the rulemakers, in revising Rule 11, meant to 
distinguish the ultimate merit of the case from the Rule 11 standards 
for filing. Indeed, the advisory committee elsewhere suggested that 
Rule 11 issues are best deferred until after decision on the merits.165 
A decision on the merits should be made in response to a motion 
under Rule 12 or Rule 56, or at trial. Yet, applying the proper pro-
cedure for determining the merits of an action is a different question 
than determining whether the court can dispose of the case for fail-
ure to abide by one of the filing standards of Rule 11. On the latter 
question, the court is not deciding the merits of the case, but is in-
stead deciding the narrower issue of whether the plaintiff complied 
with the standards of Rule 11. Dismissal in this case would be a form 
of deterrence or punishment, not a decision on the merits. Although 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strive to determine actions on  
their merits, rather than by procedural defaults,166 the rules neverthe-
less recognize dismissal as a form of punishment for rule violations.167 
 
 164.  The Supreme Court in 1966 also noted the possibility of such a non-merits dismissal 
under a former version of Rule 23, which required a plaintiff in a shareholder derivative action 
to verify his complaint. In Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966), the Court 
found that the plaintiff had sufficient basis on which to swear to her complaint, but it noted 
that the rule seemed to allow a trial court to stop proceedings and investigate, before trial, 
whether the plaintiff falsely swore to her complaint and to dismiss the complaint with prejudice 
if it found the verification lacking. See id. at 371. 
 165.  The advisory committee stated that the court should ordinarily defer resolution of 
Rule 11 motions challenging the pleadings, until after litigation on the merits, but that the 
timing is within the discretion of the trial court: 
A party seeking sanctions should give notice to the court and the offending party 
promptly upon discovering a basis for doing so. The time when sanctions are to be 
imposed rests in the discretion of the trial judge. However, it is anticipated that in 
the case of pleadings the sanctions issue under Rule 11 normally will be determined 
at the end of the litigation, and in the case of motions at the time when the motion 
is decided or shortly thereafter. The procedure obviously must comport with due 
process requirements. The particular format to be followed should depend on the 
circumstances of the situation and the severity of the sanction under consideration. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1983). 
 166.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (mandating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “be con-
strued and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every ac-
tion”). 
 167.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (providing for dismissal with prejudice for “failure of the 
plaintiff . . . to comply with these rules or any order of the court”); FED. R. CIV. P.  
37(b)(2)(C) (providing for sanction of “dismissing the action or proceeding” for failure to 
obey court discovery orders). 
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At least the Third Circuit has continued the tradition of Freeman 
and dismissed a complaint because the plaintiff or his counsel did not 
meet the filing standards of Rule 11. In Garr v. U.S. Healthcare 
Inc.,168 the trial court considered Rule 11 sanctions against two law-
yers who filed virtually identical lawsuits concerning an alleged in-
sider trading scheme that they read about in the Wall Street Jour-
nal.169 The first lawyer conducted some minimal investigation in 
addition to reading the article, but the counsel in Garr relied upon 
only the Wall Street Journal article and the complaints filed by the 
first lawyer. The defendants moved for sanctions in all three cases on 
the day that the Garr complaint was filed (only two days after the 
Wall Street Journal article appeared).170 The court held that the first 
lawyer had conducted a reasonable inquiry but that the Garr counsel 
had not,171 and assessed a number of sanctions, including dismissal of 
the Garr complaint without prejudice.172 The Third Circuit af-
firmed.173 
Some courts, such as the Ninth Circuit in Keegan, have rejected 
Garr,174 but their problem is not with the use of dismissal as a sanc-
tion but rather with the underlying ground for sanctions. The Ninth 
Circuit does not consider the filing of a meritorious complaint to be 
a violation of Rule 11, regardless of the plaintiff’s failure to investi-
gate or her improper purpose,175 but it has allowed dismissal as a 
 
 168.  22 F.3d 1274 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 169.  See id. at 1274–76 (discussing facts leading to the filing of the complaint). 
 170.  The defendants anticipated the complaints and charged that they were a part of an 
“all too familiar pattern of an instant class action lawsuit based on newspaper reports followed 
by a covey of cut and paste copycat complaints.” Id. at 1277. 
 171.  See id. The court found a Rule 11 violation in the first lawyer’s other case because 
counsel had not sufficiently investigated whether that class representative was adequate. In fact, 
the representative read the complaint for the first time after it was filed and promptly withdrew 
his support. The court, however, found that the lawyer’s investigation as to the claim itself was 
adequate. See id. 
 172.  See id. The district court also referred the matter to the Disciplinary Board of the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and ordered the lawyers to pay the attorney’s fees of the de-
fendants. See id. 
 173.  See id. at 1283. The Third Circuit did not directly address the propriety of the dis-
missal as a sanction but affirmed the Rule 11 sanctions, which included dismissal. The plaintiffs 
in Garr challenged the finding of inadequate inquiry and the amount of the monetary sanc-
tions but not the sanction of dismissal or the trial court’s referral of the matter to the state bar. 
See id. at 1282. 
 174.  See In re Keegan Management Co., 78 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 1995); see also supra notes 
131–33 (discussing Keegan). 
 175.  See supra notes 99–104 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s restrictive view). 
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form of sanctions for activity that it finds in violation of Rule 11.176 
The Eighth Circuit, where Jones was pending, has not yet addressed 
dismissal based solely on inadequate inquiry (or violation of the im-
proper purpose clause), but its precedent suggests that it would fol-
low Garr and also allow dismissal for improper purpose. As I note 
above, Bryant shows that it shares the Garr view that pre-filing in-
quiry is a separate standard.177 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has af-
firmed dismissal as a sanction against a plaintiff for other violations of 
Rule 11 that were independent of the merits of the complaint.178 
Most cases involving dismissal under Rule 11 arose under the 
1983 version of the rule.179 Ms. Jones, however, filed her complaint  
in 1994 and thus fell under the 1993 amendments. The 1993 rule 
sends a different message about sanctions. 
The 1993 amendments were in response to criticism that liti-
gants used the 1983 rule too frequently180 and that the rule had 
gone too far in its efforts to curb litigation abuse.181 Federal rule-
 
 176.  The Ninth Circuit elsewhere has approved of dismissal as a form of sanction under 
Rule 11. See Combs v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 927 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming dis-
missal of complaint, under Rule 11, for discovery abuse). 
 177.  See supra notes 126–34. 
 178.  In Carman v. Treat, 7 F.3d 1379 (8th Cir. 1993), a prisoner brought a pro se civil 
rights suit, based on an alleged assault during his transfer between correctional facilities. He 
later moved for injunctive relief and charged that all of the defendants had retaliated against 
him for filing his original complaint. Three of the defendants moved for sanctions arising from 
this motion because they had no control over plaintiff’s current confinement. The district court 
gave the plaintiff repeated opportunities to provide evidence to support the allegations in the 
motion, but he failed to satisfy the court. The court then dismissed his complaint as a sanction 
for plaintiff’s motion. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that although it “might have chosen 
a different sanction” the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint. 
Id. at 1382. 
 179.  The Garr complaint was filed in 1992 but did not reach the courts of appeals after 
the 1993 amendments. See Garr, 22 F.3d at 1274. See also supra notes 169–73 and accompa-
nying text. The Third Circuit did not address the impact of the rule change in Garr because 
the parties did not contend that it made a difference. The 1993 amendments would not have 
changed the result as to the underlying ground for sanctions because the 1993 rule uses essen-
tially the same reasonable inquiry language as the 1983 version. The 1993 rule referred to the 
presenting person’s “knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable 
under the circumstances,” see supra note 1, whereas the 1983 rule referred to the signer’s 
“knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry.” See supra note 45. 
 180.  See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 108, §§ 1331, 1333 (discussing his-
tory of rule and noting that the 1983 changes “triggered a dramatic change in the nature of 
civil practice in the federal courts” and put Rule 11 in “the forefront of the consciousness of 
almost everyone who engages in civil litigation in the federal courts”). 
 181.  Some scholars claimed that the 1983 Rule was too harsh and had a disproportionate 
effect on civil rights plaintiffs. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note 
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makers made a number of changes to Rule 11 in 1993 (changing the 
rule to its current form182), but their most significant change was to 
relax the sanctions provisions in a number of ways.183 First and fore-
 
(1993) (surveying authorities and criticisms of the 1983 rule); WRIGHT & MILLER , supra note 
108, § 1332 (same). Some critics cited the Kunstler case, discussed supra at notes 71–79, as an 
example of unfair application of Rule 11 sanctions. See Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum, 
26 GA. L. REV. 90 (1992). Not everyone agreed with this assessment. In fact, Justices Scalia 
and Thomas, in a move that is relatively rare for the Supreme Court, dissented from the 1993 
amendments based in part on their concern that the changes to Rule 11 would take away the 
incentive to raise Rule 11 issues. Order of the Supreme Court Forwarding Rule Changes to 
Congress, 507 U.S. 1091, 1096–97 (1993) (J. Scalia, dissenting); see also id. at 1098 (arguing 
that the “net effect” of the rule changes is “to decrease the incentive on the part of the person 
best situated to alert the court to perversion of our civil justice system”). 
 182.  See supra notes 91, 117–18 for a discussion of the format changes and the clarifica-
tions to the certification standards, now embodied in Rule 11(b). 
 183.  In place of the two sentences concerning sanctions in the 1983 rule, see supra note 
45, the 1993 rule has a separate section consisting of several paragraphs dedicated to sanctions: 
C. Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court de-
termines that R11(b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions 
stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or par-
ties that have violated subdivision(b) or are responsible for the violation. 
(1) How Initiated 
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from 
other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate 
subdivision(b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or 
presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such 
other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, con-
tention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If war-
ranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable 
expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent 
exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations 
committed by its partners, associates and employees. 
(B) On Court’s Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order de-
scribing the specific conduct that appears to violate R 11(b) and directing an attor-
ney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated R 11(b) with respect 
thereto. 
(2) Nature of Sanctions; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule 
shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or compara-
ble conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs 
(A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary na-
ture, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted 
for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of 
the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the 
violation. 
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a viola-
tion of subdivision(b)(2). 
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court’s initiative unless the 
court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the  
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most, Rule 11 sanctions are again discretionary.184 In addition, Rule 
11(c)(2) now instructs that sanctions “shall be limited to what is suf-
ficient to deter repetition” of the offending conduct.185 It prioritizes 
certain forms of sanctions, encouraging courts to impose “directives 
of a non-monetary nature”186 and to award attorney’s fees to the 
other party only in extraordinary cases.187 It also forecloses any 
monetary sanctions against a client for her lawyer’s violation of the 
legal merit standard of Rule 11(b)(2).188 
Although these changes seem to send the collective message that 
courts should back off and not impose severe sanctions, such as dis-
missal, the current rule does not foreclose dismissal as a sanction. 
First and foremost, the rule continues to authorize a court to impose 
“an appropriate sanction.”189 The appropriate sanctions, according to 
the advisory committee, not surprisingly, continue to include dis-
missal.190 Dismissal is uniformly recognized as within the inherent 
power of the court,191 and the federal rules compilation elsewhere 
provides for dismissal as a punishment for rule violations.192 In fact, 
 
claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanc-
tioned. 
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct deter-
mined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction im-
posed. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
 184.  See id. (“may” impose sanctions). 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  See id. 
 188.  See id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  The advisory committee listed dismissal as its first example of available sanctions: 
The court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for violations, such 
as striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or censure; requir-
ing participation in seminars or other educational programs; ordering a fine payable 
to the court; referring the matter to disciplinary authorities (or in the case of gov-
ernment attorneys, to the Attorney General, Inspector General, or agency head). 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1993) (emphasis added). 
 191.  See Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1429 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that courts have 
inherent power and authority under Rule 41(b) to dismiss a complaint as punishment against a 
plaintiff’s rule violation, “where the plaintiff has caused delay or engaged in contumacious 
conduct” and where the “ends of justice would be better served” ); TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. 
Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 916 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Courts have inherent equitable powers to 
dismiss actions . . . for failure to prosecute, contempt of court, or abusive litigation prac-
tices.”). 
 192.  See supra note 167. 
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Rule 11 allows dismissal in circumstances in which it does not permit 
monetary sanctions. Rule 11(c)(2) forbids imposition of monetary 
sanctions against a client for the lawyer’s legal errors,193 but, as the 
advisory committee explained, this restriction “does not limit the 
court’s power to impose sanctions or remedial orders that may have 
collateral financial consequences upon a party, such as dismissal of a 
claim.”194 Accordingly, courts following the 1993 amendments have 
continued to recognize dismissal as a potential sanction under Rule 
11.195 
In some cases, dismissal is the only sanction that would meet the 
Rule 11(c)(2) mandate of deterrence, and Rule 11(b)(1) improper 
purpose violations might present that type of case.196 If a plaintiff was 
bent on pursuing an improper purpose and had considerable finan-
cial means, a monetary sanction would not deter her.197 By contrast, 
dismissal, especially a dismissal “with prejudice” (forever barring the 
claim), would deter this plaintiff from using at least this claim to pur-
sue her improper motives. Jones might have been just the type of case 
in which dismissal would be the best means to achieve deterrence. 
Given Ms. Jones’s considerable financial backing from political op-
ponents of the President and assuming that Ms. Jones herself pos-
 
 193.  See supra note 183 (reprinting Rule 11(c)). 
 194.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1993) (emphasis added). 
 195.  See Marina Management Servs., Inc. v. Vessel My Girls, 202 F.3d 315 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (affirming dismissal of counterclaims “designed primarily to harass”); Kramer v. Tribe, 
156 F.R.D. 96, 101 (D.N.J. 1994) (granting Rule 11 dismissal as an alternative ground to 
dismiss a vindictive and harassing frivolous suit). See generally JOSEPH, supra note 57, § 
16(B)(9) (“The courts’ authority to dismiss an action, pleading, claim or defense as a remedy 
for a Rule 11 violation is well settled.”). See also Hutchinson v. Hensley Flying Serv., Inc., No. 
98-35361, 2000 WL 11432, at *1 n.1 (D. Mont. Jan. 6, 2000 ) (rejecting the argument that 
dismissal is not an appropriate remedy after the 1993 amendments to Rule 11). 
 196.  Rulemakers evidently considered improper purpose as a special form of violation 
that must be brought home to the party herself. At one point in the drafting of the 1993 
amendments, rulemakers considered isolating Rule 11(b)(1) as the lone rule violation that 
might warrant monetary sanctions against the client. See Letter from Sam Pointer, Jr., Chair-
man Advisory Committee on Civil Rights, to Robert Keeton, Chairman Standing Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 1, 1992), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 525 (1993) 
(stating that the “draft would have restricted the imposition of monetary sanctions upon a rep-
resented party to situations in which the party was responsible for a violation of Rule 11(b)(1) 
papers filed to harass or for the improper purpose”). The final version kept the full range of 
sanctions for Rule 11(b)(1) violations and also made the client potentially responsible for 
monetary sanctions for factual errors in violation of Rule 11(b)(3) or (b)(4). 
 197.  See Dixon v. Caulfield, No. C-96-3837-VRW, 1997 WL 414163 (N.D. Cal. July 
11, 1997) (determining that dismissal was the only effective deterrent where plaintiff filed 
complaint to harass defendants). 
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sessed an improper motive, the best way to stop her continued viola-
tion of Rule 11(b)(1) would be to dismiss her claim and bar her 
from ever bringing it again. 
But what if Judge Wright found Ms. Jones had a proper purpose 
but her lawyers did not?198 The short answer is that Judge Wright 
technically could have dismissed the complaint even under these cir-
cumstances but it is not likely she would have done so. The advisory 
committee warned courts to be wary of punishing any person, 
whether party or lawyer, for a violation for which he or she was not 
responsible. The committee instructed: “The sanction should be im-
posed on the persons— whether attorneys, law firms, or parties—
who have violated the rule or who may be determined to be respon-
sible for the violation.”199 Under this admonition, the court likely 
would have issued sanctions only against Ms. Jones’s lawyers or their 
law firms, in the form of monetary fines or disciplinary referrals.200 
Yet, nothing in the rule itself would have foreclosed dismissal if the 
court found it to be the best deterrent. 
A final concern related to the hypothesized Rule 11 motion by 
President Clinton is the 1993 revision of the methodology for rais-
ing Rule 11 issues. The 1993 rulemakers were troubled by the fre-
quency with which parties relied upon the 1983 rule to launch at-
tacks against their opponents and thus distract the courts and parties 
from the main case.201 Rulemakers amended the procedure for rais-
ing Rule 11 issues in order to reduce this satellite litigation.202 First, 
they provided a “safe harbor,” under which the party could withdraw 
the supposedly offending paper and avoid Rule 11 sanctions. The 
 
 198.  As noted in Part I.C, if Ms. Jones’s lawyers had a political motive, they violated Rule 
11(b)(1) by “presenting [the complaint] for any improper purpose.” 
 199.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1993). 
 200.  A lawyer who pursued a case for his own ill motives usually would violate a number 
of rules of professional conduct. In particular, such a situation would likely constitute an im-
permissible conflict of interest between lawyer and client. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.7(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from representing a client if the 
lawyer’s own interests material limit his representation of the client). In addition, some rules 
arguably bar a lawyer from presenting a claim for improper purposes, even meritorious claims. 
See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102(A)(1) (barring a lawyer 
from filing suit “when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to 
harass or maliciously injure another”); see also Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 13 (as-
sessing the motive restrictions in the professional rules under the Petition Clause). 
 201.  See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 108, § 1332. 
 202. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1993) (stating that the changes 
“should reduce the number of motions for sanctions”). 
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safe harbor takes an odd form. Under the new Rule 11(c)(1)(A), a 
party cannot simply file a Rule 11 motion with the court. He first 
must serve the motion on his opponent, wait 21 days, and then file 
his motion with the court only if his opponent does not withdraw or 
otherwise correct the paper within the waiting period.203 
Second, rulemakers required that Rule 11 motions be made by 
separate motion.204 No longer can a defendant simply ask for Rule 11 
sanctions at the end of his Rule 12 motion to dismiss or Rule 56 
motion for summary judgment. He must file a separate motion dedi-
cated solely to Rule 11. Although this change might seem to increase 
paperwork—through the requirement of a separate paper—it forces 
parties to more carefully consider (and perhaps not raise) their Rule 
11 arguments.205 
These revisions may deter motions for sanctions, but they do not 
foreclose them and they would not have prevented the President 
from attempting to use Rule 11 as a means to dismiss the Jones suit. 
First, the President could have complied with the safe harbor rule. 
He simply had to serve the motion on Ms. Jones and wait to see if 
she dropped her case. When she did not, he could have filed his mo-
tion with the court. Second, he could make this Rule 11(b)(1) ar-
gument by separate motion. This requirement did not require that 
the President file any other motion, such as a motion for summary 
judgment, but rather only that he not combine his Rule 11 argu-
ments if he in fact filed such other motion. The President’s motion 
would not be joined with any other. In fact, this would be the point 
of the hypothetical motion by the President: ask for an independent 
determination of Ms. Jones’s compliance with Rule 11, entirely sepa-
rate from the merits of her claims. 
 
 203.  See supra note 183 (reprinting Rule 11(c)(1)(A)). The advisory committee noted 
that “[u]nder the former rule, parties were sometimes reluctant to abandon a questionable 
contention lest that be viewed as evidence of a violation of Rule 11; under the revision, the 
timely withdrawal of a contention will protect a party against a motion for sanctions.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1993). 
 204.  See supra note 183 (reprinting Rule 11 (c)) (providing that a “motion for sanctions 
under this rule shall be made separately from other motions or requests”). 
 205.  The advisory committee did not elaborate on the purpose of this requirement, other 
than noting that it was tied to safe harbor provision, which in turn was meant to secure volun-
tary compliance and curb the number of motions filed with the court: “The rule provides that 
requests for sanctions must be made as a separate motion, i.e., not simply included as an addi-
tional prayer for relief contained in another motion. The motion for sanctions is not, however, 
to be filed until at least 21 days . . . after being served.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory commit-
tee’s note (1993). 
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Whether the President could have used this procedure to avoid 
addressing the merits altogether would have been a timing question 
within the discretion of Judge Wright. The President would have 
needed some court action if he wanted to avoid filing his answer to 
the complaint. The new twenty-one-day waiting period in Rule 
11(c) ordinarily means that a defendant must file his answer before 
his Rule 11 motion, since the time for answering is twenty days.206 
However, any defendant can move to extend the time for filing an 
answer.207 In the actual Jones case, the President requested and re-
ceived a special stay to present his immunity arguments.208 Given the 
Supreme Court’s instruction to accommodate the President,209 Judge 
Wright might have been open to the idea of staying other proceed-
ings and first hearing a Rule 11 motion, which would have focused 
exclusively on the plaintiff’s motive and therefore not have distracted 
the President from his official duties. On the other extreme, Judge 
Wright could have taken the advisory committee’s suggestion and 
deferred the President’s Rule 11 motion until after she ruled on the 
merits of Ms. Jones claims.210 
In sum, although the history and purpose of the 1993 rule 
changes certainly do not encourage such a motion, the rule would 
permit the President to raise Rule 11(b)(1) as a basis to dismiss Ms. 
Jones’s claims. This view is not as extraordinary as it might seem. 
Judge Wright in her statement concerning Rule 11 sanctions sug-
gested such an approach. By noting that “[t]he President never chal-
lenged the legitimacy of plaintiff’s lawsuit by filing a motion pursu-
ant to Rule 11,”211 she suggested that she would have been open to 
the possibility of dismissal—the ultimate “challenge” to a lawsuit. Af-
 
 206.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A). 
 207.  Generally, a party may ask the court for more time to do any act required under the 
rules. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b) (“the court for cause shown may at any time in its discre-
tion . . . order the period enlarged”). 
 208.  See Jones v. Clinton, 858 F. Supp. 902 (E.D. Ark. 1994). 
 209.  See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 707 (1997) (stating that “[t]he high respect 
that is owed to the office of Chief Executive, though not justifying a rule of categorical immu-
nity, is a matter that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding, including the timing 
and scope of discovery”). 
 210.  See supra note 165 and accompanying text; see also Lichtenstein v. Consol. Servs. 
Group, 173 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that “[c]ourts should, and often do, defer 
consideration of certain kinds of sanctions motions until the end of trial to gain a full sense of 
the case and to avoid unnecessary delay” and that “[t]his is a sensible practice where the thrust 
of the sanctions motion is that institution of the case itself was improper”). 
 211.  See supra note 5. 
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ter all, dismissal, as opposed to monetary sanctions, would be the 
only way in which the President could have avoided giving the mis-
leading deposition testimony for which she chastised the President. 
This does not mean that Judge Wright would have awarded this 
sanction, only that she would consider it. Rule 11 allowed her, and 
the President, that option. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION: MEASURING MS. JONES’S 
RIGHT TO PETITION COURTS AGAINST RULE 11(b)(1) 
The next inquiry is whether the Petition Clause would have per-
mitted Judge Wright to assess Rule 11 sanctions based solely on Ms. 
Jones’s motive. The Petition Clause itself—the right “to petition the 
government for redress of grievances”212—does not immediately 
suggest an answer. The issue requires a multiple level analysis: first, 
establish that the right to petition extends to the courts; second, de-
fine the right; and finally apply a variety of protective doctrines to 
test the right against Rule 11(b)(1). 
In Part II.A, I confirm that court access is part of the right to pe-
tition. This idea was the focus of extensive analysis in my first article 
concerning the Petition Clause, and I only briefly recap that analysis 
here.213 Likewise, in Part II.B, I recap my prior efforts to define the 
scope of the right of court access. I conclude that the “core” right 
under the Petition Clause is the right of an individual to file a win-
ning claim in court, regardless of her motive. Although it would 
seem that this definition would end the analysis—given that Ms. 
Jones lost her suit at summary judgment—the first two steps of my 
analysis are only discussions in the abstract. Actual safeguarding of 
the right depends on application of the protective doctrines of the 
First Amendment, which can have the effect of broadening the zone 
of protected activity. Application of these doctrines is the heart of 
the Petition Clause analysis. Thus, in Part II.C, I apply strict scrutiny 
and breathing room analyses and test application of Rule 11(b)(1) 
against Ms. Jones’s First Amendment right of court access. Under 
this analysis, I conclude that any use of Rule 11(b)(1) to sanction or 
deter Ms. Jones from filing her claims, based solely on her motive, 
would have violated her rights under the First Amendment. 
 
 212.  See supra note 2 (reprinting First Amendment). 
 213.  See Access to Court, supra note 13. 
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A. Basing a Right of Court Access in the First Amendment 
The right to petition dates back to at least 1215, when the 
Magna Carta allowed barons to petition the king for redress of at 
least some of their grievances.214 In 1685, the English Bill of Rights 
guaranteed the “right of the subjects to petition the king” and pro-
vided “that, for redress of all grievances . . . [P]arliaments ought to 
be held frequently.”215 English colonists in America petitioned both 
the government in England216 and their local colonial governments 
concerning public and private matters.217 When the colonies declared 
independence, many new state constitutions specifically preserved 
the people’s right to petition the state legislatures.218 
Although most historical expressions of the petition right spoke 
only of the legislative branch, the right to petition traditionally in-
cluded the right to seek private redress. Petitions to the legislature 
often were private claims. Both the English Parliament and the colo-
nial legislatures regularly acted as courts in deciding private dis-
putes.219 This was the practice even in the state governments that de-
 
 214.  See 1215 MAGNA CARTA, ch. 61, translated and reprinted in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA 
CARTA 468–73 (Cambridge University Press 2d ed. 1992) (1965) (“[I]f we or . . . any of our 
servants offend against anyone in any way . . . four barons shall come to us or our justiciar, if 
we are out of the kingdom, and shall bring it to our notice and ask that we have it redressed 
without delay.”) 
 215.  BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 43 (1971). 
 216.  Colonial charters typically granted colonists the “liberties of an Englishman.” See 
Don L. Smith, The Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances: Constitutional Development 
and Interpretations 10–45 (1971) (unpublished dissertation in Government, Texas Tech Uni-
versity) (on file with author) (describing charters and their relationship to the right to peti-
tion). 
 217.  Some colonial charters expressly preserved the right to petition the local govern-
ment. See, e.g., THE MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES (1641), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, 
supra note 215, at 73 (“Every man . . . shall have libertie to come to any publique Court, 
Councel, or Towne meeting, and either by speech or writeing, . . . to present any necessary 
motion, complaint, petition, Bill or information.” (original spelling)). 
 218.  Maryland, for example, declared that “every man hath a right to petition the Legis-
lature, for the redress of grievances, in a peaceable and orderly manner.” MARYLAND 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XI (1776), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 215, at 281. 
For a complete listing and reproduction of the early state constitutional statements of the right 
to petition, see Access to Court, supra note 13, at n.159. 
 219.  See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, 
at 154–55 (1969) (describing colonial legislative practice and noting that “[t]hey continually 
tried cases”); see also JAMES S. HART, JUSTICE UPON PETITION: THE HOUSE OF LORDS AND 
THE REFORMATION OF JUSTICE 1621–1675, at 3 (1991) (describing the judicial practices of 
the House of Lords in the seventeenth century). 
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clared, in their new constitutions, a separation of powers between 
the judicial and legislative branches.220 The legislature was the most 
powerful and active branch of the early state governments, and it was 
to that branch that the people often turned when they needed help 
from their government. 
The framers of the Federal Constitution broke away from the 
state model of government, in which the legislature was supreme, 
and established the new federal government as three co-equal 
branches. The Federal Constitution gives the judicial power to the 
courts alone.221 Significantly, the Federal Petition Clause also departs 
from the early state examples of petition clauses. The First Amend-
ment gives the people the right to petition “the government,” not 
just the legislature, and corresponds with the new division of federal 
power.222 Thus, when read in light of its history and in context of the 
Federal Constitution, the Petition Clause seems to preserve the right 
to petition courts for redress of private claims. 
Likewise, the policies behind the petition right extend to the 
courts. The Petition Clause serves many of the same values as the 
Speech Clause, but the right to petition protects a particular type of 
speech—requests to the government for redress of grievances—and 
serves special policies. Petitions give citizens a chance to peacefully 
seek change and participate in and inform their government.223 These 
 
 220.  Six of the original thirteen states—Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, North Carolina, and Virginia—expressly declared a separation of powers in their consti-
tutions. See Access to Court, supra note 13, at 609 n.170. In the Federalist Papers, James Madi-
son stated that the Virginia legislature “in many instances, decided rights which should have 
been left to judiciary controversy” and that the intrusion was “becoming habitual and familiar.” 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 62 (James Madison) (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON 
THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, 195 (Lester DeKoster ed., 1976)). 
 221.  Article III states that “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall be vested in 
one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). Congress, on the other hand, re-
ceived under Article I only “legislative [p]owers.” Id., art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 222.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. See supra note 2 (reprinting First Amendment). James Madi-
son’s proposed first draft of the Petition Clause mentioned only petitions to the federal legisla-
ture and seemingly would not have included the right to ask for judicial relief from the federal 
government, in light of the new distribution of powers in the federal constitution. See 2 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 215, at 1026 (reprinting Madison’s proposal). The House Select 
Committee, of which Madison was a member, soon revised Madison’s proposal and stated a 
right to petition the entire “government.” See id. at 1122. The House approved the proposed 
amendment on August 24, 1789. See id. at 1138. The Senate modified slightly the House ver-
sion but left intact the reference to the government. See Senate Journal (Aug.–Sept. 1789), 
reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 215, at 1149. 
 223.  See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (declaring that the peti-
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aims are served by petitions to the courts as well as the other 
branches. Courts certainly provide a peaceful mechanism for dispute 
settlement, and they also allow people, through their civil com-
plaints, to attempt to advance the law and cure societal ills. 
The Supreme Court first recognized this link between the peti-
tion right and courts in 1963, in the landmark case of NAACP v. 
Button.224 In Button, the NAACP encouraged blacks in Virginia to 
utilize NAACP lawyers and file school desegregation suits. Virginia 
attempted to stop the NAACP activity by charging that the group 
violated statutes against solicitation of legal business. The Court held 
that the First Amendment protected the NAACP litigation efforts. 
The Court relied primarily on other First Amendment rights, that of 
association and expression, but it also recognized that the Petition 
Clause extended to the NAACP litigation activity: 
[T]he First Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly 
of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion. . . . In the context 
of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving pri-
vate differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of 
equality of treatment by all government, federal, state and local, for 
the members of the Negro community in this country. It is thus a 
form of political expression. Groups which find themselves unable 
to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the 
courts. . . . And under the conditions of modern government, liti-
gation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to 
petition for redress of grievances.225  
Since Button, the right of court access has had a turbulent history 
in the Court. The Court in the early 1970s rejected most efforts to 
 
tion right is implicit in the “very idea of government, republican in form”). 
 224.  371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
 225.  Id. at 429–30 (emphasis added). The Court further explained the relationship be-
tween litigation and more traditional views of First Amendment freedoms: 
We need not, in order to find constitutional protection for the kind of cooperative, 
organizational activity disclosed by this record, whereby Negroes seek through law-
ful means to achieve legitimate political ends, subsume such activity under a narrow, 
literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly. . . . 
The NAACP is not a conventional political party; but the litigation it assists, while 
serving to vindicate the legal rights of the members of the American Negro commu-
nity, at the same time and perhaps more importantly, makes possible the distinctive 
contribution of a minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our society. For such a  
group, association for litigation may be the most effective form of political associa-
tion. 
Id. at 430–31. 
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establish a due process right of civil plaintiffs to gain access to 
court,226 but it repeatedly recognized an independent right of pris-
oners to gain access to court, at least to challenge their sentence or 
conditions of confinement.227 The right of court access under the Pe-
tition Clause was largely overlooked in these due process228 and pris- 
oner cases even though the Court elsewhere was developing the peti-
tion right. 
First, beginning in 1964, the Court applied Button to private, 
personal injury litigation in a trilogy of cases involving labor union 
efforts to encourage and assist members in litigation against their 
employers. In each, the Court relied on the rights of association and 
expression but also the right to petition. For example, in Brotherhood 
of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar,229 the Court protected a 
union service for settlement of claims under the Federal Employer’s 
Liability Act:230 “The State can no more keep these workers from us-
 
 226.  In a trilogy of cases, indigent individuals challenged the requirement that they pay a 
fee in order to file their complaint. The Court in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), 
held that due process protected the right of indigent divorce claimants to gain free access to 
court, but only because courts are the only means to dissolve a marriage and marriage is of 
fundamental importance. See id. at 375–76, 382–83. The Court held that most other indigent 
plaintiffs do not enjoy such a due process right of access to court. See United States v. Kras, 
409 U.S. 434, 444–45 (1973) (denying due process right of access to bankruptcy petitioner 
because an alleged bankrupt’s interest “does not rise to the same constitutional level” as the 
“associational” interest in dissolving a marriage and that “a debtor, in theory, and often in ac-
tuality, may adjust his debts by negotiated agreement with his creditors”); Ortwein v. Schwab, 
410 U.S. 656, 656 (1973) (per curiam) (denying due process right of access to welfare claim-
ant because the interest in welfare payments “has less constitutional significance” than divorce 
and the claimant has access to the administrative hearing process). See generally Access to Court, 
supra note 13, at 567–71 (discussing the Court’s treatment of court access under due process). 
 227.  The right of court access for prisoners does not apply to ordinary citizens. The 
Court has suggested that this unique right of court access rests upon both the habeas clause 
and equal protection, but it now bases this right on due process. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 
U.S. 539, 579 (1974) (“The right of access to the courts, upon which [prisoner access cases] 
were premised, is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied 
the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental 
constitutional rights.”). But see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 838–40 (1977) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s declaration of a “fundamental right of access to the 
courts [for prisoners] . . . is found nowhere in the Constitution”). See generally Access to Court, 
supra note 13, at 571–76 (discussing the Court’s holdings in prisoner court access cases). 
 228.  During this “early” period, a very few academic commentators urged reliance on the 
First Amendment, including the Petition Clause, as an alternative to the Court’s restrictive 
reading of due process, to give indigent plaintiffs the ability to gain access to court. See Brick-
man, supra note 3; Note, A First Amendment Right of Access to the Court for Indigents, 82 
YALE L.J. 1055 (1973). 
 229.  377 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 230.  See id. at 1–5. 
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ing their cooperative plan to advise one another than it could use 
more direct means to bar them from resorting to the courts to vindi-
cate their legal rights. The right to petition the courts cannot be so 
handicapped.”231 Within the next seven years, the Court twice again 
applied the right to union efforts to organize private injury litiga-
tion232 and thus put to rest any notion that the Petition Clause pro-
tected only “political” litigation such as that in Button.233 
Meanwhile, the Court was further developing the right of court 
access under the Petition Clause in an entirely separate line of cases, 
under the antitrust laws. It began in 1961 with Eastern Railroad 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.234 There, railroads 
lobbied the governor to veto legislation that benefited truckers, and 
the truckers sued the railroads in antitrust, charging that the rail-
roads’ lobbying efforts were intended to “destroy” competition by 
the truckers.235 The Court held that, despite the apparent breadth of  
the Sherman Act,236 the Act did not reach such lobbying activity. 
The Court based this limitation on both antitrust policies237 and the 
Petition Clause: the “right of petition is one of the freedoms pro-
tected by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute 
 
 231. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 232.  United Mine Workers, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Assoc. 389 U.S. 217, 223 
(1967) (holding that “Button and Trainmen cases are controlling” and that “the grievances for 
redress of which the right of petition was insured . . . are not solely religious or political 
ones”); United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich. 401 U.S. 576, 585–86 (1971) (holding 
that the “collective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a funda-
mental right within the protection of the First Amendment”). Id. at 585. 
 233.  See United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 223 (noting that “in Trainmen, where the 
litigation in question was, as here, solely designed to compensate victims of industrial acci-
dents, we rejected the contention made in dissent, . . . that the principles announced in Button 
were applicable only to litigation for political purposes”). 
 234.  365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
 235.  See id. at 129, 139. 
 236.  The filing of a meritorious suit could constitute an unfair trade practice under the 
literal terms of the Sherman Act, if its intent and effect were to restrain competition. Section 1 
of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Section 2 punishes “[e]very person who shall mo-
nopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or person, 
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce.” Id. § 2. 
 237.  The Court held that political activity is essentially different from the commercial 
activity that the Sherman Act was meant to regulate. See Eastern Railroad Presidents Confer-
ence v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137–38 (1961) [hereinafter Noerr]; see also 
David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Peti-
tioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293 (1994) (discussing the 
“essential dissimilarity” rationale for Noerr). 
1AND-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  9:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
54 
to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.”238 In 1972, the 
Court in California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited 239 ex-
tended Noerr antitrust immunity to petitions directed at courts: 
The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups of 
them to administrative agencies . . . and to courts, the third branch 
of Government. Certainly, the right to petition extends to all de-
partments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is in-
deed but one aspect of the right of petition.240 
In a significant development for broader recognition of the right 
to petition courts, the Court in 1983, applied California Motor 
Transport outside of the antitrust arena, to the federal labor laws, 
and to an individual plaintiff. In Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. 
NLRB,241 an employer retaliated against picketing employees by su-
ing them for defamation, based on the leaflets that the employees 
distributed.242 The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) en-
joined the employer’s lawsuit as an unfair labor practice, in violation 
of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).243 A unanimous 
Court reversed, holding that the NLRB had unduly interfered with 
the employer’s petition right of access to court: 
 
 
 238.  Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138. 
 239.  404 U.S. 508 (1972). 
 240.  Id. at 510 (emphasis added). The California Motor Transport pronouncement was 
dictum in that the Court ultimately held that the defendants’ adjudication efforts were “sham” 
(i.e., baseless claims) and therefore not protected petitioning. See id. at 510, 513. See also infra 
notes 245–52, 262–66 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s “sham” exception to 
petitioning immunity). 
 241.  461 U.S. 731 (1983). 
 242.  See id. at 733–34. The employer also alleged that the employees tortiously interfered 
with its business. The state court granted summary judgment on the tortious interference claim 
but denied it for the defamation claim. See id. 
 243.  The Court acknowledged that the literal terms of the NLRA were broad enough to 
attach to a meritorious civil suit. See id. at 742. The NLRA provides that is an “unfair labor 
practice” for an employer: 
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed in [Section 7 of the NLRA, which guarantees employees the right to self-
organize, form unions, and engage in other concerted actions of their mutual aid or 
protection]: 
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed 
charges or given testimony under this chapter . . . 
 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). See Motive Restrictions, supra note 13, at Part II.C.2 (discussing 
NLRA and its potential prohibition of meritorious lawsuits). 
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In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 
508, 510 (1972), we recognized that the right of access to the 
courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the 
Government for redress of grievances. Accordingly, we construed 
the antitrust laws as not prohibiting the filing of a lawsuit, regard-
less of the plaintiff’s anticompetitive intent or purpose in doing so, 
unless the suit was a “mere sham” filed for harassment pur-
poses. . . . We should be sensitive to these First Amendment values 
in construing the NLRA in the present context. . . . The right of 
access to a court is too important to be called an unfair labor prac-
tice solely on the ground that what is sought in court is to enjoin 
employees from exercising a protected right.244 
In this line of cases, however, the Court did not recognize an 
unqualified right of court access. Beginning as early as Noerr, the 
Court imposed a “sham” limitation on the petition right: petitions 
that were not “genuine” were not protected from antitrust liabil-
ity.245 In California Motor Transport, the Court confused the issue 
by stating a number of different tests for unprotected sham litiga-
tion.246 In Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, the Court stated a two-tiered 
test: the plaintiff’s right to continue ongoing litigation was protected 
 
 244.  Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983). See also id. at 
742–43. “Considering the First Amendment right of access to the courts and the state inter-
ests . . . we conclude that . . . [t]he filing and prosecution of a well-founded lawsuit may not be 
enjoined as an unfair labor practice, even if it would not have been commenced but for the 
plaintiffs desire to retaliate.” Id. at 751–52 (Brennan J., concurring) (acknowledging that the 
Petition Clause extended to the courts and that the narrow interpretation of the NLRA has 
“constitutional resonances”). 
 245.  Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 
144 (1961) (holding that the railroads’ lobbying efforts were not sham and were “not only 
genuine but also highly successful”). 
 246.  On the one hand, the Court suggested that “sham” litigation was that used to har-
ass. California Motor Transp. Co., 404 U.S. at 511 (noting that the power, strategy, and re-
sources of the petitioners were used “to harass and deter respondents in their use of adminis-
trative and judicial proceedings”). At other points, the Court seemed to define “sham” as 
litigation without objective merit. See id. at 512 (“petitioners ‘instituted the proceedings and 
actions . . . with or without probable cause and regardless of the merits of the cases’”); id. at 
513 (suggesting that defendants’ actions constituted “a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims”). 
The Court also suggested that sham litigation might be broader than the sham test applicable 
to political lobbying, such as that in Noerr. See id. at 512–13. See generally Thomas A. Balmer, 
Sham Litigation and the Antitrust Law, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 39, 47 (1980) (discussing the “per-
plexity” of California Motor Transport ); William R. Jacobs, The Quagmire Thickens: A Post-
California Motor View of the Antitrust and Constitutional Ramifications of Petitioning the  
Government, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 281, 301 (1973) (noting problems created by California 
Motor Transport). 
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so long as her suit presented some genuine issue of fact, but after 
completion of the suit, only a prevailing plaintiff enjoyed absolute 
protection.247 
I discuss this merits limitation at length in the next part,248 but its 
importance here is that it prompted the Court in 1993 to issue its 
most influential decision concerning the right to petition courts.249 
In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus-
tries, Inc.,250 another antitrust case, the Court attempted to clarify 
California Motor Transport and held that, in order to constitute a 
“sham,” and thus fall outside of Noerr petitioning immunity, litiga-
tion must be both objectively unreasonable and made in subjective 
bad faith.251 If the claim is objectively reasonable, motive is irrele-
vant, the claim is not a sham and its filing is immune from antitrust 
liability.252 Perhaps due to this clear definition of litigation protected 
under the Noerr petitioning immunity, an ever growing number of 
legal commentators253 and other courts254 are recognizing a universal 
 
 247.  See Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc., 461 U.S. at 748–49. See also infra notes 263–64 
(reprinting the Bill Johnson’s Restaurants tests). 
 248.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 249.  In two other cases since Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, the Court has recognized the 
right to petition courts, but only in dicta. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (“Fil-
ing of a complaint is a form of petitioning activity.”); Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 897 
(1984) (“The First Amendment right protected in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants is plainly a ‘right 
of access to the courts . . . for redress of alleged wrongs.’”). 
 250.  508 U.S. 49 (1993). 
 251.  See id. at 57. 
 252.  “Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine the liti-
gant’s subjective motivation.” Id. at 60. 
 253.  See, e.g., David K. Godschalk, Protected Petitioning or Unlawful Retaliation? The 
Limits of First Amendment Immunity for Lawsuits Under the Fair Housing Act, 27 PEPP. L. 
REV. 477 (2000) (recognizing that the Petition Clause protects access to court and limits the 
literal terms of the Fair Housing Act); James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to 
Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 
91 NW. U. L. REV. 899 (1997) (arguing that the Petition Clause protects the right to pursue 
claims against the government); Gary Myers, Antitrust and First Amendment Implications of 
Professional Real Estate Investors, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1199, 1253 (1994) (noting that 
Professional Real Estate Investors asks a constitutional question that requires a “reevaluation of 
an array of state and federal law governing litigation behavior”); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First 
Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut From a Different 
Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 58–64 (1993) (arguing that the Petition Clause applies 
to courts); Kara Elizabeth Shea (Recent Development), San Filippo v. Bongiovanni: The Public 
Concern Criteria and the Scope of the Modern Petition Right, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1697 (1995) 
(assessing the public employee’s right to petition courts); Note, A Petition Clause Analysis of 
Suits Against the Government: Implications for Rule 11 Sanctions, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1111 
(1993) [hereinafter, Note, Suits Against the Government] (arguing that suits against the gov-
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right, under the Petition Clause, to gain access to federal and state 
courts.255 
An individual’s First Amendment right of court access now seems 
to be the law of the land. Yet, it is still not a commonly known con-
stitutional precept. Indeed, in the Jones case itself, the parties and 
court litigated issues on the periphery of the Petition Clause right of 
court access but stopped short of acknowledging such a right. One 
such debate concerned the President’s claim of immunity and his 
 
ernment are “double” petitions deserving of heightened protection under the Petition Clause 
and requiring relaxation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11). 
 254.  See e.g., Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 914 (10th Cir. 2000) (recognizing a right to 
petition courts and citing the “[n]umerous other courts” that have applied the right to limit “a 
range of common law torts”); Mansky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1997) (“It is well 
established that all persons enjoy a constitutional right of access to the courts, although the 
source of this right has been variously located in the First Amendment right to petition for re-
dress, the Privileges and Immunities Clause . . . , and the Due Process Clause.”); San Filippo v. 
Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 434–35 (3d Cir. 1994) (The filing of “lawsuits . . . implicate[s] the 
petition clause . . . of the first amendment.”); Lyon v. Del Vande Krol, 940 F. Supp. 1433, 
1437 (S.D. Iowa 1996) (recognizing a fundamental right of court access under the right to 
petition); Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 948, 955 (S.D. Cal. 1996) 
(applying Noerr-Pennington to state law claims attacking the filing of a patent suit: “[t]he ma-
jority of courts who have considered the issue have concluded that the immunity is constitu-
tional and rooted in the First Amendment right to petition”); Armuchee Alliance v. King, 922 
F. Supp. 1541, 1549 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (“It is well-established that ‘the right of access to the 
courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of 
grievances.’”); Scioto County Reg’l Water Dist. No. 1 v. Scioto Water, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 692, 
702 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (“This Court agrees that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is not limited 
in application to antitrust claims. The doctrine is grounded on the First Amendment principle 
that an individual or entity has the right to pursue legitimate efforts to influence government 
decision-making and to approach the courts in order to obtain redress of grievances.”); Cove 
Road Dev. v. Western Cranston Indus. Parks Assoc., 674 A.2d 1234, 1237–38 (R.I. 1996) 
(holding that the Petition Clause protects access to court and thus limits common law torts, 
such as abuse of process and interference with contractual relations, that might otherwise im-
pose liability based solely on a plaintiff’s filing suit). 
 255.  The Petition Clause is ambiguous as to whether its petition right protects petitions 
to federal and state governments, and hence their courts. The clause refers only to “the gov-
ernment” and does not say which government. The drafters may have envisioned application 
only to the federal government, but the Court has not so limited the right to petition. For ex-
ample, in both Noerr and Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, the Court considered the extent to which 
federal law could restrict petitions to state government (the governor in Noerr and state courts 
in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants). This petition restriction problem is a different question than 
whether the limitation on the federal Congress in the Petition Clause also bars state govern-
ments from abridging the right to petition. This latter question has been termed one of “in-
corporation,” and despite early decisions to the contrary, the Court held in 1937 that the dic-
tates of the federal Petition Clause apply to states, by incorporation in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364–65 (1937) (applying the petition 
right to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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characterization of Ms. Jones’s claims as political and not worthy of 
distracting the President from his duties.256 In rejecting the Presi-
dent’s claim, the Eighth Circuit recognized Ms. Jones’s “constitu-
tional” right of court access, but it did not base that right in the Pe-
tition Clause.257 The parties engaged in a similar debate when 
President Clinton sought discovery concerning Ms. Jones’s financial 
sponsors and their activities.258 Ms. Jones and her backers opposed 
the discovery and invoked the First Amendment, including Button, 
but they did not rely upon any separate right of court access under 
the Petition Clause.259 I am not suggesting that Ms. Jones’s right to 
 
 256.  Indeed, the President’s arguments on this immunity issue were remarkably close to 
what they would have been under Rule 11(b)(1). He argued that Ms. Jones’s suit was politi-
cally motivated and not significant enough to trump his claim of immunity. See Jones v. Clin-
ton, 72 F.3d 1354, 1359–60 (8th Cir. 1996) (summarizing the President’s argument: “Mr. 
Clinton . . . would have us consider the nature of Mrs. Jones’s complaint, as well as the timing 
of the filing of her suit,” and rejecting “the suggestion that Mrs. Jones’s motives in filing suit, 
alleged to be political should be examined, and that her suit should be dismissed if we are per-
suaded that her objective in bringing suit is less than pure”). 
 257.  The Eighth Circuit did not specify any provision of the constitution but instead re-
lied upon Marbury v. Madison: 
Mrs. Jones is constitutionally entitled to access to the courts and to the equal pro-
tection of the laws. “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of 
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.” 
Marbury v. Madison . . . . Mrs. Jones retains that right in her suit against Mr. Clin-
ton, regardless of what her claims may be or when her suit was filed (if otherwise 
timely filed), provided that she is not challenging actions that fall within the ambit 
of official presidential responsibility. We further reject the suggestion that Mrs. 
Jones’s motives in filing suit, alleged to be political, should be examined, and that 
her suit should be dismissed if we are persuaded that her objective in bringing suit is 
less than pure. 
Id. (citations omitted). Likewise, Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury did not cite any particular 
constitutional provision and instead relied upon only the English legal historian, Sir William 
Blackstone. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). For a discussion of 
Sir Blackstone’s writings on the right to judicial remedy, see Access to Court, supra note 13, at 
600–03. 
 258.  See Jones v. Clinton, Order, Nov. 25, 1997 (granting limited discovery concerning 
the legal fund-raising but denying discovery concerning the individual donors on the ground 
that such compelled disclosure “would chill expressive activity not only in this case, but in fu-
ture cases as well”). 
 259.  See Jones v. Clinton, Memorandum In Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective 
Order Regarding the Subpoena For Documents Served on the Paula Jones Legal Fund, Oct. 
30, 1997 (arguing that “[s]upport of litigation is a form of expression and association pro-
tected by the first amendment”). The President constructed the issue as whether the rights of 
association and expression protect “non-political” litigation and related activities. See Jones v. 
Clinton, President Clinton’s Opposition to Motions of Paula Jones and Paula Jones Legal 
Fund For Protective Order, Oct. 30, 1997 (on file with author) (arguing that the Jones suit  
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petition would have trumped a claim of executive immunity, or that 
the Petition Clause governed the discovery dispute (those questions 
are for another day and another article260), but instead merely noting 
that the petition right never arose in the debate. 
We are thus left with an emerging right of court access, one that 
seems to be accepted but yet not well known. Recognition of the 
right itself is only the first step in assessing the impact of the Petition 
Clause in the Jones case. The next step is to define the basic parame-
ters of the right. 
B. Defining the Scope of the Right to Petition Courts 
The right of “court access” has little meaning without some 
definition. Does it mean that a litigant such as Ms. Jones can do and 
say anything in court, or, on the other extreme, does it merely allow 
her entry into the courthouse? The petition right, like its companion 
right of speech, will require many years, perhaps decades, to gain 
definition. Each new case will add further insight into the scope of 
the right to petition courts. This article, which tests the right in the 
Jones case, is one more step toward a better understanding of the Pe-
tition Clause right of court access.261 
There are a number of ways in which we could attempt to define 
the right to petition courts. Here, I set out four basic parameters of 
the right that I believe are relevant to Ms. Jones’s case. I draw these 
primarily from the Supreme Court’s few decisions concerning judi-
cial petitions, but I also rely upon the history and context of the peti-
tion right. These four parameters of the “core right” to petition 
courts are: (1) the right extends only to winning claims; (2) the right 
applies regardless of motive; (3) the right extends to both an indi-
 
does not involve “over-arching political or policy goals” and that the fund’s activities do not 
involve expressive activity). 
 260.  Professor James Pfander argues that the Petition Clause right of court access trumps 
the concept of sovereign immunity, but he does address the President’s claim of executive 
immunity in Jones. See Pfander, supra note 253. 
 261.  Indeed, in each of my efforts to define the meaning of the right to petition courts, I 
have refined and subtly adjusted both my analysis and my conclusions. For example, in a prior 
article, I wrote that the “government is free . . . to assess subsequent punishment on baseless 
claims” and that motive could “enhance the penalty for violations of Rule 11.” Motive Restric-
tions, supra note 13, at 788, 797. In this article, I caution against use of motive as a punish-
ment or penalty enhancement, even as to frivolous suits, where the prohibition is vague or di-
rected to the political motives of the plaintiff in filing suit. See infra at notes 371–85 and 
accompanying text. 
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vidual and to groups of plaintiffs; and (4) the right is one of initial 
access only and does not extend to the subsequent processing of the 
claim. These parameters define the core right under the Petition 
Clause—that which the First Amendment most values—and they do 
so only in the abstract. Meaningful understanding of the right re-
quires application of protective doctrines such as strict scrutiny and 
breathing room analyses to an actual constraint on the right, such as 
Rule 11. As I will show in Part II.C below, these protective doctrines 
will have the practical effect of broadening the protection of the Peti-
tion Clause beyond the narrow parameters of the core right. 
1. The right to file winning claims 
As I note in the preceding Part, the Court has not recognized an 
absolute right to petition courts. In Bill Johnson’s Restaurants and 
Professional Real Estate Investors, the Court imposed a “sham” or 
merits limitation on the right and suggested this limitation, as op-
posed to the plaintiff’s motive, defines the right to seek redress in 
court.262 Thus, the Court has given us a starting point for defining 
the Petition Clause right of court access, but it is only a start. The 
Court’s opinions leave a number of gaps. In order to determine the 
proper definition of the right to petition courts, we must not only 
dissect the cases in detail but also review the history, context and 
policies of the Petition Clause. 
An initial problem presented by Bill Johnson’s Restaurants and 
Professional Real Estate Investors is the fact that the two cases use a 
different standard of merit for civil complaints. The Court in Bill 
Johnson’s Restaurants defined “meritorious” suits as claims that pre-
vail and proceed to judgment, and it gave absolute immunity only to 
those winning claims.263 Under Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, losing 
 
 262.  See supra notes 245–52 and accompanying text (discussing sham limitation). 
 263.  The Court’s explanation of its meritorious standard is confusing, but, as the itali-
cized portions below illustrate, the Court ultimately equated claims on which the employer 
wins judgment as the “meritorious” claims demanding full protection from the NLRA: 
In instances where the Board must allow the lawsuit to proceed, if the employer’s 
case in the state court ultimately proves meritorious and he has judgment against the 
employees, the employer should also prevail before the Board, for the filing of a meri-
torious law suit, even for a retaliatory motive, is not an unfair labor practice. If 
judgment goes against the employer in the state court, however, or if his suit is with-
drawn or is otherwise shown to be without merit, the employer has had its day in court, 
the interest of the State in providing a forum for its citizens has been vindicated, and 
the Board may then proceed to adjudicate the . . . unfair labor case. The employer’s 
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claims, no matter how meritorious, are not protected from ultimate 
liability under the NLRA; such claims receive protection only from 
injunction while they are on-going.264 The Court in Professional Real 
Estate Investors, on the other hand, fully protected meritorious 
claims. If the claim has objective merit at the time of its filing, its fil-
ing is immune from antitrust liability even if the claim ultimately 
loses at summary judgment or at trial.265 The winning claim standard 
of Bill Johnson’s Restaurants was dictum (the appeal concerned in-
junction of an on-going suit, not one that had lost at trial), and it is 
possible that the Court in Professional Real Estate Investors meant to 
change the Bill Johnson’s Restaurants winning claim standard. This 
interpretation is doubtful, given that the Professional Real Estate In-
vestors Court relied upon Bill Johnson’s Restaurants and cited it with 
approval.266 Unfortunately, the Court did not attempt to distinguish 
 
suit having proved unmeritorious, the Board would be warranted in taking that fact 
into account in determining whether the suit had been filed in retaliation for the ex-
ercise of the employees’ . . . rights. If a violation is found, the Board may order the 
employer to reimburse the employees whom he had wrongfully sued for their attor-
ney’s fees and other expenses. 
Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 747 (1983) (emphasis added); see also 
Godschalk, supra note 253 at 498–99 (describing the Bill Johnson’s Restaurants test as one of 
objective merit but noting that an “unmeritorious” suit is one that does not prevail). 
 264.  For on-going litigation, the Court adopted the test for summary judgment, whether 
the employer’s suit presents “any genuine issues of fact”: 
When a suit presents genuine factual issues, the state plaintiff’s First Amendment in-
terest in petitioning the state court for redress of his grievance, his interest in having 
the factual dispute resolved by a jury, and the State’s interest in protecting the 
health and welfare of its citizens, leads us to construe the Act as not permitting the 
Board to usurp the traditional fact-finding function of the state-court jury or judge. 
Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc., at 745. Non-meritorious suits that fail this test enjoy no pro-
tection from injunction. See id. at 744 (holding that “it is an enjoinable unfair labor practice to 
prosecute a baseless lawsuit with the intent of retaliating against an employee for the exercise of 
rights protected [under] the NLRA”). 
 265.  The claim at issue in Professional Real Estate Investors lost on summary judgment. 
See Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49, 53 (1993). The 
Court urged caution against too quickly condemning losing claims as lacking merit, id. at 60 
n.5, and found that the claim there had sufficient merit to avoid antitrust implications. See id. 
at 63. See supra notes 250–55. 
 266.  The Court based its rejection of a subjective limit on Noerr immunity in part on Bill 
Johnson’s Restaurants: 
Whether applying Noerr as an antitrust doctrine or invoking it in other contexts, we 
have repeatedly reaffirmed that evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose alone 
cannot transform otherwise legitimate activity into a sham. . . . Indeed, by analogy 
to Noerr’s sham exception, we held that even an “improperly motivated” lawsuit 
may not be enjoined under the National Labor Relations Act as an unfair labor prac-
tice unless such litigation is “baseless.” Bill Johnson’s Restaurants . . . . Our decisions 
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Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, so we must make the distinction. 
The difference in the standard likely results from the fact that the 
Petition Clause was only one factor in the Court’s interpretations of 
the statutes at issue in both cases. In Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, the 
Court expressed its reluctance to narrow the NLRA due to both the 
Congressional intent that the NLRA be applied as a broad remedial 
statute and the high risk of abuse in suits by a powerful employer 
against individual employees.267 Despite this reluctance, “weighty 
countervailing considerations”—the employer’s right to petition and 
the states’ interest in providing a judicial forum to its citizens—
compelled the Court to give some limited protection to the em-
ployer’s right to sue.268 The antitrust laws in Professional Real Estate 
Investors presented a different Congressional intent and a different 
mix of policies. First, the Court has not found a Congressional intent 
to broadly read the antitrust laws. The Court found as early as Noerr 
that Congress intended the antitrust laws to regulate only economic 
activity, not political petitioning.269 Furthermore, the risks of litiga-
tion abuse are not as high in the antitrust setting as they are in the 
labor context, because the typical dispute is between commercial 
competitors. There may be disparity between the competitors, but 
 
therefore establish that the legality of objectively reasonable petitioning “directed 
toward obtaining governmental action” is “not at all affected by any anticompetitive 
purpose [the actor] may have had.” 
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 508 U.S. at 59 (citations omitted). 
 267.  The Court stated: 
Sections 8(a)(1) and (4) of the Act are broad, remedial provisions that guarantee 
that employees will be able to enjoy their rights . . . [B]y suing an employee who 
files charges with the Board or engages in other protected activities, an employer can 
place its employees on notice that anyone who engages in such conduct is subjecting 
himself to the possibility of a burdensome lawsuit. Regardless of how unmeritorious 
the employer’s suit is, the employee will most likely have to retain counsel and incur 
substantial legal expenses to defend against it. . . . Furthermore, . . . the chilling ef-
fect of a state lawsuit upon an employee’s willingness to engage in protected activity 
is multiplied where the complaint seeks damages in addition to injunctive relief. . . . 
Where, as here, such a suit is filed against hourly-wage waitresses or other individu-
als who lack the backing of a union, the need to allow the Board to intervene and 
provide a remedy is at its greatest. 
Bill Johnson’s Restaurant, Inc., 461 U.S. at 740–41. 
 268.  See id. at 741 (finding that these interests were “weighty countervailing considera-
tions . . . that militate against allowing the [NLRB] to condemn the filing of a suit as an unfair 
labor practice”). I discuss the two counterveiling interests in the next subsection, infra Part 
II.B.2. 
 269.  Noerr, 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961). This is called the “essential dissimilarity” ration-
ale of Noerr petitioning immunity. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
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not as much as between an employer and an hourly worker. Thus, 
these policies, and not the Petition Clause, can explain the difference 
in protection between Professional Real Estate Investors and Bill John-
son’s Restaurants.270 
We are still left with the task of determining the constitutional 
standard. This task is not easy, given that even Bill Johnson’s Restau-
rants, the case setting the lesser standard, involved a mix of policies 
and First Amendment constraints. I further explore the constitu-
tional meaning of Bill Johnson’s Restaurants in the next subsection, 
but here we can conclude at a minimum that Professional Real Estate 
Investors does not set the constitutional standard. This is for the sim-
ple reason that Bill Johnson’s Restaurants would have permitted li-
ability to attach to the claims that Professional Real Estate Investors 
protected—meritorious but losing claims. In other words, the “core” 
right under the First Amendment extends only to winning claims. 
A winning claim standard seems unworkable. How could any 
plaintiff ever know at the outset whether her claim will prevail? In-
deed, as I argue in Part II.C below, this practical reality mandates 
protection beyond the core right and results in some protection to 
the plaintiff’s ability to file losing but meritorious claims. However, 
this protection comes as a form of New York Times “breathing 
room” aimed at safeguarding the core right of filing winning 
claims,271 not through definition of the core right itself, that which 
the First Amendment most values. 
That the core right covers winning claims is not an extraordinary 
concept. After all, only prevailing claims get “redress” from the gov-
ernment. Anglo-American courts have long placed a special value on 
winning claims. They historically required losing litigants, including 
plaintiffs, to pay damages, in the form of costs and attorney’s fees, to 
the winning party, but the courts did not so burden a winning plain-
 
 270.  Most observers take an all or nothing approach—Professional Real Estate Investors is 
either a constitutional mandate or entirely a question of antitrust policy. See generally supra 
notes 253–54 (citing relevant cases and commentary). A few courts, however, have recognized 
that part of the protection in Professional Real Estate Investors is required under the Petition 
Clause and that the remainder is a policy choice. See also Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n, 208 F.3d 885, 889 n.4 (10th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing Professional Real Estate 
Investors from Bill Johnson’s Restaurants and concluding that although the Petition Clause 
played a role in both cases, they involved other factors and must be limited to their particular 
contexts). 
 271.  I discuss the New York Times breathing room standards infra Part II.C. 
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tiff.272 The “American Rule,” which purports to limit fee awards 
against losing plaintiffs, is a relatively modern innovation and one 
that is riddled with exceptions in both federal and state courts.273 
These exceptions to the “American Rule” do not always distinguish 
between meritorious and frivolous losing suits, and some of the ex-
ceptions burden losing plaintiffs.274 These burdens might not survive 
modern breathing room analysis, but they underscore the special 
value of winning claims, that which is at the core of the petition 
right. 
2. The right to file claims regardless of motive 
A second question of definition is whether a plaintiff’s motive 
also defines the core right. Put another way, must the plaintiff have a 
proper motive in order to petition “for redress of grievances” within 
the meaning of the First Amendment? Bill Johnson’s Restaurants and 
Professional Real Estate Investors seem to say no. The issue in both 
cases was the effect of bad motive. The Court in Bill Johnson’s Res-
taurants stated the issue there as whether the NLRB could base 
NLRA liability solely on the employer’s retaliatory motive in filing 
suit, regardless of the merit of the underlying claim.275 The Court 
said no.276 The Court in Professional Real Estate Investors asked 
“whether litigation may be sham merely because a subjective expec-
tation of success does not motivate the litigant,”277 and the Court 
again answered no.278 Thus, under both Bill Johnson’s Restaurants 
 
 272.  See generally Motive Restrictions, supra note 13, at Part II.A. 
 273.  See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Per-
son’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1570–90 (1993) (summarizing the common 
law exceptions and the more than 2000 state and 200 federal statutes shifting attorney’s fees). 
 274.  See id. Moreover, the “American rule” applies only to attorneys’ fees: losing plain-
tiffs routinely pay other of the defendant’s expenses. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1994) (providing 
that “[a] judge or clerk or any court of the United States may tax as costs” certain listed items, 
such as marshal and clerk fees, court reporter fees, printing costs, and witness fees). 
 275.  The Court summarized the Board’s position: “[T]he Board does not regard lack of 
merit in the employer’s suit as an independent element of the § 8(a)(1) and § 8(a)(4) unfair 
labor practice. Rather, it asserts that the only essential element of a violation is retaliatory mo-
tive.” Bill Johnson’s Restaurant, Inc., 461 U.S. at 740. 
 276.  Id. at 741. See also id. at 743 (“The filing and prosecution of a well-founded lawsuit 
may not be enjoined as an unfair labor practice, even if it would not have been commenced but 
for the plaintiff’s desire to retaliate against the defendant for exercising rights protected by the 
Act.”). 
 277.  Professional Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 57. 
 278.  See id. (“We now answer this question in the negative and hold that objectively rea-
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and Professional Real Estate Investors, improper motive cannot by it-
self expose the plaintiff to liability. 
However, because both Bill Johnson’s Restaurants and Profes-
sional Real Estate Investors were exercises in statutory interpretation, 
the question arises as to whether policy, and not the First Amend-
ment, prompted the Court’s treatment of improper motive. Bill 
Johnson’s Restaurants gave less protection and therefore is the better 
case for assessing this question. In the case, two influences—the Peti-
tion Clause and the state interest in providing a civil remedy to its 
citizens279—prompted the Court to set a dual standard for protec-
tion. An employer is not liable for NLRA damages unless she both 
had a retaliatory motive and lost her suit. It is possible that the First 
Amendment requires only one of the two protections. Under this 
view, the Petition Clause in isolation would permit punishment of a 
plaintiff if she were at “fault” by either filing a losing claim or filing a 
claim for a bad motive;280 whereas the state interest in civil remedies 
would require either the other protection or both. This is unlikely. 
The state interest in providing a redress for civil injuries is almost in-
distinguishable from the First Amendment’s interest in safeguarding 
court access, and to the extent that they are different, one would as-
sume that the First Amendment freedom would require the greater 
protection. 
 
sonable effort to litigate cannot be sham regardless of subjective intent.”). 
 279.  Bill Johnson’s Restaurant, Inc., 461 U.S. at 742–43. The Court described the state 
interests as “maintenance of domestic peace,” the need to provide “a civil remedy for conduct 
touching interests ‘deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility,’” and “‘protecting the 
health and well-being of its citizens.’” Id. at 741. 
 280.  Justice Scalia pondered a similar possibility with respect to speech in the oral argu-
ment in the Supreme Court’s review of Jerry Falwell’s emotional distress judgment against 
Larry Flynt and his Hustler magazine. In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 
(1988), the Court rejected such a motive standard for speech about public figures, but in oral 
argument, the Court questioned whether intent alone could ever trigger civil liability for 
speech. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
ON TRIAL, ch. 37 (1988) (reprinting excerpts of oral argument). For example, Justice Scalia 
asked: 
[A]ll New York Times says is if you state falsehood with knowledge of the falsehood, 
the First Amendment does prevent it. All I’m asking you is why can’t that principle 
be extended to say you can cause emotional harm to your heart’s content, just as 
you can state falsity to your heart’s content, but where you intend to create that 
emotional harm, we have a different situation? Isn’t that a possible line? 
Id. at 268. Flynt’s Attorney, Alan Issacman, argued that intent to cause harm should not by 
itself trigger liability, but that knowing falsity may. Id. at 269; see also infra notes 285, 320 
(discussing Falwell). 
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Moreover, the text, history, and policies of the Petition Clause 
tend to argue against a motive limitation on the scope of the right to 
petition courts. The text of the clause is the best argument for such a 
limitation, but even this basis is weak. The argument turns on the 
meaning of the word “for.” On the one hand, a plaintiff who does 
not genuinely seek relief from his claim, regardless of its merit, ar-
guably is not petitioning “for redress of grievances.”281 On the other 
hand, “for” could distinguish one form of petition from another—
those that request relief and those that do not.282 A complaint that 
states a meritorious or winning claim certainly requests relief, regard-
less of whether the plaintiff actually wants or expects that relief. 
Moreover, both readings of “for” would include a plaintiff who 
wants relief but also has some other motive. Thus, the textual argu-
ment at most would exclude only those plaintiffs who desire no relief 
at all. 
The policies underlying the Petition Clause argue against making 
any distinction for a plaintiff’s motive, whatever that may be. The 
presentation of a meritorious claim serves the aims of informing the 
government and advancing the law, regardless of the plaintiff’s inten-
tions. These aims might not be served if the government checked the 
motives of plaintiffs, for often only a highly motivated person is will-
ing to endure the burdens of modern civil litigation.283 That motiva-
tion is rarely benevolent. Indeed, another policy basis for extending 
the petition right to the courts—to provide an opportunity for 
peaceful resolution of disputes—assumes hostility by the petitioner. 
Civil plaintiffs necessarily bear ill feeling toward the defendant with 
whom they are in a dispute. 
 
 281.  A late eighteenth century dictionary defines the word “for” as meaning, among 
other things, “for the reason.” JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1784). 
 282.  See id. (listing “with respect to” as an alternative meaning of the word “for”). 
 283.  The Court in Noerr recognized this practical reality when it noted that most peti-
tions are accompanied by some selfish or other “less than ideal” motive: 
The right of the people to inform their . . . government of their desires with respect 
to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to depend upon 
their intent in doing so. It is neither unusual nor illegal for people to seek action on 
laws in the hope that they may bring about an advantage to themselves and a disad-
vantage to their competitors . . . . A construction of the Sherman Act that would 
disqualify people from taking a public position on matters in which they are finan-
cially interested would thus deprive the government of a valuable source of informa-
tion and, at the same time, deprive the people of their right to petition in the very 
instances in which that right may be of the most importance to them. 
Noerr, 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961). 
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Moreover, defining the right to petition courts in terms of the 
plaintiff’s motive runs the risk of imposing community preferences 
and undermining the freedom of thought inherent in First Amend-
ment liberties.284 An acceptable motive in one place and time may 
not be acceptable in another. For the same reasons that the First 
Amendment right of speech is not defined by community prefer-
ence,285 the right to petition courts should not be so defined. 
Historical practice likewise supports the view that a plaintiff’s 
motive in seeking relief does not define the right to petition courts. 
The requirement that a plaintiff have a proper motive in filing suit is 
a modern one. Such standards apparently began in the late nine-
teenth century as an effort to improve the ethics of lawyers286 and did 
not apply to litigants themselves, through the procedural rules, until 
federal rulemakers added the delay element to the 1912 Federal Eq-
uity Rules (Equity Rule 24, the predecessor to Rule 11).287 Likewise, 
the tort of abuse of process, designed to redress the use of litigation 
as a weapon, is a relatively new tort, created by English courts in the  
mid-nineteenth century.288 Even today, application of this tort to an 
 
 284.  See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) (noting that “it is a prized 
American privilege to speak one’s mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all 
public institutions”); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the competition of the market”). I further discuss motive regulation and viewpoint preferences 
infra at notes 373–87 and accompanying text. 
 285.  Professor Post argues that this is the reason for the result in Hustler v. Falwell, where 
the Court refused to allow damages for emotional distress based solely on the ill intentions of 
the speaker, at least where the victim was a public figure. See supra note 280 and infra note 
320 (discussing Falwell). Professor Post argues that “[b]ecause it enforces a civility rule, the 
intent element at issue in Falwell maintains a particular vision of community life, and so is in-
consistent with the neutrality necessary for public discourse.” See generally Robert C. Post, The 
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1990). See also Laurence H. Tribe, The 
Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and 
Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 36 (1993) (arguing that government may use motive 
to define what facts the actor knows and what he perceives about his injury, but not to regulate 
his beliefs: “one of the presumptive rights people . . . have under our constitutional system is 
that their values and beliefs ordinarily should not define what they are permitted to do, or 
shape the consequences that attach to how they choose to act”). 
 286.  See Motive Restrictions, supra note 13, at Part II.A (discussing history of motive re-
strictions on court access). 
 287.  See supra note 106 (discussing Equity Rule 24 and the origin of Rule 11). 
 288.  Professor Prosser credits the 1848 English case of Grainger v. Hill, 132 Eng. Rep. 
769, 773 (1848), as the origin of the tort of abuse of process. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, 
§ 121, 856 (4th ed. 1984). See also Jacobsen v. Garzo, 542 A.2d 265, 267 (Vt. 1988) (noting 
that “[t]he tort now known as abuse of process first appeared in Grainger v. Hill”). 
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otherwise meritorious lawsuit is rare.289 
The question remains as to whether the improper motives of the 
petitioner’s representative, her lawyer, defines her right to petition. 
The textual analysis of the Petition Clause would be the same regard-
less of the lawyer’s motive because the plaintiff herself would be peti-
tioning for redress. She has an individual right to do so. The policies 
of free court access also support a plaintiff’s right to present legal 
claims for review, regardless of her lawyer’s motive. She would be 
advancing the law, informing the government, and seeking a peace-
ful end to her dispute, just as she would if her lawyer had no ill mo-
tive. As to historical practice, some lawyer oaths may have imposed 
motive restrictions on lawyers prior to the adoption of the First 
Amendment, but these provisions did not define the right to peti-
tion. These early oaths apparently spoke to the motives or self-
interests of the individual lawyer, not of the client, and thus would 
not have barred the assistance of all lawyers.290 Moreover, as a his-
torical matter, even a restriction against all lawyer assistance would 
not have been a significant impediment to court access. Early Ameri-
cans usually represented themselves, without the help of lawyers.291 
In sum, the history, text, and policies of the Petition Clause es-
tablish that a petitioner’s motive does not define the core right to 
petition courts. Nor does the motive of her lawyer define her right. 
In other words, the mere fact that Ms. Jones and her lawyers may 
have had aims other than redress does not by itself remove her from 
the protection of the Petition Clause. 
3. The right of an individual to file claims 
Another issue of definition concerns whether the petition right 
of court access is an individual right or merely a collective right. This 
issue has been the source of some uncertainty. Button, Railroad 
Trainmen, and the other union cases all spoke in terms of the collec-
tive right to litigate,292 and some observers, including the Court on 
occasion, have continued to suggest this limitation on the right to 
 
 289. Many courts refuse to extend the tort of abuse of process to the filing of a meritori-
ous complaint for an abusive purpose. See Motive Restrictions, supra note 13, at Part II.B.4. 
 290.  See id. at Part II.A (discussing early lawyer oaths and ethics codes). 
 291.  See generally Charles Warren, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 3–18 (1966) (dis-
cussing “Law without Lawyers”). 
 292.  See supra notes 224–31 and accompanying text (discussing Button and Trainmen). 
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petition courts.293 Some textual basis exists for this definition of the 
right as a collective right. The First Amendment ties the right to pe-
tition to the right to assemble, and also states the right as one of 
“the people” to petition.294 This purported limitation, however, does 
not survive closer scrutiny. 
First, the Court has not in fact limited the petition right to as-
sembled petitioners. In California Motor Transport, where the Court 
first extended Noerr immunity to the courts, the Court stated that 
the right belonged to “citizens or groups of them.”295 California 
Motor Transport was dictum on this point because the litigation at 
issue was a collective effort by several truckers, but the Court in Bill 
Johnson’s Restaurants applied the petition right to a single plaintiff. 
Other petition right cases also have involved a single petitioner.296 
Moreover, the history of the Petition Clause suggests that the 
linkage of the assembly and petition rights was in response to Eng-
lish attempts to limit the ability of groups to petition and thus was an 
effort to secure the collective right to petition, as opposed to an ef-
fort to restrict the individual right.297 Finally, other freedoms in the 
Bill of Rights, such as the Fourth Amendment, use the term “peo-
ple” but nonetheless protect individuals.298 Thus, an individual has 
 
 293.  See Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 334–35 (1985) 
(noting “conceptual difficulties” in applying the union litigation cases to an individual claim 
because “the First Amendment interest at stake [in the union cases] was primarily the right to 
associate collectively”); see also McGowan & Lemley, supra note 237, at 386 n.447 (suggesting 
that Button addressed only pre-filing group organization and planning of litigation); Span-
bauer, supra note 253, at 43–49 (interpreting the group litigation cases as requiring the pres-
ence of a First Amendment freedom other than petitioning); Brickman, supra note 3, at Part 
IV.B (noting the associational elements of the court’s First Amendment court access doctrine). 
 294.  The term “right” appears only once, as a preface to both assembly and petition, and 
these rights appear together in one clause, separated by a semicolon from the Speech and Re-
ligion Clauses: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . .; the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
 295.  California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) 
(emphasis added). 
 296.  See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985), discussed infra notes 336–38. 
 297.  See id. at 484 n.5 (noting that the right to petition was under attack in England in 
the late eighteenth century particularly with regard to the right of large groups to petition). See 
generally Access to Court, supra note 13, at nn. 228–47 (discussing the history of the right to 
assemble in relation to the right to petition). 
 298.  The Fourth Amendment, for example, guarantees only the right of “the people” to 
be safe from unreasonable searches. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . .”). 
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the right to gain access to court and need not join with other plain-
tiffs before her right is protected under the First Amendment. 
4. The right to gain initial access through filing a claim 
A final issue of interpretation is the extent of the right in terms of 
the processing of the claim. Does the Petition Clause protect only 
initial access to court or does it extend beyond the filing of the com-
plaint and protect the processing of the claim? The protection 
against injunction of meritorious suits in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants 
suggests some protection of the processing of the claim, but as I will 
explain in more detail in Part II.C below, I contend that this protec-
tion arises as a form of “breathing room” and does not define the 
core right. In other words, I argue the core right under the Petition 
Clause is the right of initial access only—the right to file a claim for 
relief—and any further protection of the processing of the claims 
comes either under this First Amendment breathing room doc-
trine,299 or, as a matter of due process, under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. 
That the Petition Clause protects only the ability to request relief 
seems to be a logical reading of the Petition Clause, which preserves 
the right “to petition.” This is the view taken by the Supreme Court 
with regard to petitions to the other branches of government. In 
Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight,300 the 
Court held that the Petition Clause does not impose any duty on the 
government to listen or respond to executive petitions: “Nothing in 
the First Amendment or in this Court’s case law interpreting it sug-
gests that the rights to speak, associate, and petition require govern-
ment policymakers to listen or respond to individuals’ communica-
tions on public issues.”301 Instead, “[d]isagreement with public  
 
 
 299.  I discuss breathing room analysis in detail infra Part II.C. 
 300. 465 U.S. 271 (1984). In Knight, state employees challenged a statute that required 
the state employer to meet only with the designated representative of public employees and did 
not require it to meet with individuals. The employees claimed “an entitlement to a govern-
ment audience for their views.” Id. at 282. 
 301.  Id. at 285 (relying in part on THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (James Madison)); see also 
Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979) (per cu-
riam) (“The public employee surely can associate and speak freely and petition openly, and he 
is protected by the First Amendment from retaliation for doing so . . . . But the First Amend-
ment does not impose any affirmative obligation to listen, to respond or, in this context, to 
recognize the association and bargain with it.”). 
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policy and disapproval of official’s responsiveness . . . is to be regis-
tered principally at the polls.”302 
This is a bone of contention to some scholars. They argue that 
the petition right is meaningless without a duty of response and that 
the petition right historically included at least some form of re-
sponse.303 These arguments have some merit. Petitions certainly are 
more meaningful if the petitioner knows the government must re-
spond in some form. Additionally, petitions played an important role 
in the early development of our state and federal governments. In-
deed, the agenda of the First Congress (the authors of the Petition 
Clause) was shaped largely by citizen petitions.304 But these consid-
 
 302.  Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) 
(citing Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915)). In Bi-Metallic, 
Justice Holmes rejected the argument that due process required that individual taxpayers be 
heard before the government increased taxes: “Their rights are protected in the only way that 
they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make 
the rule . . . . There must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if government is to 
go on.” 239 U.S. at 445–46. 
 303.  See Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the 
Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2169 (1998); Spanbauer, supra note 253, at 
33–34, 49–51; Note, Suits Against the Government, supra note 253, at 1116–17; David C. 
Frederick, John Quincy Adams, Slavery, and the Disappearance of the Right of Petition, 9 L. & 
HIST. REV. 113, 114–15 (1991); Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right to Peti-
tion Government for the Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 145–149, 155–167 (1986); 
Anita Hodgkiss, Petitioning and the Empowerment Theory of Practice, 96 YALE L.J. 569 
(1987); Edmund G. Brown, The Right to Petition: Political or Legal Freedom, 8 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. 729, 732–33 (1961). This is not the universal view of legal academics; some advocate that 
the petition right is one of access only. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right 
to Petition, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 739, Part III (1996) (arguing that the right to petition does 
not necessarily include a duty of response and that the duty and nature of the response must be 
considered independently as to each branch of government); McGowan & Lemley, supra note 
237, at 385, 389 (noting that under California Motor Transport “the First Amendment grants 
a right of access—it gives a petitioner the right to get inside the courthouse door” and that 
“[o]nce in court, plaintiff’s First Amendment rights are at the mercy of the rules of the fo-
rum”); Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging . . . “: An Analysis of the Neglected, 
but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1191 (1986) (stating that 
“the petition clause of the first amendment protects only the core petitioning activities—
preparing and signing a written petition and transmitting it to the government” and that 
“[a]ny protection of activities beyond this scope is derived from other constitutional rights”). 
See generally Court Access, supra note 13 (summarizing academic commentary concerning a 
duty of response). 
304. See 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS xxv. 
The accomplishments of the petitions submitted to the First Congress were consid-
erable. Their impact on the legislative agenda transcended private claims, in several 
instances influencing legislative business of far-reaching significance; for example, 
the acts relating to copyrights and patents, federal revenues and their collection, the  
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erations do not necessarily mean that a response is part of the core 
right. Petitions, even without a guaranteed response, still act to in-
form the government and give the petitioner at least the chance of a 
response. In addition, some historical evidence suggests that even 
members of the First Congress might have viewed responses as dis-
cretionary and as a matter of political prudence,305 as suggested by 
the Court in Knight.306  
This debate may be of little consequence when applied to judicial 
petitions. To the extent that the scholars advocate a response duty 
under the Petition Clause, most argue that the duty is minimal and 
may require only a summary denial.307 Due process already requires 
 
federal debt, the location of the capital, the mitigation of revenue penalties, and the 
land office. 
Id.; see generally id. at 1–462 (surveying actions on petitions presented to the First Congress). 
 305.  For example, in the House debates concerning the adoption of the Bill of Rights, 
Representative Gerry phrased the government’s response to petitions as a “hope” and de-
scribed it as a matter within the discretion of the individual government agent. House Debates, 
August 15, 1789, reprinted in 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 215, at 1095–96. “I hope we shall 
never shut our ears against that information which is to be derived from the petitions and in-
structions of our constituents. I hope we shall never presume to think that all the wisdom of 
the country is concentrated within the walls of this House.” Id. at 1269 (“[T]he amendment 
[proposing a right to instruct] does not carry the principle to such an extent [to bind represen-
tatives], it only declares the right of the people to send instructions; the representative will, if 
he thinks proper, communicate his instructions to the house, but how far they shall operate on 
his conduct, he will judge for himself.”). See generally Access to Court, supra note 13, at Part 
III. B.1 (surveying evidence and arguments against a duty of response). 
 306.  See supra notes 300–02 (discussing Knight). Some academics also cite political prac-
ticality as the explanation for the early Congressional response to petitions: 
It is true that the early congresses took petitions quite seriously and sought, at least 
through committee referrals, to address them all. There may have even been indi-
vidual members of Congress who thought it their legal duty to treat petitions in this 
fashion. But this confuses expectations with legal requirements. There are very good 
reasons why legislative bodies will make every effort to treat citizen petitions seri-
ously. Petitions are, or at least were in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
among the best sources of information for legislatures about citizen concerns, and 
careful attention to those concerns may improve the perceived legitimacy of the 
government, or even stave off revolution. But that does not mean that such treat-
ment of petitions is a legal requirement. That is especially true given the Constitu-
tion’s express provisions for periodic election of legislative officials . . . . The right to 
petition emerged in England largely as a substitute for such formal mechanisms of 
representation. The Constitution, however, expressly chooses electoral representa-
tion as the primary means of citizen input and control. 
Lawson & Seidman, supra note 303, at 761. 
 307.  See Spanbauer, supra note 253, at 51 (noting that the historical “right to petition 
did include both the right to present a written petition and the right to receive a response, 
which, at a minimum, might be a summary denial”). 
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at least that much and likely more. Unlike executive or legislative pe-
titions,308 a civil complaint, once filed, invokes a property interest 
that is subject to due process protection.309 Due process requires that 
the government give fair and reasonable consideration to a civil com-
plaint once it is filed.310 Thus, there is a good “fit” between the two 
protections. The Petition Clause, with its attendant heightened 
scrutiny, protects the initial access, the ability to ask for justice, and 
due process steps in thereafter to guard, through its reasonableness 
standards, the procedure used to resolve the claim.311 
As I will explain in Part II.C, the First Amendment also applies 
to processing of the claim, to the extent that governmental denial of 
fair process would unduly chill the initial filing of winning claims. 
That protection, however, takes the form of breathing room, which 
depends on a balancing of interests and which likely would reach the 
same outcome as a due process reasonableness analysis. This view is 
consistent with the holding in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants. In other 
words, the core right to file a winning suit, regardless of motive, gets 
some “breathing room” by allowing a meritorious claim to proceed 




 308.  The Court has held that legislative and executive petitions do not trigger any due 
process obligation on the government to respond. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). 
 309.  See generally Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) 
(noting that civil actions are a form of property interest and that “there can be no doubt that at 
a minimum [due process] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication 
be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing”); see also infra note 317 (discussing due 
process standard). 
 310.  The filing of the complaint puts the government in control of the claim. Filing dis-
tinguishes the cases recognizing the due process right of civil plaintiffs to reasonable proce-
dures from those decisions in which the Court narrowly defined due process in terms of the 
plaintiff’s ability to gain initial access to court. See supra note 226 (discussing Boddie and other 
due process cases addressing initial access). In addition, some observers argue that the federal 
courts’ duty to respond derives from the nature of the “judicial power” under Article III of the 
Constitution. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 303, at 757–58. 
 311.  The Supreme Court explained this different level of protection afforded due process 
and First Amendment freedoms, including the right to petition, in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 
516 (1945), which I discuss infra notes 313–15. See also Falise v. American Tobacco Co., 94 
F. Supp. 2d 316, 351–52 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting the difference between the right of initial 
access, which is protected by the First Amendment, and the subsequent right to prosecute or 
defend the claim, which raises questions of procedural due process under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments). 
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The difference in defining the core right under the Petition 
Clause and protecting closely related activity through breathing 
room or due process analysis may seem like one of semantics. How-
ever, as I explain and demonstrate below, the correct definition of 
the core First Amendment right is essential to protection of the peti-
tion right because the definition determines the level of protection. 
Application of doctrines such as strict scrutiny and breathing room 
analysis turn on the definition of the core right. Here, that core right 
was the right of Ms. Jones individually to file winning claims in court 
regardless of her motive. 
C. Testing Rule 11(b)(1) Against Ms. Jones’s Right to Petition 
Courts 
Although Bill Johnson’s Restaurants and Professional Real Estate 
Investors are useful tools in recognizing and defining the right of 
court access under the Petition Clause, they do not tell us what the 
right of petition would have meant in the Jones case in response to a 
Rule 11 challenge. Those cases interpreted the Petition Clause in the 
context of two specific statutes and their related policies. A court rule 
such as Rule 11 necessarily differs from those substantive statutes, 
both in its terms and in its policies. We must turn to broader First 
Amendment principles and methodology, principally the strict scru-
tiny and breathing room analyses, to actually test Rule 11 against 
Ms. Jones’s rights.312 I explain this basic methodology in the first 
 
 312.  A few commentators have briefly examined the validity of the improper purpose 
clause against a Petition Clause challenge, but not in detail and with mixed results. See Myers, 
supra note 253, at 1246–50 (arguing that Professional Real Estate Investors has a constitutional 
element that would apply to limit application of the Rule 11 improper purpose clause); Thies 
Kolln, Comment, Rule 11 and the Policing of Access to Courts after Professional Real Estate In-
vestors, 61 U. CHIC. L. REV. 1037 (1994) (arguing that Professional Real Estate Investors is 
based on policy, but noting that if it were based on the First Amendment, it would call into 
question the Rule 11 improper purpose clause); Note, Suits Against the Government, supra 
note 253, at 1123–24 (concluding that the improper purpose clause carries out the sham ex-
ception and does not violate the interests of the Petition Clause); Charles S. Heish, Note, Pro-
fessional Real Estate Investors: The Line Between Patent and Antitrust, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
173, 183–86 (1993) (arguing that Professional Real Estate Investors will not have much impact 
because Rule 11 still imposes an improper purpose standard). In addition, some scholars have 
suggested that other aspects of Rule 11 might present a Petition Clause problem. See MONROE 
H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDNG LAWYER ETHICS 80–81 (1990) (questioning the chilling 
effect of Rule 11 and noting that “adequate regard has not been given to constitutional . . . 
objections to Rule 11 and similar rules”); Spanbauer, supra note 253, at 58–63 (arguing that 
Rule 11 infringes upon the right to petition by imposing sanctions for merely negligent con-
duct as opposed to subjective bad faith); Thomas A. Waldman, Comment, SLAPP Suits: 
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section below and apply it in the second. Ultimately, I conclude that 
the First Amendment would have overridden any potential use of 
Rule 11(b)(1) against Ms. Jones based solely on her motive. I reach 
this conclusion even with regard to sanctions imposed after Ms. 
Jones lost her claims on summary judgment. I therefore arrive at a 
different outcome than that suggested by Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, 
not by rejecting that case’s holding, but instead by balancing the dif-
ferent interests at stake in a Rule 11 challenge. 
1. The methodology of First Amendment protection 
The Court has not developed a comprehensive scheme to analyze 
challenges under the Petition Clause. In its few petition cases, the 
Court for the most part has announced its decision, without dictat-
ing a particular mode of analysis. Nevertheless, the Court has sug-
gested use of its Speech Clause methodology. In the 1945 case of 
Thomas v. Collins,313 the Court declared that the rights of petition,  
speech, and press, “though not identical, are inseparable,”314 and 
 
Weaknesses in First Amendment Law and in the Courts’ Responses to Frivolous Litigation, 39 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 979 (noting a First Amendment right of court access and arguing that Rule 
11 is vague and chills public interest litigation); Note, Suits Against the Government, supra 
note 253, at 1124–27 (arguing that the reasonable inquiry prong of Rule 11, as applied in 
suits against the government, unduly chills such suits and is invalid under the Petition Clause); 
Donna Marino, Note, Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation: The Trend Toward Limiting Ac-
cess to Federal Courts, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 923 (1992) (arguing that Rule 11 is vague and 
chills First Amendment values and resort to court). A few courts have considered the validity of 
state statutes similar to Rule 11, but the federal courts apparently have not yet so examined 
Rule 11. See Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 704 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) 
(quoting Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983), recognizing 
that “[b]aseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition” and 
examining the California “vexatious litigant” statute); Gordon v. Marrone, 616 N.Y.S.2d 98, 
102 (App. Div. 1994) (considering New York sanctions statute and rejecting the “contention 
that an award of sanctions . . . here impermissibly infringes upon his First Amendment right of 
access to the courts”); see also Eastway Constr. Corp. v. New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 575 
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that in awarding sanctions under Rule 11, the court should consider 
the deterrent effect on court access, especially in suits against the government: such suits “pub-
licize grievances and thus permit the ventilation of private outrage that the First Amendment’s 
right to petition protects”). 
 313.  323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
 314.  The Court explained the relationship of petition and speech: 
It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press 
were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assem-
ble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are in-
separable. They are cognate rights, . . . and therefore are united in the First Article’s 
assurance. 
Id. at 530 (citations omitted). 
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demand greater protection than other rights: 
[T]he preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indis-
pensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amend-
ment . . . gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permit-
ting dubious intrusions. And it is the character of the right, not of 
the limitation, which determines what standards governs the 
choice. . . . 
For these reasons, any attempt to restrict those liberties must be 
justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or re-
motely, but by clear and present danger. The rational connection 
between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in 
other contexts might support legislation against attack on due 
process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer foun-
dation. . . . Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount inter-
ests, give occasion for permissible limitation. It is therefore in our 
tradition to allow the widest room for discussion, . . . particularly 
when this right is exercised in conjunction with peaceable assem-
bly.315 
This greater protection often takes the form of “strict scrutiny” 
under which the government may intrude on a First Amendment 
right only if it has a compelling state interest and the government 
narrowly tailors its regulation to achieve that interest.316 As the Tho-
mas Court noted, this strict scrutiny is more protective than the 
analysis applied to protect due process. Protection of due process re-
quires only that the state reasonably aim—not narrowly tailor—its 
regulation to achieve a legitimate state object—not necessarily a 
compelling state interest.317 
Unfortunately, a conclusion that Speech Clause doctrines govern 
Petition Clause cases does not necessarily simplify the analysis. The 
Court’s speech jurisprudence is notorious for its varying, and some-
times inconsistent, standards and approaches. Despite the Thomas 
Court’s invocation of strict scrutiny doctrines in 1945, the Court 
cannot today even agree as to what constitutes strict scrutiny, let 
 
 315.  Id. 
 316. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438–44 (1963) (describing and applying the 
strict scrutiny test applicable to First Amendment freedoms); see infra note 335 (quoting But-
ton). 
 317.  See Jones v. Union Guano Co, Inc., 264 U.S. 171, 181 (1924) (holding that a 
court will not invalidate a precondition to filing suit under due process if “the condition im-
posed has a reasonable relation to a legitimate object” (emphasis added)). 
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alone whether it applies to a particular speech challenge.318 I try to 
avoid this controversy and complexity by borrowing perhaps one of 
the more well known speech doctrines—that of the New York Times 
line of defamation cases319—and applying it only in broad strokes. I 
propose a two-part approach to Petition Clause court access analysis. 
First, strict scrutiny should govern restrictions that intrude upon ac-
tivity within the core right to petition, or in other words, the peti-
tion activity that the First Amendment most values, the filing of 
winning claims. Second, breathing room analysis should apply to re-
strictions that regulate activity related to but on the periphery of the 
core First Amendment activity, such as the processing of claims. 
The New York Times approach to defamation cases suggests this 
two-tiered analysis. In these cases, the Court first categorizes speech 
as within or without the core First Amendment right. False speech is 
outside the core right. The New York Times case concerned false 
speech, so the Court did not address the proper treatment of true 
speech there, but true speech seemingly would garner protection 
under some form of heightened scrutiny. In the defamation context, 
such scrutiny likely would mean that “true” speech may not be sub-
ject to civil liability.320 In other contexts, the Court has applied dif-
 
 318.  See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105, 124–28 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the strict scrutiny standard 
found its way into First Amendment jurisprudence “by accident”). In R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), for example, members of the Court disagreed as to whether strict 
scrutiny applied to a hate speech ordinance that regulated “fighting words,” a category of 
speech not traditionally considered to be within the core right of protected speech. Justice 
Scalia, writing for the Court, characterized the ordinance as one invoking viewpoint and man-
dating strict scrutiny. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395–96; see also infra notes 372–81 (discussing 
R.A.V., but Justice White argued that fighting words warranted no protection); R.A.V., 505 
U.S. at 399–400 (“This Court’s decisions have plainly stated that expression falling within cer-
tain limited categories so lacks the values the First Amendment was designed to protect that 
the Constitution affords no protection to that expression.”). Likewise, in recent cable access 
cases, members of the Court have disagreed as to the proper standard of review. See Denver 
Area Educ. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 786 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (criticizing the plurality opinion for not applying strict scrutiny despite its 
use of “synonyms” for strict scrutiny). 
 319.  See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 320.  The Court has suggested this result, but it has not completely foreclosed defamation 
liability for all true speech, such as true but defamatory speech about private individuals and 
private subjects. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the Court held that the First 
Amendment barred criminal sanctions against a speaker whose statements were true but spo-
ken with ill will, but the Court expressly limited its holding to statements about the perform-
ance of public officials in their jobs. See id. at 77–78. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 
46 (1988), the Court extended the doctrine to public figures and to civil liability other than 
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ferent standards, which have allowed some regulation of even true 
speech; however this analysis involves the issue that I seek to avoid, 
the complex question of the varying standards of review.321 More-
over, these different holdings, while not the product of “strict scru-
tiny” analysis in its literal sense, reflect at least the spirit of strict scru-
tiny in that they tolerate very little regulation of “true” speech, the 
“core” right under the Speech Clause.322 
The primary import of New York Times was its treatment of false 
speech as outside of the core right. The Court gave true speech 
“breathing room” by applying the actual malice standard to false 
speech: it immunized from liability false and defamatory speech 
about public issues or public figures, unless the speaker spoke with 
actual knowledge or reckless disregard for the falsity of the state-
ment.323 Because liability does not attach to merely negligent false 
speech, the actual malice standard protects speech by putting the 
speaker in control of his liability.324 Thus, in order to protect the ex-
 
defamation, but again limited its holding. See id. at 53 (“In [Garrison], we held that even 
when a speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or ill will his expression was protected by the 
First Amendment . . . . Thus while such a bad motive may be deemed controlling for purposes 
of tort liability in other areas of the law, we think the First Amendment prohibits such a result 
in the area of public debate about public figures.”). In Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps, 
475 U.S. 767 (1986), the Court held that the First Amendment required a private figure 
plaintiff to prove the falsity of the statement (as opposed to placing the burden of proof and 
risk of doubt on the speaker), but even the Hepps decision left some gaps. The case involved a 
media defendant and speech of public concern, and the Court limited its holding to these facts. 
See id. at 778, 779 n.4. Thus, the Court has suggested but not unequivocally held, that all true 
speech is absolutely immune from civil liability, regardless of the motive of the speaker. See gen-
erally Linda Kalm, The Burden of Proving Truth or Falsity in Defamation: Setting a Standard 
for Cases Involving Nonmedia Defendants, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 812 (1987) (summarizing cur-
rent law and arguing that private plaintiffs should not have to prove falsity in defamation suits 
arising from speech about private issues). 
 321.  The Court, for example, gives the government greater leeway in regulating com-
mercial speech and speech in private fora. It allows reasonable regulation of the time, place, 
and manner of such speech. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1998). 
 322.  See generally id. at ch.2 (providing an overview of free speech methodology and not-
ing that the term “heightened scrutiny” describes the Court’s approach in most speech cases). 
 323.  See New York Times, Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80. The Court also gave the speech at 
issue in New York Times added breathing room in the form of a higher burden of proof: public 
figure plaintiffs must prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 285. 
 324.  Professor Post explains how the New York Times actual malice standard protects 
speech, whereas a bare intent requirement can unduly restrict speech: 
The reason the use of an intent requirement is constitutionally impermissible in the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotion distress, but constitutionally acceptable in 
the actual malice standard, is that the latter does not use the criterion of intent to 
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pression of true speech about important issues, the Court immunizes 
some false speech outside the core right of the First Amendment 
(i.e., negligent false speech about public officials).325 
The form of breathing room depends upon the relative interests 
at stake and requires a balancing of interests. In New York Times, the 
speech received the protection of the actual malice standard because 
it concerned public officials and important social issues. In Gertz v. 
Welch, the Court refused to extend the protection of the actual mal-
ice standard to persons who defamed private persons, as opposed to 
public figures.326 Liability based solely on a negligence standard still 
has a chilling effect on the speech, but the Gertz Court allowed this 
chilling effect due to the different balance of interests. Private speech 
is not as important, under the First Amendment, as speech about 
public figures, and the state interest in protecting a private person is 
greater than that in protecting public officials who can protect them-
selves.327 Nevertheless, the Gertz Court gave some breathing room to 
 
enforce a civility rule. . . . The purpose of the actual malice standard is not to de-
marcate any such “boundary between morally acceptable and unacceptable modes of 
political discussion”; it is rather to forge “an instrument of policy, to attain the spe-
cific end of minimizing the chill on legitimate speech.” The element of intent in the 
actual malice standard accomplishes this objective by placing a defendant, to the 
maximum extent possible, in control of the legality of his own speech. 
Post, supra note 285, at 649 (citations omitted). See also Motive Restrictions, supra note 13, at 
2 n.6 (discussing the different restrictive and protective roles of motive in regulating speech). 
 325. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (“[W]e have been especially anxious 
to assure to the freedoms of speech and press that ‘breathing space’ essential to their fruitful 
exercise.’ To that end this Court has extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory 
falsehood.”). 
 326.  See id. at 334, 342. 
 327.  The Gertz Court explained these different interests: 
[W]e have no difficulty in distinguishing among . . . plaintiffs. The first remedy of 
any victim of defamation is self-help—using available opportunities to contradict the 
lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. 
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the 
channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to 
counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individu-
als are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them 
is correspondingly greater. 
 . . . 
[Public officials and public figures also assume some of the risk of defamation]. No 
such assumption is justified with respect to a private individual. He has not accepted 
public office or assumed an “influential role in ordering society.” . . . Thus, private 
individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public 
figures; they are also more deserving of recovery. 
For these reasons we conclude that the States should retain substantial latitude in 
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speech about private persons by forbidding presumed or punitive 
damages because such damages had too chilling an effect.328 
Other speech doctrines, such as the presumption against prior re-
straints, the vagueness rule, and the overbreadth doctrine, grow out 
of a similar concern about chilling effect. First, courts look critically 
at prior restraints on speech, even of non-core speech, because, 
unlike subsequent punishment, prior restraints stop speech, rather 
than merely deter it.329 Although prior restraints usually take the 
form of an injunction, preconditions to speech, such as a permit 
scheme, can have the same effect.330 The vagueness doctrine requires 
specificity in laws governing speech so that persons can determine 
what speech the law permits.331 A vague statute that does not clearly 
 
their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the 
reputation of a private individual. 
Id. at 344–46 (citations omitted). 
 328.  The Gertz Court explained that the possibility of punitive and presumed damages 
both increased the chilling effect on speech and had less governmental interest: 
The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss 
unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory 
falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms . . . . More 
to the point, the States have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs, such as 
this petitioner, gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of any actual in-
jury. 
We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply because we doubt its wisdom, 
but here we are attempting to reconcile state law with a competing interest 
grounded in the constitutional command of the First Amendment. It is therefore 
appropriate to require that state remedies for defamatory falsehood reach no farther 
than is necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved. 
Id. at 349–50. The Court later refined this aspect of breathing room by distinguishing Gertz as 
involving speech of public concern and holding that presumed and punitive damages could be 
awarded if the speech concerned purely private matters and persons. See Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (“In light of the reduced consti-
tutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest 
adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages—even absent a showing of ‘ac-
tual malice.’”). 
 329.  See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (setting out 
prior restraint rule); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1020 
(5th ed. 1995) (noting that with subsequent punishment “the ideas or speech at issue can be 
placed before the public” but that “prior restraint limits public debate and knowledge more 
severely. Punishment of speech, after it has occurred, chills free expression. Prior restraint freezes 
free speech.” (emphasis added)). See generally SMOLLA, supra note 321, at ch. 15 (discussing 
prior restraints). 
 330.  See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (noting 
that an “ordinance requiring a permit and a fee before authorizing public speaking, parades, or 
assemblies in ‘the archetype of a traditional public forum’ . . . is a prior restraint on speech”). 
 331.  Vagueness is a due process concern as to all statutes. See Connally v. General Constr. 
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differentiate between permissible and outlawed speech unduly chills 
exercise of the permitted speech. Finally, the related doctrine of 
overbreadth invalidates laws that unduly deter speech by reaching 
too broadly and restricting both protected and unprotected 
speech.332 A key aspect of the overbreadth doctrine, sometimes 
termed a rule of standing, is that it allows a person to challenge an 
overbroad statute even though the plaintiff’s own conduct falls out-
side of the core activity protected by the First Amendment.333 This 
helps avoid the chilling effect that the statute may have on other per-
sons. 
Thus, in the defamation context, the Court protects core speech 
through two principal means. First, the speech within the core right 
of free expression—true speech—gets nearly absolute protection. 
Second, the core speech is protected through the application of the 
various breathing room doctrines. By protecting non-core speech 
under certain circumstances, such as barring harsh penalties or prior 
restraints, the Court gives breathing room to the exercise of the core 
right. 
As noted above, I advocate that the courts use this two-tiered 
approach to protect the right to petition courts. This is not a great 
leap, for the Court itself has suggested this approach for petition 
 
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act 
in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law”). When applied to 
First Amendment freedoms, however, the doctrine is even more exacting. See NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
 332.  Not just any potential improper application will invalidate a statute that otherwise 
properly reaches activity within the police power of government. The test is whether the stat-
ute substantially burdens protected activity. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 
1077 (1991). (“The ‘overbreadth’ doctrine applies if an enactment ‘prohibits constitutionally 
protected conduct.’ . . . To be unconstitutional, overbreadth must be ‘substantial.’”) (citations 
omitted). 
 333.  See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963) (“[I]n appraising a statute’s in-
hibiting effect upon [First Amendment] rights, this Court has not hesitated to take into ac-
count possible applications of the statute in other factual contexts besides that at bar.”). Pro-
fessors Nowak and Rotunda assert that “it is not precise to think of the overbreadth problem as 
a form of standing”: 
Rather, one should recognize that when the Court is asked to strike a law on its face 
as being overbroad, the individual is asserting that no one—including persons who 
speech is unprotected by the First Amendment—can be subjected to punishment 
under a statute so sweeping that it could include both protected and unprotected 
speech within its scope. 
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 329, at 999. 
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cases. First, the Thomas case established the rights of petition and 
speech as corollary freedoms to which strict scrutiny applies.334 Like-
wise, the Court in Button warned that statutes touching on First 
Amendment rights, including the right to petition, mandate strict 
scrutiny and “narrow specificity”: 
[S]tandards of statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free ex-
pression . . . . [T]he danger [is] tolerating, in the area of First 
Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible 
of sweeping and improper application. . . . These freedoms are deli-
cate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society. 
The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently 
as the actual application of sanctions . . . . Because First Amend-
ment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may 
regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.335 
In McDonald v. Smith,336 the Court applied the New York Times 
breathing room doctrine to petitions. There, a defamation defendant 
claimed that his allegedly defamatory statements enjoyed absolute 
immunity because they were stated in a petition, as opposed to an-
other form of speech.337 The Court rejected this view and held the 
statements to the standards of New York Times.338 McDonald drew 
attention (and criticism) due to its rejection of absolute immunity for 
petitions,339 but the Court already had rejected this in the Noerr line 
 
 334.  See supra notes 313–15. 
 335.  Button, 371 U.S. at 432–33 (citations omitted). 
 336.  472 U.S. 479 (1985). 
 337.  McDonald wrote President Reagan to urge that he not appoint Smith as United 
States Attorney. Smith sued for defamation, and McDonald claimed that his letter was abso-
lutely protected under the Petition Clause. See id. at 480–81. 
 338.  The Court rejected preferential treatment of petitions: 
To accept petitioner’s claim of absolute immunity would elevate the Petition Clause 
to special First Amendment status. The Petition Clause, however, was inspired by 
the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, pub-
lish, and assemble. . . . These First Amendment rights are inseparable, . . . and there 
is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made 
in a petition to the President than other First Amendment expressions. 
Id. at 485 (citations omitted). 
 339.  A number of academic commentators have criticized McDonald, primarily because it 
did not adequately protect petitions. See Mark, supra note 303; Spanbauer, supra note 253; 
Eric Schnapper, “Libelous” Petitions for Redress of Grievances—Bad Historiography Makes Worse 
Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 303 (1989); Higginson, supra note 303; Smith, supra note 303 at 
1154–70; Robert A. Zauzmer, The Misapplication of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in Non-
Antitrust Right to Petition Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1243 (1984). 
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of cases.340 Instead, McDonald is important here because it applied 
the breathing room analysis to a petition challenge.341 
We nevertheless must use caution in applying the defamation 
breathing room doctrine to petition cases, such as a Rule 11 chal-
lenge in the Jones case. The actual malice standard was appropriate 
for the executive petition in McDonald, because it was a defamation 
case, but the defamation distinctions between public and private 
speech likely are not suitable for judging challenges to restrictions on 
court access. The New York Times defamation standards turn in large 
part on whether the speech at issue involves a matter of public inter-
est, but all civil lawsuits involve matters of some public concern in 
that they invoke laws or ask for change in the law. The governmental 
interests in avoiding harm also differ in the wrongful litigation con-
text from that in defamation suits. For example, a wronged defen-
dant often suffers the same reputational harm as the plaintiff in a 
defamation case, but unlike a defamation plaintiff, he also must incur 
the cost of defending a lawsuit, a cost “forced” upon him by the 
government itself.342 Rather than applying the particular protections 
of the defamation cases, such as the actual malice standard, we 
should protect the right to petition courts by looking at the factors 
underlying the Court’s development of the breathing room stan-
dards—the potential effect of the law (Rule 11) and the competing 
interests underlying both the rule and the First Amendment freedom 
at issue (Ms. Jones’s right of court access). 
The Court in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants reflected this general ap-
proach. Citing Gertz, the Court excluded losing suits from the core 
right to petition,343 and although the Court did not use the terms 
 
 340.  See supra notes 245–52 and accompanying text. 
 341.  See Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 208 F.3d 885, 896–99 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (J. Lucero dissenting from en banc decision of 10th Circuit) (arguing that the 
“breathing space” philosophy of McDonald and New York Times required some protection to 
pre-litigation letters between private parties even though the letters were not directed to the 
government and thus not within the core right to petition the government). 
 342.  I further explain these differences in Access to Court, supra note 13, at 675–76. See 
also McGowan & Lemley, supra note 237, at 392–97 (analyzing Noerr immunity as applied to 
courts and arguing that New York Times “buffer zone” is not appropriate for courts because 
courts must have “near-plenary authority to control the speech” in courts). 
 343.  Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (“Just as false 
statements are not immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech [citing 
Gertz], baseless litigation is not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition.”) (cita-
tions omitted). The Court elsewhere in the opinion defined baseless litigation as losing suits. 
See supra note 263. 
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“breathing room” or “prior restraint,” it gave some breathing room 
by applying a lower standard of merit to protect ongoing suits from 
injunction.344 I expand on this approach. I apply strict scrutiny to the 
extent that a rule directly regulates the core right to file a winning 
claim, and I apply general breathing room standards to test restric-
tions on losing claims and other activity outside of the narrow scope 
of the core right to petition courts. 
2. Strict scrutiny and breathing room analyses of Rule 11(b)(1)  
in Jones 
My Petition Clause analysis of Rule 11(b)(1) in the Jones case 
consists of three parts. The first looks at Rule 11 as an initial barrier 
to court access and applies strict scrutiny to the certification compo-
nent of Rule 11(b)(1). Because this aspect of Rule 11 would bar 
even winning claims, if improperly motivated, Rule 11 is invalid on 
its face, and Ms. Jones could have raised this challenge to defeat any 
motion by the President, regardless of the stage at which the Presi-
dent filed it. The other two parts are additional arguments against 
use of Rule 11(b)(1). They apply breathing room doctrine and de-
pend on the stage at which President Clinton would have raised his 
Rule 11 motion. If the President had tried to use Rule 11(b)(1) to 
dismiss the case early, before any determination on the merits, the 
analysis would ask if such a dismissal—an obvious and complete im-
pediment of the processing of her claim—would unduly chill exercise 
of the core right to file claims. If the President instead waited and 
sought monetary sanctions after Judge Wright granted summary 
judgment against Ms. Jones, the analysis would ask if the imposition 
of sanctions to her losing claim would unduly chill exercise of the 
core right to file winning claims. I conclude that Rule 11(b)(1) 
would have failed First Amendment analysis at both stages, even after 
Ms. Jones lost her claims. 
a.  Strict scrutiny of Rule 11(b)(1) as a precondition to filing suit. 
Rule 11 is not just a post-litigation sanctions provision. It also is a 
precondition to court access. It requires litigants to stop, think, and 
 
 344.  That the Court allowed injunctions under some circumstances—if the employer’s 
on-going state court suit lacked merit and was filed for a retaliatory purpose—further suggests 
a balancing of interests test. See Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc., 461 U.S. at 743; see also supra 
note 264 (reprinting excerpt from Bill Johnson’s Restaurants). 
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certify their pleadings before they can gain access to court.345 Rule 
11(b)(1), in particular, tells potential plaintiffs to consider their mo-
tives before they file suit and instructs them that they may file their 
complaint only if they can certify to the court that they do not have 
any improper purpose. The rule thus acts as an initial barrier to court 
access for those plaintiffs with improper purposes.346 
The Rule 11(b)(1) motive barrier is indifferent to the merit of 
the claim. This barrier directly impacts the plaintiff’s ability to file 
even a winning claim, the core right protected under the Petition 
Clause. The rule therefore is invalid unless it can pass strict scrutiny. 
This strict scrutiny analysis is a two-part test. Rule 11(b)(1) must 
both serve a compelling state interest and narrowly achieve that aim. 
As a preliminary matter, we must consider how this issue would 
have arisen in the Jones case. After all, Rule 11(b)(1) obviously did 
not stop Ms. Jones from filing her claims for ulterior aims. More-
over, because she did not win her suit, her claim was not within the 
core right of the Petition Clause. This may be true, but Ms. Jones 
could have attacked Rule 11(b)(1) as invalid on its face. Otherwise, 
the deterrent effect of Rule 11(b)(1), when viewed solely as a pre-
condition to filing suit, might never be challenged. A litigant with an 
improper purpose will either choose to forego her suit or file suit and 
wait for her opponent to raise Rule 11(b)(1). Because the former 
litigant has chosen not to pursue her claim and therefore has no op-
portunity to challenge Rule 11(b)(1), the Court allows the latter liti-
gant to raise the First Amendment challenge—and subject the rule to 
strict scrutiny—even if she is not directly impacted.347 
The first step of strict scrutiny analysis is to determine whether 
the government has a compelling interest behind its regulation of the 
First Amendment activity. Although the federal rules advisory com-
mittee has never succinctly stated the precise purpose of Rule 11,348 
 
 345.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1993) (noting that the 1993 rule 
“continues to require litigants to ‘stop-and-think’ before initially making legal or factual con-
tentions”). 
 346.  The certification requirement thus is akin to the permit scheme that the Court in 
Forsyth County characterized as a prior restraint. See supra note 330. However, the certification 
requirement is self-implementing and does not require prior government action and therefore 
is less burdensome than a permit or license requirement. 
 347.  This is part of the overbreadth doctrine, under which the Court allows litigants to 
challenge statutes even though their own activity may not be within the core protected right. 
See supra notes 332–33 and accompanying text. 
 348.  The advisory committee notes instead state the aims of the two revisions to Rule 11. 
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the Supreme Court, which has ultimate rulemaking authority,349 has 
stated that “the central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings 
and thus . . . streamline the administration and procedure in federal 
courts.”350 This deterrence seems to be a compelling purpose, for a 
number of reasons. First, baseless suits consume the limited re-
sources of the courts, waste taxpayer dollars, and hinder the process-
ing of meritorious claims.351 Frivolous suits also burden the defen-
dant with the costs of defending such suits, damage his reputation, 
and cause him emotional distress. To be sure, many of these costs, 
whether to taxpayers, other litigants, or the defendant, are incurred 
with every lawsuit, frivolous or not, but the suit brings no positive 
return when it is frivolous. The government has a compelling interest 
in avoiding this waste and in protecting its citizens from these inju-
ries. 
The problem with this justification for Rule 11(b)(1) is the sec-
ond prong of strict scrutiny. Rule 11(b)(1) is not narrowly tailored 
to achieve the end of avoiding frivolous claims. Rule 11(b)(1) might 
deter some frivolous lawsuits—because such suits usually are accom-
panied by ill motives—but the improper purpose prohibition is not 
necessary for this deterrence. Paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) of Rule 
11 bar legally and factually deficient lawsuits.352 Since these other 
clauses of Rule 11(b) already bar a frivolous suit, the only added ef-
fect of Rule 11(b)(1) is to reach meritorious suits (even those that 
state winning claims) that the plaintiff files for an improper aim. 
Thus, if deterrence of frivolous claims is the sole interest behind Rule 
11(b)(1), it fails strict scrutiny. 
This leaves the question whether Rule 11(b)(1) can be justified 
as serving any other compelling purpose. Does the government have 
 
Perhaps the most succinct statement is in the notes to the 1983 revision to the rule, which 
state that the rule, since its inception, has provided sanctions “to check abuses.” FED. R. CIV. 
P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1983). See also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 
384, 393 (1990) (noting that the purpose of Rule 11 must be drawn from its history and “by 
an understanding of the deficiencies in the original version of Rule 11”). 
 349.  See supra note 43 (discussing the Court’s rulemaking authority under the Rules 
Enabling Act). 
 350.  Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). 
 351.  In a Petition Clause challenge to federal restrictions on lobbying, the Court held 
that Congress had a “vital national interest” in regulating lobbying to prevent the voice of the 
people from otherwise being “drowned out by the voice of special interest groups.” United 
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954). 
 352.  See supra note 1. 
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an interest in regulating motive itself? Rulemakers obviously had 
some purpose behind Rule 11(b)(1), but whether this aim extended 
beyond deterrence of frivolous claims is open to question. In fact, as 
discussed in Part I.C, we are not sure that the rulemakers meant to 
apply Rule 11(b)(1) to meritorious complaints, let alone what their 
purpose might have been in such an application. The rulemakers’ si-
lence on this question, combined with the refusal of many courts to 
apply the improper purpose clause to meritorious claims, certainly 
undermines any argument that the rule serves a compelling inter-
est.353 
However, the literal language of the rule would apply the im-
proper purpose standard to non-frivolous claims, and there is some 
suggestion in the advisory committee notes that the clause was 
meant to prevent “other” types of abuse. The committee’s citation 
to the DASA case suggests that the clause was intended to stop liti-
gants from using the federal courts for their own collateral economic 
purpose.354 Similar forms of abusive collateral purposes would in-
clude use of the litigation process as a weapon or, as in the Jones case, 
to achieve publicity and political gain. The government has a reason-
able interest in avoiding the use of its courts for such personal gain 
or other ill purposes. By prohibiting such uses, the government 
maintains the integrity of its courts and protects citizens from this 
type of harm. But a reasonable aim is not enough to survive strict 
scrutiny analysis, and this justification for Rule 11(b)(1) fails on a va-
riety of levels. 
First, the interest in avoiding these collateral aims does not seem 
compelling. The filing of a winning claim with the intent to use the 
litigation for a collateral purpose does not on balance create the same 
degree of harm that frivolous claims do. Such plaintiffs may selfishly 
consume scarce judicial resources for private uses, but they still con-
vey the societal benefits of a winning claim: advancement in the law 
and cure of wrongdoing by the defendant. The defendant will suffer 
but mostly to the same degree that he would if the plaintiff did not 
have this ulterior motive. The plaintiff is presenting a winning claim, 
and the Petition Clause reflects the judgment, made two hundred 
 
 353.  See supra notes 99–104 (discussing Ninth Circuit’s decision in Townsend and that of 
other circuits adopting the restrictive view of Rule 11(b)(1)). 
 354.  See supra notes 46–56, 110–15 (discussing 1983 advisory committee citation to 
DASA). 
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years ago, that the benefits of these claims outweigh the burdens. 
The defendant may incur some unique emotional distress if he 
knows the plaintiff’s ill feelings, but the government’s interest in 
avoiding this marginal additional emotional harm is not compelling. 
Moreover, even if the government had a compelling interest in 
avoiding some collateral aims, Rule 11(b)(1) sweeps too broadly and 
comes perilously close to regulating the political or other views of 
plaintiffs. The government obviously does not have a compelling in-
terest in regulating the political views of its citizens; for freedom of 
political thought is the heart and soul of the First Amendment.355 
Yet, the improper purpose clause could have this effect. Take, for ex-
ample, the Button case.356 The majority of society today may cheer 
the NAACP’s political aims behind its desegregation suits, but a sig-
nificant segment of Virginia society in the early 1960s had the oppo-
site reaction. Had the current version of Rule 11 been applicable at 
the time, it is not an impossible stretch of the imagination to envi-
sion a Virginia court in 1963 making the assessment that the 
NAACP’s purpose was “improper.” 
The Jones case provides a modern example of political mood 
swings. One observer has provocatively argued that popular politics 
caused many to condemn Ms. Jones’s motives but applaud those of 
Anita Hill, who made similar charges against the conservative nomi-
nee for the Supreme Court, Clarence Thomas.357 Again, it is not dif-
ficult to imagine the risk of applying such political preferences 
through Rule 11(b)(1), under which a court would find Ms. Jones’s 
political motives “improper” and those of Ms. Hill (if she filed suit) 
proper. This aspect of Rule 11(b)(1) thus fails strict scrutiny. The 
government does not have a compelling interest in regulating the 
political views of persons who use its courts to file winning claims, 
and the rule is impermissibly vague and overbroad in that it arguably 
reaches the political views of plaintiffs. 
The final potential justification of Rule 11(b)(1) is the negative 
effect of improper purposes on the legal profession. The Court in 
some cases has recognized such interests as justifying a limited intru-
 
 355.  Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (noting that political speech is at the 
“zenith” of First Amendment protection). See also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 
U.S. 377, 410-11 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that it is “unassailable” that 
“[p]olitical speech is the primary object of First Amendment protection”). 
 356.  See supra notes 224–25, 335 (discussing Button). 
 357.  See supra note 9 (noting the article by Stuart Taylor, Jr.). 
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sion upon First Amendment rights.358 Here, the argument would be 
that the legal profession is harmed by any use of lawyers to achieve ill 
aims, whether that of the lawyer or of the client. Again, this justifica-
tion fails. First, the reputational concern arising from a client’s mo-
tives is too remote to justify an intrusion on the client’s right of 
court access.359 A lawyer who personally has pure motives will not do 
much, if any, harm to the legal profession when he files a winning 
claim, even if his client has ill motives. In short, this governmental 
interest is not compelling. 
On the other hand, the government might have a compelling in-
terest in regulating the personal motives of the plaintiff’s attorney, as 
opposed to those of the client. When a lawyer acts out of his own ill 
motives, he directly injures the reputation of the legal profession. 
The government has an interest in avoiding not only this reputa-
tional harm, but it also has the more important interest of preventing 
harm to the plaintiff herself. Personal ill motives of the lawyers likely 
constitute a conflict of interest under which the lawyer will pursue 
his own aims to the detriment of his client.360 Moreover, a ban on 
the lawyer’s bad motives would have less impact on the plaintiff, who 
presumably could hire another lawyer without these personal mo-
tives. The problem with Rule 11(b)(1), however, is that it is not nar-
rowly tailored to address only the motives of the lawyers. Although a 
modified rule that addressed only the purposes of the lawyer might 
pass strict scrutiny, the current rule does not. Its vague wording ar-
guably reaches both the motives of the plaintiff and of her lawyers. 
 
 358.  The Court recently relied in part upon such “reputational” interests to uphold a 
moderate limitation on lawyer speech. In Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 
(1995), the Court upheld a 30-day waiting period on lawyer solicitation of accident victims 
and surviving family members. The Court noted that the state presented substantial evidence 
of “the outrage and irritation with the state-licensed legal profession,” id. at 631, and con-
cluded that the state “has a substantial interest both in protecting injured Floridians from inva-
sive conduct by lawyers and in preventing the erosion of confidence in the profession that such 
repeated invasions have engendered.” Id. at 635. The dissenting Justices charged that the ma-
jority’s reliance on the “reputation and dignity of the bar” was antithetical to the principles of 
the First Amendment. Id. at 639–40 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 359.  The Court’s decisions in the group litigation cases of the 1960s suggest this re-
moteness test when assessing the impact of a regulation of lawyers against various First 
Amendment values in litigation. For example, the Court in United Mine Workers v. Illinois 
State Bar Ass’n held that concerns about lawyer professionalism were “too speculative” to jus-
tify their significant intrusion into the union members’ First Amendment rights to organize 
litigation. See 389 U.S. 217, 223, 225 (1967); see supra notes 232–33. 
 360.  See supra note 200 (discussing the professional rules barring conflicts of interests). 
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This justification for Rule 11(b)(1) thus fails the second prong of 
strict scrutiny as well as the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. 
For these reasons, Rule 11(b)(1) does not pass strict scrutiny in 
that it bars the filing of winning claims for improper purposes. The 
rule is facially invalid. Ms. Jones could have made this argument in 
response to any Rule 11(b)(1) motion by the President, whether at 
the beginning of the suit or after its completion. Judge Wright could 
not have applied Rule 11(b)(1) to sanction Ms. Jones. This would be 
all that Ms. Jones would have needed to defeat a Rule 11 motion. 
However, in the next two sections, I outline two additional argu-
ments that she could have made against application of Rule 11(b)(1) 
to her case, depending on the timing of, and the relief requested, in 
the President’s motion. 
3.  Breathing room analysis of early dismissal of Ms. Jones’s claims 
under Rule 11(b)(1) 
Ms. Jones would have an additional First Amendment argument 
against Rule 11 if President Clinton filed his Rule 11 motion early in 
the case, to dismiss the suit before Judge Wright ever reached the 
merits of the claims on summary judgment or otherwise. At this 
stage, neither the court nor the parties would know whether Ms. 
Jones had stated winning claims. This argument may seem settled al-
ready, either by my analysis of the certification element of Rule 11 in 
foregoing section, or, by Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, which held that 
the NLRB could not enjoin ongoing suits. Yet, neither definitively 
answers the question here. 
The difference between this motion and the pre-filing certifica-
tion use of Rule 11, discussed above, lies in the fact that the rule’s 
application under this motion would not be to the core right of fil-
ing the claim but instead to the related activity of processing the 
claim. Judge Wright would have been applying Rule 11 to stop Ms. 
Jones’s further pursuit of her claims, not the original filing of her 
claim. Indeed, to isolate the issue, assume that Judge Wright on this 
motion would rely solely on the portion of Rule 11(b) that applies to 
the “later advocating” of a claim, as opposed to its initial filing.361 
Because this application of the rule would not directly regulate the 
core right of filing claims, it is not judged under strict scrutiny but 
 
 361.  See supra note 40. 
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instead breathing room analysis. Bill Johnson’s Restaurants addressed 
the processing of the claim, but it does not answer the question here 
because the Court was concerned with the NLRA, not Rule 11. 
Breathing room analysis necessarily differs depending on the relative 
interests at stake. Thus, we must conduct independent breathing 
room analysis of the potential use of Rule 11(b)(1) to dismiss Ms. 
Jones’s ongoing suit. 
Breathing room analysis looks first at the chilling effect of the 
rule on the core right. Under the assumed use of Rule 11 in this sce-
nario, Judge Wright would dismiss the complaint based solely on 
Ms. Jones’s motive without looking at the merit of her claims. It 
would not matter if Ms. Jones’s suit stated winning claims. If a plain-
tiff such as Ms. Jones, who had ulterior motives, understood this 
risk, she might choose not to file suit even if she had winning claims. 
To be sure, the assumed restriction of the rule to later advocacy 
would have permitted her to file, but she would have at most only a 
few weeks or months in court, with no development of the merits 
and facts of the case. In most cases, the benefits of this short-lived 
suit would not be worth the time and money necessary to prepare 
and file the complaint. Some plaintiffs might go ahead and file to 
achieve at least some of their ulterior motives, such as publicity, but 
others would forego filing any claim, even winning claims, under this 
scenario. This use of Rule 11 therefore would have a chilling effect 
on the exercise of the core right to file winning claims. 
The next question is whether this chilling effect is justified by the 
dangers that Rule 11(b)(1) aims to avoid in this context. The gov-
ernmental interests behind a ban on improperly motivated advocacy 
seemingly are the same as those for the initial filing of the claim: de-
terring advocacy of frivolous claims, preserving the integrity of the 
judicial system, preventing emotional or other harm to defendants, 
and maintaining the reputation of the legal profession. As concluded 
in the preceding section, these interests do not justify a direct ban on 
the core right, but the analysis here is under the breathing room 
doctrine, as opposed to strict scrutiny, and the interests need not be 
compelling or narrowly connected to the regulation at issue. Instead, 
the interests need only be sufficient to justify the chilling effect on 
the exercise of the core First Amendment right and its resultant im-
pact on First Amendment values. As noted previously, the effect on 
the core right is less in this scenario because the plaintiff can at least 
gain initial access to court and achieve some of her aims (and those 
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of the Petition Clause) through the mere filing of her complaint. 
The question is whether the chilling effect is sufficiently minor when 
balanced against the governmental interests in stopping abusive liti-
gation tactics. 
The relative balance of interests might be best seen by comparing 
the motive ban on later advocacy to yet another form of motive ban, 
one against filing a particular motion or a discovery paper for an im-
proper purpose.362 A ban on later advocacy would stop processing of 
the claim altogether. Dismissal of the entire suit obviously will have a 
far greater impact than a ban on a single motion or discovery paper. 
The mere threat that a particular motion might not be available 
would not prompt a rational plaintiff to forego an otherwise winning 
claim, but the threat of dismissal of the suit itself likely would. 
Furthermore, the First Amendment interest in continued general 
advocacy of a claim is greater than that in preserving every available 
motion or discovery tactic. A meritorious claim serves important in-
terests throughout its life in the court system. It continues to inform 
the government of societal problems, advance the state of the law, 
and provide a peaceful outlet for resolution of disputes. These aims 
are no longer served if the court dismisses the claim altogether. By 
contrast, only a rare motion or discovery paper is essential to the 
claim. Modern systems of procedure provide almost endless possibili-
ties for motions, hearing, and discovery. The claim may be advocated 
and resolved—and the First Amendment interests served—in any 
number of ways. 
Moreover, individual motions and other litigation papers can 
undermine First Amendment interests. A motion or discovery paper 
may have factual and legal merit but detract from resolution of the 
dispute. A plaintiff, for example, might file technically legitimate dis-
covery requests (asking for relevant material that might lead to ad-
missible evidence),363 not for the purpose of advancing her case, but 
instead to harass the defendant or embarrass a third party. This type 
of discovery can consume the time and energy of the court and liti-
gants, even to the detriment of the claim. 
 
 362.  The improper purpose standard of Rule 11(b) applies to most written motions, but 
Rule 11(d), added to the rule in 1993, provides that the rule does not apply to discovery pa-
pers and motions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(d). However, Rule 26(g) imposes a virtually identical 
purpose restriction on discovery papers. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(2)(B). 
 363.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (setting forth the general standards and scope of civil discov-
ery in federal court). 
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One need only think of the seemingly single-minded determina-
tion of Ms. Jones and her lawyers to uncover damaging and embar-
rassing evidence of President Clinton’s sexual dalliances, including 
the Lewinsky affair. This discovery, although marginally relevant, was 
not essential to her claims. Yet, Ms. Jones and her lawyers used con-
siderable resources on these issues, resources that might have been 
better spent on more central issues. Indeed, given that Judge Wright 
granted summary judgment against Ms. Jones based on lack of evi-
dence of a legally cognizable injury,364 Ms. Jones and her lawyers 
could have better used their discovery developing this aspect of the 
claim. Thus, a motive ban on a particular litigation step not only 
serves the government’s various interests in avoiding collateral uses 
of its courts, but in some applications, such a ban might also pro-
mote the First Amendment interest in general advocacy and resolu-
tion of the claim. 
In sum, the balance of interests might allow a motive ban on par-
ticular stages of the process, because such a prohibition would have 
only a minor chilling effect and serve both governmental and First 
Amendment interests. By contrast, a motive limitation on all advo-
cacy of the claim would exact too great a cost. It would not give 
enough breathing room to the right to file winning claims. The First 
Amendment thus would have barred Judge Wright from relying 
upon Rule 11(b)(1) to dismiss Ms. Jones’s complaint, based solely 
on her motive. 
4. Breathing room analysis of post-judgment monetary sanctions 
under Rule 11(b)(1) 
Ms. Jones would have had a different breathing room argument 
if the President relied upon Rule 11(b)(1) to seek monetary sanc-
tions after Ms. Jones lost at summary judgment. Unlike the motion 
to dismiss in the prior section, the President would base this sanc-
tions motion on the wrongful act of filing, as opposed to its process-
ing. In other words, his motion would assert that Ms. Jones violated 
Rule 11(b)(1) in May 1994 when she initially filed her complaint for 
improper purposes. Moreover, the motion here would seek only 
monetary damages and not impede development of the claim. Judge 
Wright would have been able to assess damages for Ms. Jones’s ini-
 
 364.  See supra note 10. 
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tial violation of Rule 11 only after Ms. Jones lost at summary judg-
ment. 
Analysis of this use of Rule 11(b)(1) must assume that the rule 
were re-written to apply only to losing claims, because as the rule 
now stands, Ms. Jones could attack it as facially invalid under the 
overbreadth doctrine. Assuming such a revised Rule 11(b)(1), the 
analysis is under the breathing room doctrine. Would post-judgment 
sanctions against a losing claim unduly chill the initial filing of win-
ning claims? Again, Bill Johnson’s Restaurants seems to answer this 
question by allowing damages against a losing but meritorious suit, 
but the Court there applied Petition Clause analysis to the NLRA, 
not Rule 11. The difference in governmental interests as well as the 
difference in effect on the core right mandate another result here. 
Again, the first step in breathing space analysis is to assess the 
chilling effect of the post-judgment sanctions. Would their assess-
ment against losing claims, long after plaintiff originally filed for an 
improper purpose, impact the filing of winning claims? The answer is 
yes. The problem is that a potential plaintiff who has an improper 
motive at the time of filing will have no way of absolutely avoiding 
the Rule 11(b)(1) sanctions other than foregoing her claim alto-
gether. If her claim has sufficient merit to meet the factual and legal 
standards of Rule 11(b), a potential federal litigant cannot know 
whether her suit will prevail. Too many uncertainties surround this 
outcome. She would have to guess as to matters such as the course 
of discovery, the availability of witnesses, and the court’s interpreta-
tion of the law. The risk of sanctions if she guesses wrong will be too 
much for some potential plaintiffs to bear, even those who in fact 
have winning claims. Therefore, even if Rule 11(b)(1) were applied 
solely to plaintiffs who had both improper motive and lost their 
claims on the merits, its potential for sanctions would have a chilling 
effect on the core right to file winning claims. 
Contrast the effect of post-judgment sanctions assessed against a 
plaintiff who files a frivolous claim for an improper purpose. At the 
time plaintiff files suit, she likely can ascertain whether a claim meets 
the legal and factual merit standards of Rule 11(b)(2) and (b)(3).365 
These standards set minimum requirements of reasonableness, at the 
time of filing, and do not require the plaintiff to guess as to the fu-
ture. To be sure, any risk of sanctions, even one tied to objective rea-
 
 365. See supra note 1. 
1AND-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  9:30 PM 
1] Jones v. Clinton: A Study in Politically Motivated Suits 
 95 
sonableness, might deter some plaintiffs from filing a winning suit, 
but not nearly to the degree that a winning claim standard would do 
so. The chilling effect of a sanction against improperly motivated 
frivolous claims would be far less than one applied to losing but 
meritorious claims. 
Perhaps the best means of assessing the chilling effect of the Rule 
11 motive restriction on losing claims is to compare it to that which 
the Court seemingly tolerated in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants. The 
Court there allowed damages under the NLRA based on retaliatory 
motive so long as the suit progressed to completion and the plaintiff 
lost. Unquestionably, this risk has a chilling effect on plaintiff-
employers who are contemplating suit against their employees. The 
Court allowed this chilling effect. The difference in this effect and 
that under Rule 11 comes from the definition of the improper mo-
tive. Under the NLRA, the plaintiff-employer still must guess as to 
whether she will prevail, but she also knows that she will not be sub-
ject to damages unless she also possesses a retaliatory intent in viola-
tion of the NLRA. This she can easily ascertain. The NLRA narrowly 
defines the prohibited motive and therefore has only an isolated im-
pact on the filing of winning claims (only those claims that are filed 
for the specified retaliatory motive). 
By contrast, Rule 11 broadly bans “any improper purpose,” and 
thus, in terms of sheer numbers, Rule 11(b)(1) deters far more 
claims than the NLRA. More significantly, the vague prohibition in 
Rule 11(b)(1) compounds the uncertainty facing the plaintiff. Even 
if a plaintiff is conscious of her motives (e.g., she wants to get public-
ity or pursue a political vendetta), she has no way of knowing 
whether this purpose is improper within the meaning of Rule 11. Af-
ter all, the courts cannot agree on a single definition and have con-
flicting opinions as to whether publicity and political motives are 
proper aims.366 Thus, under Rule 11, a potential plaintiff must guess  
not only as to whether her claim will prevail but also as to whether 
her particular motive is “improper.” 
The government interests behind the two forms of motive re-
strictions also differ. One of the government’s primary aims in a sub-
stantive statute such as the NLRA is to stop acts that are defined by 
 
 366.  See supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text (discussing the courts’ attempts to 
define improper purpose in the context of publicity and other ulterior aims). 
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the retaliatory motive.367 The motive element is essential to achieving 
a goal of the NLRA, to guarantee free exercise of labor rights with-
out retaliation. By contrast, the motive element is not essential to the 
central purpose of Rule 11, which is intended to deter baseless suits. 
To be sure, the government also may have some interest in stopping 
general ill motives—to protect the integrity of the process and attor-
ney professionalism interests discussed above368—but these interests 
are secondary to the deterrence of frivolous claims. Indeed, there is 
some question, as illustrated by the Ninth Circuit’s “restrictive view” 
of the improper purpose clause, as to whether such an interest exists. 
This ambiguity is in marked contrast to the central role of retaliatory 
motive in implementing the NLRA. 
The difference in the effect and purpose of the two restrictions 
may be subtle, but a subtle difference can change the result in a bal-
ancing test. The differences here are enough to tip the scales. Rule 
11 does not give enough breathing room to the plaintiff’s ability to 
file winning claims and therefore runs afoul of the Petition Clause. 
Thus, even when viewed in isolation as applied only to losing claims, 
Rule 11(b)(1) fails First Amendment scrutiny and would have barred 
imposition of sanctions against Ms. Jones, even after she lost on 
summary judgment. 
III. THE CONCLUDING QUESTION: ASSESSING THE CONTINUED 
USE OF MOTIVE IN RULE 11 AND THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL 
SUITS 
The analysis in Part II demonstrates that at least some aspects of 
Rule 11 are fatally flawed and that the courts must tolerate some po-
litically motivated lawsuits. The next question is how far we can take 
these conclusions. Can federal rulemakers, through Rule 11, ever 
impose any form of motive restriction or penalty? Are parties free to 
use the federal courts to pursue political vendettas? The short answer 
is that while the First Amendment may permit some penalties tied to 
motive, it does not allow any penalties based on the political pur-
poses of the plaintiff. 
We now know Rule 11(b)(1) is facially invalid to the extent it 
requires plaintiffs to pre-certify that they have proper motive in filing 
suit. The chief problem with the motive certification requirement is 
 
 367.  See supra note 243 (reprinting excerpts from the NLRA). 
 368.  See supra notes 353–59 and accompanying text. 
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that it applies to all claims and thus regulates the core right under 
the Petition Clause to file winning claims. The government does not 
have an interest compelling enough to justify this ban on winning 
claims. 
We also know this problem cannot be corrected through revision 
of the rule so that the purpose certification, and sanctions for its vio-
lation apply only to losing claims. The complication here is that the 
plaintiff, at the time she files suit, cannot isolate the winning claims 
from the losing but meritorious claims. She would have to guess as 
to the outcome of many contingencies in order to have any inkling 
as to whether her claim would prevail. She would be put in the di-
lemma of either foregoing her right to file winning claims or suffer-
ing punishment if she guesses wrong. This does not give enough 
breathing space to the right of court access. 
The rule might be able to impose a motive certification as to 
frivolous claims, those that do not meet the legal and factual merit 
standards of Rule 11(b)(2) and (b)(3). This check would have little 
chilling effect on the filing of winning claims because a plaintiff 
could determine at the time she files suit whether her claim meets 
the minimum merit requirements. But this revision would not serve 
the general policy goals of Rule 11. It would have one of two ill ef-
fects, depending upon the wording of the rule revision. The rule 
would be meaningless if it required plaintiff to certify merit as to 
only those claims that the rule already forbids, namely frivolous 
claims. If, on the other hand, the rule outlawed only those claims 
that lack merit and have an improper purpose, the revision would 
undermine the rule’s aim of deterring frivolous claims. Such a revi-
sion would allow frivolous claims brought for proper purposes and 
thus would substantially narrow the current rule, which bars all 
frivolous lawsuits. 
Rule 11 might be amended to use motive to limit the plaintiff’s 
litigation steps after filing suit. The validity of such a limitation 
would depend on its effect. The First Amendment would not permit 
a broad ban on “advocacy” for an improper purpose. It might allow 
a motive ban on individual motions or other litigation papers, but 
even this ban may sweep too broadly. If a plaintiff had an ill motive 
in bringing her winning claim, she presumably would have ill pur-
poses behind each step she takes to win that lawsuit. In such a case, a 
motive ban applicable to “motions” would invite the defendant to 
question, and the court to prohibit, each motion she files. This ban 
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would have too great of a chilling effect on the right to file the win-
ning claim. This is not to say that a motive ban on motions could 
never survive First Amendment scrutiny, only that such a rule must 
be carefully approached, both in its drafting and in its application. 
The Petition Clause would allow Rule 11 to continue to limit 
the motive of the defendant. Because the right to petition applies 
only to claims for relief, the lone application of the Petition Clause 
to the defendant would be to his counterclaims.369 Even as to coun-
terclaims, federal rulemakers likely could impose a number of con-
straints so long as they limit only the manner of its presentation and 
not bar the claim altogether. Even a motive restriction on counter-
claims might serve the purpose of streamlining the main case and 
safeguarding the plaintiff’s interest in processing her claims. So long 
as such a prohibition did not bar the defendant’s right to ever pre-
sent the claim and only would bar its presentation in this particular 
suit, the restriction likely would survive strict scrutiny. 
Rule 11 also might appropriately regulate the motives of the 
plaintiff’s lawyer.370 The government has a much stronger interest in 
limiting the motives of the lawyer because such personal interests risk 
harm not only to society, the defendant, and the legal profession, 
but also to the plaintiff herself. The primary concern here is the con-
flict of interest presented by the attorney’s own motivations. This is-
sue might be better addressed by state rules of professional conduct, 
which already prohibit such conflicts,371 but the federal court could 
separately control the motives of lawyers appearing before it through 
a modification of Rule 11.372 
Finally, Rule 11 might use motive solely as an aggravating factor 
or penalty enhancement in assessing sanctions (against the plaintiff or 
 
 369.  Due process, however, would mandate that the defendant be given a reasonable 
and fair opportunity to defend his claim. See supra notes 309–11, 317 and accompanying text 
(discussing due process standards). 
 370.  I further analyze the validity of restrictions on the motives of lawyers in Rules of 
Professional Conduct, supra note 13. 
 371.  See supra note 200 (noting the model rule on conflict of interest). 
 372.  Federal courts to some extent already enforce state conflicts rules through motions 
to disqualify counsel. These motions usually are raised by an aggrieved party, who is adverse to 
the party that his former (or current) counsel now represents in the litigation. By contrast, in 
this hypothesized revision of Rule 11 to outlaw the motives of the plaintiff’s lawyer, the ag-
grieved party, from a conflicts perspective, would be the plaintiff, but the defendant would 
more likely have the incentive to raise the issue in a motion to disqualify under the new Rule 
11. 
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her lawyers) for other violations of the rule. This penalty enhance-
ment seems to be the most logical use of motive in Rule 11. It 
would apply only after the claim, motion, or other paper reached its 
natural completion, and then only to frivolous papers. However, 
even a penalty enhancement use of motive would face some uncer-
tainty under First Amendment analysis, due to the fact that some re-
strictions on motive come close to regulating ideas or beliefs. To be 
sure, many penalties in law turn on the state of mind of the actor—
indeed, intent is a critical limiting feature in most criminal statutes—
but special problems arise when laws use the amorphous concept of 
motive to limit activity close to that protected under the First 
Amendment. The Court’s hate crime and hate speech cases illustrate 
this difficulty. 
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell,373 the Court allowed the state to use ra-
cial motivation as a penalty enhancement for conduct that the state 
otherwise could regulate and outlaw, such as battery. However, in 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,374 the Court held a city could not prohibit 
messages based on “bias-motivated hatred” and “virulent notions of 
racial supremacy.”375 The ordinance targeted language that the 
Court traditionally has not protected—fighting words—but singled 
out for prohibition only those fighting words that insulted or pro-
voked violence on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender. 
The Court held the ordinance was invalid because its particular ef-
fect, as opposed to that of a broad prohibition on fighting words, 
“was to invoke the viewpoint of the city.”376 The city’s interest in 
 
 373.  508 U.S. 476 (1993). 
 374.  505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 375. The Minnesota Supreme Court described as “a prohibition of fighting words that 
contain . . . messages of ‘bias-motivated’ hatred and in particular . . . messages ‘based on viru-
lent notions of racial supremacy.’” Id. at 392. The actual ordinance did not speak directly to 
the speaker’s motive: 
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, charac-
terization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, 
which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or re-
sentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits 
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Id. at 380. 
 376.  “[T]he only interest distinctively served by the content limitation is that of display-
ing the city council’s special hostility towards the particular biases thus singled out. That is pre-
cisely what the First Amendment forbids.” Id. at 396. The concurring Justices agreed with the 
outcome, but disagreed with the majority’s approach to regulation of speech that the Court 
traditionally held outside of First Amendment protection. See supra note 318. 
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preventing racial or other discrimination may be compelling, but its 
interest in imposing the city’s viewpoint on race is not.377 
As an abstract matter, use of motive as a penalty enhancement 
against frivolous claims in a revised Rule 11 seems to fall closer to 
the penalty enhancement permitted under Mitchell than to that 
barred under R.A.V.378 A motive penalty, at least in the abstract, is 
less intrusive on First Amendment values than a viewpoint regula-
tion. A viewpoint regulation limits the content of what is communi-
cated. An example in the context of courts would be a rule that the 
plaintiff could not file a suit that itself reflected or incited racial ha-
tred, regardless of what the plaintiff intended or felt toward the de-
fendant. This rule would look to the content of the plaintiff’s suit.379 
By contrast, a motive penalty would punish the particular state of 
mind of the plaintiff in filing her claim and not necessarily the con-
tent of her claim. To again use the race example in the context of 
courts, a motive restriction would punish the bringing of any suit, no 
matter its type, for reasons of racial discrimination (e.g., a landlord  
who chooses to sue a defaulting black tenant, as opposed to a de-
faulting white tenant, based on his race).380 
 
 377.  The Court held that the government’s asserted interest in enacting the ordinance 
was compelling—”to ensure the basic human rights of members of groups that have histori-
cally been subjected to discrimination, including the right of such group members to live in 
peace where they wish.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395. The ordinance seemingly achieved that end, 
but, the Court held, because the city council could have achieved the end through other more 
benign means—such as through a prohibition on all fighting words—it failed strict scrutiny. 
See id. at 395–96. 
 378.  I further discuss motive restrictions on court access in relation to Mitchell and 
R.A.V. in Motive Restrictions, supra note 13, at Part III.C.3.b. 
 379.  That the government might impose a viewpoint preference on civil suits is not mere 
academic conjecture. Although the government typically does not impose direct bans on disfa-
vored viewpoints, it has on occasion attempted to influence the content of suits through other 
means. See e.g., In re Workers’ Compensation Reform, 46 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that Minnesota statute that deferred challenges to the workers’ compensation statute through 
shifting all costs to plaintiffs, win or lose, violated the Petition Clause right of court access). 
The Supreme Court in April 2000 granted certiorari to determine whether Congress impermis-
sibly imposed a preferred viewpoint in prohibiting lawyers who receive federal Legal Service 
Corporation funds from challenging welfare laws. Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 164 F.3d 
757 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. granted, United States v. Velazquez, 529 U.S. 1052 (2000). The 
validity of these restrictions is beyond the scope of this article. 
 380.  The literal terms of the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., argua-
bly would outlaw such an action even if the landlord’s suit had merit. See Godschalk, supra 
note 253 (assessing the limits of the Act under the Petition Clause); David Franklin, Com-
ment, Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties? The Legality of State Court Lawsuits Under the Fair Hous-
ing Act, 63 U. CHIC. L. REV. 1607 (1996) (advocating application of the Act to lawsuits in-
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A carefully defined motive regulation also would differ from a 
regulation of belief. To say that a person was motivated to act in a 
particular instance out of racial hatred is different than saying that he 
is a racial bigot. A belief restriction in the context of the courts 
would bar all court access to bigots regardless of the nature or con-
tent of their suits. It would regulate his general belief system. The 
government has no legitimate interest in regulating our beliefs, but it 
has some interest in penalizing the specific motive with which one 
actually acts because the motive creates a higher risk of that type of 
harm and causes more concrete damage to a particular person.381 
Thus, the Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell distinguished a situation 
where a state might (impermissibly) punish a defendant for his “ab-
stract beliefs”382 from the Wisconsin penalty enhancement statute 
which (permissibly) addressed the specific harms caused by racially-
inspired conduct.383 
However, this does not mean that motive penalties are free of 
First Amendment concern. In some applications, they come too 
close to infringing on First Amendment rights, even when used 
merely as a penalty enhancement for otherwise sanctionable conduct. 
A key to distinguishing Mitchell and R.A.V. is the degree to which 
the regulation intrudes into First Amendment values.384 Under this 
 
tentionally targeted against groups protected under the Act). See generally Motive Restrictions, 
supra note 13, at Part III (assessing under the Petition Clause the validity of various civil rights 
laws as applied to the act of filing civil suit). 
 381.  See Tribe, supra note 285. See generally Frederick M. Lawrence, The Punishment of 
Hate: Toward a Normative Theory of Bias-Motivated Crimes, 93 MICH. L. REV. 320 (1994) 
(outlining the ill effects of bias motivated crimes, including their added propensity to be vio-
lent crimes, their emotional impact on the victim and their adverse effects on the targeted 
group as well as society as a whole). 
 382.  The Court stated that where evidence admitted by a sentencing judge “‘proved 
nothing more than [the defendant’s] abstract beliefs,’ . . . its admission violated the defen-
dant’s First Amendment rights.” Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 486 (1993). 
“[A]bstract beliefs, however obnoxious to most people, may not be taken into consideration.” 
Id. at 485 (citations omitted). 
 383.  The Court stated: 
[T]he Wisconsin statute singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct because 
this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm. For exam-
ple, . . . bias-motivated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict 
distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest. The State’s 
desire to redress these perceived harms provides an adequate explanation for its pen-
alty-enhancement provision over and above mere disagreement with offenders’ be-
liefs or biases. 
Id. at 487–88 (citations omitted). 
 384.  See id. at 488 (applying the overbreadth doctrine and noting that the predicted ef-
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test, the government may impose some forms of motive penalty en-
hancements against frivolous claims. Frivolous lawsuits are outside 
the core right, they serve little, if any, societal values, and they are 
particularly offensive if filed for certain motives. However, the mo-
tive restriction must be carefully drawn. The government might 
properly enhance the penalty for filing a frivolous lawsuit for any 
number of itemized purposes, such as racial discrimination (as in 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell) or the cost and delay examples currently listed 
in Rule 11(b)(1). The catch-all “improper purpose” language, how-
ever, of the current rule may not withstand scrutiny, even if used 
solely as a penalty enhancement. 
The first problem with the language is its vagueness. Vague stat-
utes present due process problems even when they do not attach to 
First Amendment activity.385 As illustrated by the current struggle of 
courts to define what is proper and improper under Rule 11(b)(1), 
the “improper purpose” language does not put persons on notice as 
to what motives would be subject to such a penalty.386 Thus, al-
though the provision would only penalize activity outside the core 
right of the First Amendment—the filing of frivolous suits—this 
raises due process concerns. 
More importantly, the broad language could attach to punish 
some motives that are themselves at the heart of the First Amend-
ment, such as political aims. Freedom in political belief, expression 
and debate is at the very heart of the First Amendment.387 Indeed, 
the degree of protection afforded in the New York Times defamation 
cases turns on the extent to which the speech touches upon public or 
political issues.388 The greater extent to which the speech touches on 
political issues, the greater the protection under the First Amend-
ment. 
 
fect on speech was “attenuated” and “unlikely”). The degree of intrusion appears to be the test 
that the Court had used when judging civil rights laws against challenges that they infringe 
upon the First Amendment right of association. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609 (1984). 
 385.  See supra note 331. 
 386.  See supra Part I.B. 
 387.  See supra note 355 and accompanying text. 
 388.  See supra notes 319–28 (discussing New York Times breathing room standards). The 
Court in New York Times said that the purpose of the freedom of expression was “to assure 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people.” New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v. 
U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
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To be sure, a political motive is different than political content, 
but political motive can provoke political debate even in the context 
of seemingly non-political suits. The Jones case itself shows that po-
litical motive can create debate about content. The very fact that the 
suit, against a sitting President, seemed so obviously motivated by 
politics itself spurred a national debate on the meaning of sexual har-
assment and the persons who should be held accountable.389 It espe-
cially caused debate and dissension within women’s groups, such as 
the National Organization of Women, that had supported President 
Clinton’s policies on women’s issues.390 Similar debates conceivably 
could arise from any form of lawsuit against a public official, since all 
such suits would seek to hold the official accountable for his or her 
actions and would draw attention to the law governing the case. 
The suit need not be against governmental officials to be politi-
cally inspired and provocative of political debate. Many plaintiff’s 
lawyers claim they bring product liability suits for the public good 
and to act where Congress or other elected officials have failed to 
act. The recent product suits against tobacco and gun manufacturers 
illustrate the newly political nature of suits. These suits are taking 
over subjects that traditionally were the province of politically elected 
bodies. To say these suits, if they turned out to be frivolous, war-
ranted added penalty because of the plaintiff’s arguably political mo-
tive would cut against the core purpose of the First Amendment to 
foster debate about issues of public concern. 
A penalty assessment based on political motive also runs the risk 
of imposing a preferred political viewpoint. Although the penalty 
provision could be drafted so that it punishes all political motives, 
rather than one particular view, the practical reality, as illustrated by 
 
 389.  The Court in Gertz explained the importance of any speech about a public official: 
[S]ociety’s interest in the officers of government is not strictly limited to the formal 
discharge of official duties . . . . [T]he public’s interest extends to “anything which 
might touch on an official’s fitness for office . . . . Few personal attributes are more 
germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, 
even though these characteristics may also affect the official’s private character.” 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–45 (1974) (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 64, 77 (1964)). 
 390.  The Dulles (or Northern Virginia) chapter of NOW broke away from the national 
organization because it believed that “the national leadership [had] been too easy on President 
Clinton over his alleged sexual improprieties.” Dana Schwartz, All Politics CNN, (Feb. 24, 
1998) <www.cnn.ru/ALLPOLITICS/1998/02/24/now/>.Indeed, the Dulles chapter sepa-
rately filed an amicus brief with the Eighth Circuit, arguing that Judge Wright had improperly 
granted summary judgment against Ms. Jones. See supra note 9. 
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the NAACP, Ms. Jones, and Anita Hill examples, is that such a rule 
runs the risk of penalizing suits based on political popularity.391 A 
court might conclude that the political motive of a plaintiff who 
shares the court’s or the majority’s political viewpoint is properly 
motivated by a desire to correct societal ills but also conclude that a 
plaintiff who has contrary views is simply acting for improper per-
sonal political reasons. 
Finally, a political motive penalty in a case such as Jones runs 
some risk of intruding on the plaintiff’s First Amendment interest in 
free political association. The fact that led most people to conclude 
that Ms. Jones might have a political motive, rather than merely the 
aim of seeking publicity or financial gain, was her association with 
politically conservative groups. Ms. Jones (as well as her backers) had 
a First Amendment right to form these political associations. The 
Court in Mitchell allowed the court to consider evidence of the de-
fendant’s associations when deciding whether he possessed the requi-
site racial motivation.392 However, interpreting an association as an 
expression of political views raises special concerns because such as-
sociation is closer to the core of the First Amendment than one 
formed to share and promote notions of racial hatred. At a mini-
mum, this near encroachment upon associational freedoms further 
underscores the dangers and sensitive nature of any use of political 
motive as a penalty. 
So what does all of this mean for politically motivated lawsuits in 
general and the Jones case in particular? The short answer is that we 
must tolerate the suits, so long as they have the requisite factual and 
legal merit. A court should not consider the political motivation of 
the plaintiff in applying Rule 11.393 To the extent the suit is frivolous 
and also accompanied by an itemized ill motive, such as those already 
listed in Rule 11(b)(1), the First Amendment would allow the court 
 
 391.  See supra notes 356–57 and accompanying text. 
 392.  The Court rejected Mitchell’s argument that prosecution under the statute would 
impermissibly consider evidence of his speech and associations. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487–89; 
see also id. at 489 (stating that “[t]he First Amendment . . . does not prohibit the evidentiary 
use of speech to establish elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent”). 
 393.  This is not to say that inquiry into the political motives of the plaintiff are entirely 
off bounds in a civil lawsuit. Such motives might properly be the subject of discovery or cross-
examination, in determining bias or other issues of credibility. In fact, this is the basis on which 
the President sought, and Judge Wright permitted, some limited discovery into Ms. Jones’s 
fund-raising and financial backing. See Jones v. Clinton, Nov. 25, 1997 order; see also supra 
note 258. 
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to use the plaintiff’s motive as a penalty enhancement. This amend-
ment also would permit the court to consider motive in determining 
whether particular motions or discovery requests are proper. In none 
of these assessments, however, may the court consider that the suit is 
politically motivated.394 
In Jones, assuming an appropriately narrowed version of Rule 11, 
the First Amendment would have allowed very little consideration of 
Ms. Jones’s motives with respect to her initial filing of the suit. At 
most, Judge Wright could have considered Ms. Jones’s non-political 
aims (e.g., her desire for publicity and collateral financial reward), in 
assessing the amount of sanctions, if and only if Judge Wright found 
Ms. Jones’s claims to be frivolous, in violation of Rules 11(b)(2) and 
(b)(3).395 As to Ms. Jones’s subsequent conduct of the lawsuit, Judge 
Wright would have had somewhat more leeway and could have con-
sidered Ms. Jones’s non-political motives in determining whether to 
sanction her individual motions or discovery acts, so long as such 
consideration was not so pervasive that it unduly burdened Ms. 
Jones’s general pursuit of the claim. Judge Wright also could have 
disqualified or otherwise sanctioned Ms. Jones’s attorneys if she 
found their motives in conflict with their duties to Ms. Jones. How-
ever, in none of these assessments could Judge Wright have consid-
ered the political aims of Ms. Jones. 
These limits do not leave much for courts to consider other than 
the merit of the claims. This is how it should be. The principles un-
derlying the First Amendment strive to have us evaluate ideas on 
their merit. We may not appreciate plaintiffs using our courts for 
their own political vendettas, particularly those that are contrary to 
our own views, but this is true with respect to any form of speech 
that we find annoying. As the Court recognized in New York Times, 
 
 394.  This cuts both ways. The fact that the plaintiff had a political motive behind her suit 
will not save her from sanctions, if they are otherwise warranted. In other words, plaintiffs may 
not use courts to pursue political vendettas through frivolous claims. Thus, the Circuit of the 
District of Columbia was correct in the suit against President Reagan and other government 
officials, when it held that the political motivation behind the suit did not save the plaintiffs 
from sanctions for filing a frivolous claims. See supra note 66 (discussing the Saltany case). 
 395.  The First Amendment likely would have permitted Judge Wright to assess a penalty 
enhancement based on such motive, even if only some, but not all, of Ms. Jones’s claims were 
frivolous. However, such penalty enhancement must be narrowly confined to the added bur-
den caused by the pleading of the frivolous claims themselves, which in most cases would be 
minimal when viewed in relation to the suit as a whole. See Access to Court, supra note 13 (dis-
cussing the definition of “losing suits” for purposes of Petition Clause analysis). 
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we have a “profound national commitment to the principle that de-
bate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, 
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes un-
pleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”396 We 
must be patient. First Amendment freedoms do not come without 
cost, and in the context of the Petition Clause right of court access, 
that cost is toleration of politically motivated suits, so long as they 
have factual and legal merit. Because Rule 11 does not embody this 
tolerance, it violates the First Amendment. 
 
 396.  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
